PEOPLE v. CUCCHIARA (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the defendant's request to represent himself at trial.  “ ‘Before allowing a defendant to proceed pro se, the court must determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently’ ” (People v. Bristol, 102 A.D.3d 881, 882, 958 N.Y.S.2d 215, quoting People v. Rafikian, 98 A.D.3d 1139, 1139, 951 N.Y.S.2d 226).  “ ‘To ascertain whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a court must undertake a searching inquiry designed to insur[e] that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” (People v. Stroud, 144 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 40 N.Y.S.3d 910 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255).  “In particular, the record should show that the trial court ‘adequately warn[ed][the] defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and appris[ed][the] defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication’ ” (People v. Rafikian, 98 A.D.3d at 1140, 951 N.Y.S.2d 226, quoting People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154; see People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205).  “The record should also disclose ‘that a trial court has delved into a defendant's age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver’ of the right to counsel” (People v. Rafikian, 98 A.D.3d at 1140, 951 N.Y.S.2d 226, quoting People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d at 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205).

Here, in response to the defendant's request to proceed pro se, the Supreme Court questioned the defendant as to his education, occupation, legal knowledge and experience, and prior exposure to the criminal justice system.  The court adequately informed the defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, drew the defendant's attention to the many challenges that he would face if he proceeded pro se, and apprised him of the benefits and the singular importance of representation by counsel in the adversarial system of adjudication.  In response, the defendant steadfastly maintained his desire to proceed. pro se. Accordingly, the record demonstrated that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 483, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255; People v. Sutton, 161 A.D.3d 783, 76 N.Y.S.3d 570; People v. Wright, 152 A.D.3d 801, 802, 56 N.Y.S.3d 465; People v. Franklin, 146 A.D.3d 1082, 1085, 45 N.Y.S.3d 635; People v. Morrow, 143 A.D.3d 919, 919, 39 N.Y.S.3d 232).

Insofar as the defendant argues that his waiver of the right to counsel resulted in the erroneous admission of certain evidence that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair such that he is entitled to a new trial, this argument is without merit.  A defendant who knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his right to counsel must accept the consequences of that decision (see People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438, 448, 850 N.Y.S.2d 377, 880 N.E.2d 863; People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 210, 216–217, 785 N.Y.S.2d 384, 818 N.E.2d 1125).

BALKIN, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.