SHERMAZANOVA v. AMERIHEALTH MEDICAL (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell over the leg of a person sitting in a chair in the reception area of the defendant's medical practice.  Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced this personal injury action.  The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

While a possessor of real property has a duty to maintain that property in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868), there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition, which as a matter of law is not inherently dangerous (see Lazic v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 776, 776, 20 N.Y.S.3d 643;  Barone v. Risi, 128 A.D.3d 874, 9 N.Y.S.3d 620;  Varon v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 123 A.D.3d 810, 998 N.Y.S.2d 433;  Schiavone v. Bayside Fuel Oil Depot Corp., 94 A.D.3d 970, 942 N.Y.S.2d 585;  Mathew v. A.J. Richard & Sons, 84 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 923 N.Y.S.2d 218;  Katz v. Westchester County Healthcare Corp., 82 A.D.3d 712, 713, 917 N.Y.S.2d 896;  Tyz v. First St. Holding Co., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 818, 819, 910 N.Y.S.2d 179).  The issue of whether a dangerous condition is open and obvious is fact-specific, and usually a question of fact for a jury (see Gordon v. Pitney Bowes Mgt. Servs., Inc., 94 A.D.3d 813, 942 N.Y.S.2d 155;  Cassone v. State of New York, 85 A.D.3d 837, 925 N.Y.S.2d 197).

“Whether a hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances” (Katz v. Westchester County Healthcare Corp., 82 A.D.3d at 713, 917 N.Y.S.2d 896;  see Lazic v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d at 776, 20 N.Y.S.3d 643;  Barone v. Risi, 128 A.D.3d at 874, 9 N.Y.S.3d 620;  Baron v. 305–323 E. Shore Rd. Corp., 121 A.D.3d 826, 994 N.Y.S.2d 651).  “A condition that is ordinarily apparent to a person making reasonable use of his or her senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted” (Katz v. Westchester County Healthcare Corp., 82 A.D.3d at 713, 917 N.Y.S.2d 896;  see Lazic v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 134 A.D.3d at 776, 20 N.Y.S.3d 643;  Maneri v. Patchogue–Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 121 A.D.3d 1056, 996 N.Y.S.2d 64;  Russo v. Home Goods, Inc., 119 A.D.3d 924, 990 N.Y.S.2d 95;  Stoppeli v. Yacenda, 78 A.D.3d 815, 816, 911 N.Y.S.2d 119;  Villano v. Strathmore Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc., 76 A.D.3d 1061, 1062, 908 N.Y.S.2d 124).

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that any hazard due to the placement of chairs in a passageway leading from the reception area of the medical practice to the bathroom was open and obvious, i.e., readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident (see Baron v. 305–323 E. Shore Rd. Corp., 121 A.D.3d at 826, 994 N.Y.S.2d 651;  Zhuo Zheng Chen v. City of New York, 106 A.D.3d 1081, 966 N.Y.S.2d 177;  Hadgraft v. Morin, 94 A.D.3d 701, 941 N.Y.S.2d 513;  Clark v. AMF Bowling Ctrs., Inc., 83 A.D.3d 761, 921 N.Y.S.2d 273;  Bloomfield v. Jericho Union Free School Dist., 80 A.D.3d 637, 915 N.Y.S.2d 294).

Since the defendant failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court should have denied the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642;  Cassone v. State of New York, 85 A.D.3d 837, 925 N.Y.S.2d 197).

LEVENTHAL, J.P., COHEN, HINDS–RADIX and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.