PASCUAL v. RUSTIC WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for permanent injunctive relief, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kim Dollard, J.), dated October 20, 2017.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for a protective order striking certain discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with one bill of costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for a protective order striking certain discovery demands is granted.

The defendant Kathleen Fogarty, as president of the Rustic Woods Condominium I, and the defendant Rustic Woods Homeowners Association, Inc., separately served discovery demands upon the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs moved, inter alia, for a protective order striking those discovery demands, arguing, among other things, that they were palpably improper.  In an order dated October 20, 2017, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the plaintiffs' motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”  However, the principle of “full disclosure” does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (McAlwee v. Westchester Health Assoc., PLLC, 163 A.D.3d 547, 548, 81 N.Y.S.3d 102 [internal quotation marks omitted];  Ramirez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 132 A.D.3d 653, 654, 17 N.Y.S.3d 176;  Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v. Walsh, 45 A.D.3d 531, 531, 845 N.Y.S.2d 124).

Discovery demands are palpably improper where they seek irrelevant information, are overbroad and burdensome, or fail to specify with reasonable particularity many of the documents requested (see Jordan v. City of New York, 137 A.D.3d 1084, 1084–1085, 27 N.Y.S.3d 656;  H.R. Prince, Inc. v. Elite Envtl.  Sys., Inc., 107 A.D.3d 850, 850, 968 N.Y.S.2d 122;  Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Librizzi, 106 A.D.3d 921, 921, 965 N.Y.S.2d 183;  Montalvo v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 102 A.D.3d 842, 843, 958 N.Y.S.2d 459;  Ural v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am., 97 A.D.3d 562, 566, 948 N.Y.S.2d 621).  Where the discovery demands are overbroad, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the entire demand rather than to prune it (see Stepping Stones Assoc., L.P. v. Scialdone, 148 A.D.3d 855, 856, 50 N.Y.S.3d 76;  Berkowitz v. 29 Woodmere Blvd. Owners', Inc., 135 A.D.3d 798, 799, 23 N.Y.S.3d 352;  Scorzari v. Pezza, 111 A.D.3d 916, 916, 976 N.Y.S.2d 140;  Bell v. Cobble Hill Health Ctr., Inc., 22 A.D.3d 620, 621, 804 N.Y.S.2d 362).

Here, the discovery demands at issue were palpably improper in that they sought irrelevant information, or were overbroad and burdensome (see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Levenson, 149 A.D.3d 1053, 1055, 53 N.Y.S.3d 150;  Diaz v. City of New York, 117 A.D.3d 777, 778, 985 N.Y.S.2d 695;  Kamanou–Goune v. Swiss Intl. Airlines, 100 A.D.3d 968, 969, 954 N.Y.S.2d 227).  Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of their motion which was for a protective order striking those discovery demands.

The plaintiffs' remaining contentions regarding discovery are without merit.

MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, MALTESE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.