PEOPLE v. VARGAS (2019)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Cawley Jr., J.), rendered December 24, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree.

In satisfaction of a four-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree.  Thereafter, defendant made a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, claiming, among other things, that he was coerced by defense counsel into pleading guilty.  County Court denied the motion without a hearing and then sentenced defendant as a second felony offender, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, to a prison term of three years followed by five years of postrelease supervision.  Defendant appeals.

We are unpersuaded by defendant's contention that County Court abused its discretion in summarily denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  “When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry rests largely in the discretion of the [j]udge to whom the motion is made and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances” (People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782 [2010] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted];  see People v. Nealon, 166 A.D.3d 1225, 1226, 88 N.Y.S.3d 283 [2018];  People v. Jabot, 156 A.D.3d 954, 955, 66 N.Y.S.3d 719 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1116, 77 N.Y.S.3d 341, 101 N.E.3d 982 [2018] ).  Here, the record belies defendant's contention that he was coerced into pleading guilty by defense counsel.  Defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he had not been forced or coerced into pleading guilty and was entering the plea freely and voluntarily (see People v. Jackson, 163 A.D.3d 1273, 1274, 80 N.Y.S.3d 735 [2018], lvs denied 32 N.Y.3d 1063, 1065, 89 N.Y.S.3d 118, 119, 113 N.E.3d 952, 953 [2018];  People v. Carpenter, 93 A.D.3d 950, 952, 939 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 863, 947 N.Y.S.2d 411, 970 N.E.2d 434 [2012] ).  Contrary to defendant's contention, defense counsel's frank advice regarding the strength of the People's case against defendant and the potential increased sentencing exposure did not amount to coercive or threatening conduct (see People v. Schluter, 136 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 24 N.Y.S.3d 478 [2016], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1138, 39 N.Y.S.3d 121, 61 N.E.3d 520 [2016];  People v. Mohammed, 208 A.D.2d 1118, 1119, 617 N.Y.S.2d 955 [1994], lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 941, 627 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 651 N.E.2d 928 [1995] ).  In addition, defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea agreement with the statutory minimum sentence (see Penal Law §§ 70.02[1][c];  70.06[6][c];  120.05[3] ), and nothing in the record reflects that defendant received less than meaningful representation (see People v. Jackson, 163 A.D.3d at 1274, 80 N.Y.S.3d 735).  Morever, in denying the motion to withdraw, County Court found it significant that defendant offered to withdraw the motion in exchange for a more lenient sentence.  Under these circumstances, we find that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying, without a hearing, defendant's motion to withdraw his plea (see id. at 1275, 80 N.Y.S.3d 735;  People v. Jabot, 156 A.D.3d at 955, 66 N.Y.S.3d 719;  People v. Carpenter, 93 A.D.3d at 952, 939 N.Y.S.2d 658).  Defendant's remaining contentions raised in his pro se brief are without merit.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Clark, J.

Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch and Aarons, JJ., concur.