PEOPLE v. LEBRON (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Daniel Lewis, J.), both rendered August 17, 2015, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminal trespass in the second degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree (two counts), and petit larceny (two counts) under Indictment No. 791/14, and burglary in the second degree and petit larceny under Indictment No. 1733/14, upon jury verdicts, and imposing sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions because that the People failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator of the burglaries and related crimes in this case.  However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of all of the crimes of which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt were not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying his discovery requests pursuant to CPL 240.40 for material that was not in the possession or control of the People (see People v. Colavito, 87 N.Y.2d 423, 428, 639 N.Y.S.2d 996, 663 N.E.2d 308;  People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 189, 191–193, 630 N.Y.S.2d 693, 654 N.E.2d 967;  People v. Beckham, 142 A.D.3d 556, 36 N.Y.S.3d 483).

The defendant's right to confrontation (see U.S. Const Sixth Amend) was not violated by the testimony of a criminalist employed by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the City of New York. The criminalist performed his own analysis of certain DNA profiles, concluded that there was a DNA match, and issued the final report, which was challenged on cross-examination (see People v. Pascall, 164 A.D.3d 1265, 1266, 82 N.Y.S.3d 577;  People v. Henderson, 142 A.D.3d 1104, 1105, 37 N.Y.S.3d 620;  People v. Beckham, 142 A.D.3d 556, 36 N.Y.S.3d 483).  The criminalist's testimony regarding his review and analysis of the case files indicated that he independently analyzed the raw data, rather than functioned as “ ‘a conduit for the conclusions of others’ ” (People v. Austin, 30 N.Y.3d 98, 105, 64 N.Y.S.3d 650, 86 N.E.3d 542, quoting People v. John, 27 N.Y.3d 294, 315, 33 N.Y.S.3d 88, 52 N.E.3d 1114).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of eyewitness reliability because the proposed testimony was not relevant to the specific circumstances of this case (see People v. Allen, 53 A.D.3d 582, 583–584, 861 N.Y.S.2d 775, affd 13 N.Y.3d 251, 889 N.Y.S.2d 890, 918 N.E.2d 486;  see also People v. Rosario, 100 A.D.3d 660, 661, 953 N.Y.S.2d 299;  see generally People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

MASTRO, J.P., AUSTIN, MILLER and MALTESE, JJ., concur.