The People of the State of New York v. Salomon Castillo, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant moves for an order dismissing the indictment on the grounds that the People violated his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under CPL§ 190.50 and failed to comply with the accelerated discovery obligations of CPL § 245.10(1)(c). He contends that because the People did not disclose approximately thirty minutes of body worn camera (BWC) footage containing his recorded statements at least forty-eight hours before his scheduled grand jury appearance, he did not have a proper opportunity to testify. The defendant served cross grand jury notice pursuant to CPL § 190.50(5)(a) at his Criminal Court arraignment on March 27, 2026, thereby timely invoking his statutory right to appear. He asserts the People's failure to provide the required discovery prevented him from exercising that right. The People filed a response on May 20, 2026 and oppose the motion.¹

Although the defendant does not explicitly cite CPL § 210.20(1)(c), a motion seeking dismissal of an indictment on the ground that it was obtained in violation of CPL § 190.50(5)(a) is, by operation of law, a motion made pursuant to CPL § 210.20(1)(c). CPL § 190.50(5)(c) expressly provides that such a motion "must be made not more than five days after the defendant has been arraigned upon the indictment." The defendant was arraigned on the indictment on May 6, 2026, and filed the instant motion within the statutory five-day period. Accordingly, the motion is timely and properly before the court.

The procedural history is undisputed. The defendant was arraigned in Criminal Court on March 27, 2026, released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to June 4, 2026. At arraignment, the People served CPL § 710.30(1)(a) notice summarizing the defendant's statements as: "I was drinking last night I was driving." On March 31, 2026, the People notified the defendant that the case would be presented to the grand jury on April 6, 2026, The grand jury returned an indictment on April 7, 2026, and the case was advanced for Supreme Court arraignment on May 6, 2026. The People did not disclose the BWC footage until April 29, 2026, weeks after the grand jury presentation and filed their opposition on May 20, 2026.

The People argue that they complied with CPL § 190.50 because the defendant was given reasonable notice of the grand jury presentation but failed to respond, acknowledge, or make any arrangements to testify. The defense did not act upon the People's notice of the scheduled date and time of the grand jury presentation. The People assert that the defendant simply chose not to utilize the opportunity afforded to him, and that his failure to appear cannot be attributed to any conduct by the People. They further rely on People v Alexander, 83 Misc 3d 1295(A) (Sup Ct, Kings County), to argue that even if a discovery violation occurred, dismissal is not warranted.

Because the motion is timely under CPL § 190.50(5)(c), the court must determine whether the People's failure to comply with CPL § 245.10(1)(c) impaired the defendant's right to testify before the grand jury.

The defendant served cross grand jury notice at arraignment pursuant to CPL § 190.50(5)(a), thereby preserving his right to appear. The People's failure to disclose the full thirty-minute recorded statement — providing instead only a two-sentence summary - directly affected the defendant's ability to make an informed decision whether to testify. The discovery violation therefore bears directly on the alleged CPL § 190.50 violation and must be analyzed in conjunction with it.

In Alexander, the defendant was arrested on May 22, 2024, for burglary and related offenses. The People represented to defense counsel that no recorded statements existed and further stated that they did not use any of the defendant's statements in the grand jury presentation. In reliance of the People's representation, the defense withdrew their cross grand jury notice. The court concluded that the failure to disclose the May 22nd statements constituted a discovery violation, not a CPL § 190.50 violation. A critical factor in the court's analysis was the People's argument that, because they did not use the defendant's statements before the grand jury, the defendant suffered no prejudice from the non-disclosure. The court further held that dismissal was not proportional to the prejudice suffered, particularly because the defendant withdrew his CPL § 190.50 notice after being told that no body-worn camera footage existed relating to the May 22nd arrest. Under those circumstances, the court imposed a sanction under CPL § 245.80 by precluding the People from using the defendant's May 22nd statements on their case-in-chief, but declined to dismiss the indictment.

The circumstances here are fundamentally different.

First, the defendant did not withdraw his CPL § 190.50 notice. He served cross grand jury notice at arraignment and maintained his intent to testify.

Second, the People disclosed only two sentences - "I was drinking last night I was driving." — out of a nearly thirty-minute recorded statement. Without knowing the actual tone, context, and content of a lengthy recorded conversation, the defendant could not meaningfully evaluate how his statements would appear to the grand jury or prepare an explanation or mitigation. A two-sentence summary is materially and fundamentally different from reviewing the full recording.

Third, unlike in Alexander, the People in this case did not deny their use of the defendant's statements before the grand jury. At the time of this motion, the grand jury minutes had not been disclosed to the defense or to the court, and therefore the court cannot determine whether the People used the defendant's statements, in whole or in part, during the presentation. However, that fact alone is not dispositive. What is dispositive is that the People failed to disclose the full context, tone, and content of the defendant's recorded statement within the forty-eight hours required by CPL § 245.10(1)(c). Without that disclosure, the defendant could not make an informed decision whether to testify, regardless of whether the People ultimately used his statements before the grand jury.

Fourth, although the defense did not act upon the People's notice of the scheduled grand jury presentation, that inaction must be evaluated in context. The defendant lacked the full recorded statement that CPL § 245.10(1)(c) required the People to disclose at least forty-eight hours before his appearance. Without the tone, context, and content of the nearly thirty-minute recording, the defendant could not make an informed decision whether to testify. His failure to appear was therefore not a voluntary relinquishment of his right, but a consequence of the incomplete and inadequate information available to him at the time.

Fifth, the defendant's right to testify under CPL § 190.50 includes the right to a meaningful opportunity to prepare. Viewing the actual tone, context, and content of a nearly thirty-minute recorded conversation is materially different from receiving a two-sentence summary. The defendant was deprived of his ability to evaluate how his statements would appear to the grand jury, to determine whether to testify, and to prepare an explanation to mitigate. The fact that he ultimately did not testify does not cure the violation; rather it underscores the prejudice. The prejudice goes to the core of the defendant's statutory right to testify: the ability to make an informed decision whether to appear before the grand jury. The defendant's decision not to testify was made without the benefit of the discovery the statute requires.

This case is analogous to People v Smith, 85 Misc 3d 1206(A), where the court dismissed the indictment because the People failed to provide the actual recording of the defendant's statements before the grand jury presentation. As in Smith, the defendant here was deprived of the ability to make an informed decision about testifying. People v Randell, Indictment No. 70934-26 (Sup Ct, Bronx County, 2026 [Goldsmith, J]) (unpublished decision provided by defense) likewise supports dismissal, holding that failure to disclose body-worn-camera footage containing the defendant's statements before a scheduled grand jury appearance violated CPL § 245.10(1)(c) and impaired the defendant's rights under CPL § 190.50.

CPL § 245.10(1)(c) is explicit. It requires the People to disclose "statements of the defendant as described in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 245.20" no later than forty-eight hours before the defendant testifies in the grand jury. CPL §§ 245.20(1)(a) includes "all written or recorded statements" of the defendant. The BWC footage at issue here is plainly a recorded statement within the meaning of the statute. The Legislature did not limit accelerated disclosure to statements the People intend to use, nor did it authorize the substitution of a brief written summary for a lengthy recorded statement.

Because the People failed to comply with CPL § 245.10(1)(c), the defendant's statutory right to testify before the grand jury was impaired and compromised. The defendant's motion is therefore granted, with leave to the People to re-present the charges to a new grand jury.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.

May 26, 2026

GARY F. MIRET, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This decision has been amended sua sponte to correct a typographical error on page 4. The substantive holding and legal reasoning of the court's original decision dated May 21, 2026 remain unchanged.

Gary F. Miret, J.