Maria Clementina Gualan Suqilanda, appellant, v. Fresh Meadow Mechanical Corp., et al., respondents. (2026)

Argued—January 16, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

C/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robert I. Caloras, J.), entered February 14, 2025.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence is granted.

In January 2024, while traveling westbound on the Long Island Expressway in Queens, a vehicle operated by the plaintiff was struck in the rear by a truck operated by the defendant Sean George and owned by the defendant Fresh Meadow Mechanical Corp. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in the accident.  In their answer, the defendants asserted, among other things, an affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.  In an order entered February 14, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“ ‘A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle’ ” (Fischetti v. Simonovsky, 227 AD3d 670, 671 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Ordonez v. Lee, 177 AD3d 756, 757).  Accordingly, “ ‘[a] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision’ ” (id., quoting Diamond v. Comins, 194 AD3d 784, 784–785).  “ ‘A nonnegligent explanation may include a mechanical failure, a sudden, unexplained stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause’ ” (Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d 885, 887, quoting Donnellan v. LaMarche, 221 AD3d 783, 784).  “To be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of a defendant's liability, a plaintiff does not bear the burden of establishing the absence of his or her own comparative negligence” (Abramov v. Martinez, 224 AD3d 794, 795).  “However, ‘the issue of a plaintiff's comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence’ ” (Fischetti v. Simonovsky, 227 AD3d at 671, quoting Karim v. Proline Rental, LLC, 222 AD3d 851, 852).

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability through the submission of her affirmation, in which she stated that her vehicle was stopped on the Long Island Expressway in response to a traffic condition ahead of her when her vehicle was struck in the rear (see id.;  Balanta v. Guo Lin Wu, 220 AD3d 720, 720;  Bello v Masters Auto Collision of Long Is., Inc., 216 AD3d 726, 727–728;  Lopez v. Dobbins, 164 AD3d 776, 777).  The plaintiff also established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that she was not at fault in the happening of the accident (see Balanta v. Guo Lin Wu, 220 AD3d at 720;  Bello v Masters Auto Collision of Long Is., Inc., 216 AD3d at 727–728;  Lopez v. Dobbins, 164 AD3d at 777).  In opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showings, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Contrary to the defendants' contention, evidence that the plaintiff's vehicle made a sudden stop to avoid colliding with another vehicle that had stopped short in the roadway ahead of the plaintiff's vehicle did not, standing alone, provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident or raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively negligent in the happening of the accident (see Bello v Masters Auto Collision of Long Is., Inc., 216 AD3d at 727–728;  Lopez v. Dobbins, 164 AD3d at 777).

Moreover, the plaintiff's motion was not premature.  “[W]hile a party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in advance of a summary judgment determination, [a] party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” (Quintanilla v. Mark, 210 AD3d 713, 714 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (id. at 715 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Here, the defendants' proffered need to conduct depositions in order to cross-examine the plaintiff regarding her account of the accident did not warrant denial of the motion, and the defendants' “mere hope or speculation that evidence might be uncovered was insufficient to deny the motion” (Maurice v. Donovan, 235 AD3d 633, 635;  see Quintanilla v. Mark, 210 AD3d at 714).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.

DILLON, J.P., DOWLING, LANDICINO and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court