GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING INC v. BENYAMINIAN (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (David P. Sullivan, J.), entered August 5, 2022.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate a dismissal of the action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property located in Roslyn.  In July 2017, the plaintiff moved to vacate an October 2012 dismissal of the action (hereinafter the October 2012 dismissal).  The court denied the plaintiff's motion in an order entered December 5, 2017.  Thereafter, in February 2021, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the October 2012 dismissal.  In an order entered August 5, 2022, the court denied the plaintiff's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Under CPLR 5015(a), a court is empowered to vacate a default judgment [or order] for several reasons, including excusable neglect;  newly-discovered evidence;  fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by an adverse party;  lack of jurisdiction;  or upon the reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior order” (Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68;  see CPLR 5015[a] ).

Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a party seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her default and a potentially meritorious claim or defense (see CPLR 5015[a][1];  Young Su Hwangbo v. Nastro, 153 AD3d 963, 965).  Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default that resulted in the October 2012 dismissal or for its delays of nearly five years and more than eight years, respectively, in making its motions to vacate the October 2012 dismissal (see e.g. Ganach v. Milloul, 192 AD3d 669, 671).  Since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its default, it is not necessary to determine whether it demonstrated a potentially meritorious claim (see Gutierrez v. Plonski, 219 AD3d 807, 809).

“In addition to the grounds set forth in section 5015(a), a court may vacate its own judgment [or order] for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” (Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d at 68).  However, “[a] court's inherent power to exercise control over its judgments [or orders] is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments [or orders] taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” (Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau, Off. of County Attorney, 61 N.Y.2d 739, 742 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Francis, 209 AD3d 957, 959).  In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect that would constitute a basis to vacate the October 2012 dismissal in the interest of substantial justice (see HSBC Bank USA v. Josephs–Byrd, 148 AD3d 788, 790).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are not properly before this Court or without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the plaintiff's motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the October 2012 dismissal.

DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.