The People, etc., respondent, v. Steven Barrere, appellant. (2026)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

The People, etc., respondent, v. Steven Barrere, appellant.

2023–12441 (Ind. No. 71761 /22)

Decided: July 08, 2026

BETSY BARROS, J.P. LARA J. GENOVESI WILLIAM G. FORD LILLIAN WAN, JJ.

Richard M. Langone, Garden City, NY, for appellant. Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (David L. Glovin and Michael J. Balch of counsel), for respondent. The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's requests to proceed pro se at the suppression hearing based on the defendant's disruptive conduct during the proceedings, as “[a] defendant may forfeit the right to proceed pro se by engaging in disruptive or obstreperous conduct calculated to undermine, upset or unreasonably delay the progress of the trial” (People v Wingate, 184 AD3d 738, 738 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 18). Furthermore, the defendant failed to establish that his speedy trial rights were violated due to this alleged improper denial. “A defendant seeking dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds under CPL 30.30 meets his or her initial burden on the motion simply by alleging that the People failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed period” (People v Brown, 214 AD3d 823, 824 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the defendant failed to meet his initial burden of alleging that the statutorily prescribed period had elapsed without a declaration of readiness by the People.

Argued—June 5, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Caryn R. Fink, J.), rendered December 15, 2023, convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as a felony, reckless driving, reckless endangerment in the second degree, and operating a motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as a felony, reckless driving, reckless endangerment in the second degree, and operating a motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent.

The defendant contends that his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as a felony was against the weight of the evidence. “There is no preservation requirement for weight-of-the-evidence appellate review” (People v. Rafikian, 247 AD3d 794, 795 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Rose, 191 AD3d 697, 698). In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410; People v. Grigoroff, 244 AD3d 1233, 1234). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 645–646; People v. Rivera, 180 AD3d 939, 940).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by the arresting officer's improper bolstering of his own testimony and the prosecutor's improper vouching for the credibility of the officer is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, the challenged testimony and summation comment “were not so flagrant or pervasive so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial” (People v. Cuevas, 207 AD3d 557, 558 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Bianchini, 198 AD3d 912, 914). The officer's testimony did not unduly enhance his own credibility or adversely impact the jury's fact-finding process, but rather established the reasons behind the officer's conduct and completed the narrative of the defendant's arrest (see People v. Torres, 243 AD3d 813, 813–814; People v. Rosario, 100 AD3d 660, 661). The prosecutor expressed no personal opinion regarding the officer's veracity, and the comment was properly responsive to the defendant's summation, in which the defendant attacked the officer's credibility (see People v. Halm, 81 N.Y.2d 819, 821; People v. Rodriguez, 242 AD3d 1124, 1125).

BARROS, J.P., GENOVESI, FORD and WAN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

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