IN RE: HEREFORD INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, Victor Ramirez appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gretchen Walsh, J.), dated October 16, 2024.  The order granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On June 6, 2021, Victor Ramirez was the owner and operator of a taxicab insured by the petitioner, Hereford Insurance Company (hereinafter Hereford).  A vehicle operated by Gabriel Pool collided with Ramirez's taxicab.  After the collision, Ramirez and Pool pulled over, Pool exited his vehicle, walked over to Ramirez's taxicab, and allegedly struck Ramirez in the face with an ashtray while Ramirez was sitting inside his taxicab.  Pool's vehicle was uninsured.

Ramirez sought to recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement contained in his car insurance policy with Hereford.  Hereford denied coverage, concluding, inter alia, that Ramirez's injuries did not arise out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle, the motor vehicle was not the proximate cause of Ramirez's injuries, and Ramirez's injuries were solely the result of an assault by the adverse driver.  Ramirez sought to arbitrate the matter, and Hereford thereafter commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, among other things, to permanently stay arbitration.  Ramirez opposed the petition, contending, inter alia, that pursuant to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan (16 NY3d 349), the June 6, 2021 incident was an “accident” within the meaning of the uninsured motorist endorsement.  The Supreme Court granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration.  Ramirez appeals.

“A court may stay arbitration where the particular claim sought to be arbitrated is outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate” (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reyes, 109 AD3d 468, 468 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr.  Co.], 51 N.Y.2d 1, 7).  “[F]or purposes of automobile insurance policies, the term ‘accident’ means an event typically involving violence or the application of external force” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan, 16 NY3d at 355;  see Michaels v. City of Buffalo, 85 N.Y.2d 754, 758).  “In order to determine whether a particular event was accidental, it is customary to look at the casualty from the point of view of the insured, to see whether or not ․ it was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen” (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan, 16 NY3d at 355 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

However, uninsured motorist endorsements, such as the one at issue in this case, provide coverage only when the injuries are the result of an accident “arising out of such uninsured motor vehicle's ownership, maintenance or use” (11 NYCRR 60–2.3[f] [Insuring Agreements (II) ];  see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Reyes, 109 AD3d 468, 468).  “Use of an automobile encompasses more than simply driving it, and includes all necessary incidental activities such as entering and leaving its confines” (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reyes, 109 AD3d at 469;  see Rowell v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d 636, 639).  “To satisfy the requirement that it arose out of the ‘ownership, maintenance or use of’ a motor vehicle, the accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the automobile and, as such, inter alia, the automobile must not merely contribute to the condition which produces the injury, but must, itself, produce the injury” (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reyes, 109 AD3d at 469;  see Zaccari v Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 597, 599;  Eagle Ins. Co. v. Butts, 269 A.D.2d 558, 558–559).  Although the vehicle itself need not be the proximate cause of the injury, “ ‘negligence in the use of the vehicle must be shown, and that negligence must be a cause of the injury’ ” (Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reyes, 109 AD3d at 469, quoting Zaccari v Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 35 AD3d at 599).  “To be a cause of the injury, the use of the motor vehicle must be closely related to the injury” (Zaccari v Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 35 AD3d at 599 [emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Reyes, 109 AD3d at 469).

Here, from Ramirez's point of view, the occurrence was unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan, 16 NY3d at 355).  However, as a matter of law, Ramirez's injuries did not result from the inherent nature of Pool's vehicle, nor did the vehicle itself produce the injuries.  The injuries were caused by Pool's alleged assault, and the uninsured vehicle merely contributed to the condition which produced the injuries (see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Reyes, 109 AD3d at 469).  Hereford established that a proximate causal relationship between the uninsured vehicle and the incident was lacking, and Ramirez failed to rebut that showing (see id.;  Empire Ins. Co. v. Schliessman, 306 A.D.2d 512, 513;  Eagle Ins. Co. v. Butts, 269 A.D.2d at 559).

Ramirez's remaining contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration.

CONNOLLY, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and LOVE, JJ., concur.