MARIN v. REYES (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Frank A. Tinari, J.), dated September 19, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate (1) an order of the same court (Leonard D. Steinman, J.) dated October 24, 2022, granting the plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant, and (2) a judgment of the same court (Frank A. Tinari, J.) entered July 25, 2023, which, upon the order dated October 24, 2022, and after an inquest on the issue of damages, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sum of $20,000,000.

ORDERED that the order dated September 19, 2024, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order dated October 24, 2022, and the judgment entered July 25, 2023, are granted.

On August 13, 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act (see CPLR 214–g) against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries.  The defendant was served with the summons with notice on August 25, 2021.  The defendant retained counsel shortly thereafter.  However, the defendant failed to respond to the summons with notice.

On August 16, 2022, the plaintiff moved for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant.  In an order dated October 24, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion.  After an inquest on the issue of damages, at which the defendant failed to appear, the court entered a judgment on July 25, 2023, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sum of $20,000,000.

In October 2023, the defendant, by new counsel, moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order dated October 24, 2022, and the judgment.  A hearing was conducted on the issue of whether the defendant established a reasonable excuse for the default.  In an order dated September 19, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion.  The defendant appeals.

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Cross v. Woodbine Caterers, 241 AD3d 1263, 1264;  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Joseph, 209 AD3d 633, 634).  The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the Supreme Court's discretion (see Cross v. Woodbine Caterers, 241 AD3d at 1264;  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lewis, 232 AD3d 649, 651).  Where there is a pattern of default and neglect, the negligence of the defendant's prior attorney can be imputed to the client (see Cross v. Woodbine Caterers, 241 AD3d at 1264;  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Joseph, 209 AD3d at 634;  New York Vein Ctr., LLC v. Dovlaryan, 162 AD3d 1056, 1058).  “The court should also consider potential prejudice to the opposing party, whether the default was willful or evinced an intent to abandon the litigation, and whether vacating the default would serve the public policy of resolving actions on their merits” (Skutelsky v. JN Natural Fruit Corp., 138 AD3d 1099, 1100 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the defendant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for his default.  The record demonstrates that the defendant was repeatedly misled by his prior attorney concerning the status of his case (see Gottlieb v. Northriver Trading Co. LLC, 106 AD3d 580, 580–581).  Furthermore, the defendant remained apprised of the status of his case and communicated with his prior attorney any time he became aware of a development in the litigation.  As such, the defendant did not evince an intent to abandon the litigation, but was operating under the assumption that the action was being handled by his prior attorney (see id.;  Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 103 AD3d 790, 791;  Steel Krafts Bldg. Materials & Supplies v Komazenski, 252 A.D.2d 731, 732;  cf.  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Joseph, 209 AD3d at 634;  Vizelter v. Strogov, 170 AD3d 917, 918–919).  In addition, when the defendant discovered that a default judgment had been entered against him, he immediately retained new counsel (see Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 103 AD3d at 790).

Moreover, the defendant has demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action.  The defendant submitted affidavits of nonparty witnesses who had personal knowledge of the time frame and location of the alleged acts complained of which contradicted the plaintiff's allegations (see Gottlieb v. Northriver Trading Co. LLC, 106 AD3d at 581).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order dated October 24, 2022, and the judgment.

GENOVESI, J.P., DOWLING, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.