Michael Lopez Bonilla, Plaintiff v. Barry Petrina, Defendant(s). (2026)

The following papers numbered 1 — 3 were read and considered in connection with Defendants Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an Order granting summary judgment to Defendant BARRY PETRINA, dismissing the Complaint, together with such other and further relief thus Court deems proper:

PAPERS NUMBERS

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Statement of Material Facts/ Memorandum of Law in Support/Affirmation in Support of Melanie S. Schlosser, Esq./Defendant's Exhibits A-C 1

Affirmation of Ellen D. Lazarus, Esq. in Opposition/Plaintiff's Exhibits A-C 2

Affirmation of Melanie S. Scholsser, Esq. in Reply/Defendant's Exhibit D 3

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff commenced this action on October 10, 2024, with the filing of the summons and complaint. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 1. Defendant BARRY PETRINA was served pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) on October 15, 2024, by service on TOM HART, at 115 Franklin Turnpike, #350 Mahwah, New Jersey. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 3. Defendant joined issue with the filing of a Verified Answer raising ten (10) affirmative defenses. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 5.

Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness for Trial on January 21, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 18. Subsequently, Defendant timely filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 20-26.

BACKGROUND

The instant action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 1, 2024, at approximately 5:30pm-6pm on Route 202 at the intersection at Lake Road. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 23-25.

Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony

Plaintiff MICHAEL LOPEZ BONILLA [hereinafter BONILLA] testified at his examination before trial (herein referred to as "EBT"), that he was involved in a motor vehicle accident on February 1, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 25, p. 11:1-9. Defendant BONILLA stated that before the subject accident occurred, he had the day off from his father's landscaping business and was driving home after shopping at Walmart in Monroe, New York. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 25, p. 13:3-12. Further, he stated that he was the only person in his vehicle at the time of the accident. See NYSCEF Doc. 25 p. 14:2-4.

Plaintiff BONILLA testified that while driving north on Route 202, "a car [suddenly and unexpectedly] crossed over the divider of the two directions for the traffic in motion and it came like a diagonal[,] and it hit me." NYSCEF Doc. 25, p. 19:16-21. The Plaintiff stated that "[a]s a result of being hit, I was propelled out of my lane and I ended up hitting, I don't know what it was, I think it was a pole." NYSCEF Doc. 25, p. 20:6-8. According to BONILLA, the car that allegedly hit him was a Nissan Altima, and the contact with his vehicle occurred on his passenger side door with the other vehicle's front bumper. See NYSCEF Doc. 25 p. 20:14-25.

Plaintiff BONILLA testified that upon first contact with the Defendant's car, his vehicle was "totally destroyed." See NYSCEF Doc. 25 p. 21:3-4. When asked how he was hit on his passenger side (right side) -- if the cars in the other lane were travelling left -- the Plaintiff responded "[m]aybe I didn't explain it properly, but I never said that he was coming on the opposite direction on the route where I was going in one direction and he was coming in the opposite direction, no, otherwise he would have hit me myself as a driver of this car on the left, but he hit me on the right, so, he came from somewhere behind me." NYSCEF Doc. 25, p. 22:21-25, 23:2- 4.

According to the Plaintiff, after he collided with the pole, he was taken by ambulance to the emergency room at Samaritan Hospital in Suffern, New York, where he remained for over three (3) hours. See NYSCEF Doc. 25, p. 25: 19-25. The Plaintiff testified that while at the hospital he saw the police report (submitted as NYSCEF Doc. 23 and Plaintiff's Exhibit A) for the subject accident and did not attempt to amend it. See NYSCEF Doc. 25, 14:10-20.

Defendant's Deposition Testimony

Defendant BARRY PETRINA [hereinafter referred to as PETRINA] testified at the time of the accident he was on his way home to his residence at "The Sentinel," an assisted living community in Suffern, New York. See NYSCEF Doc. 24, pp. 9:20-25; 14:20-25. PETRINA testified he was traveling on Lake Road when he reached the intersection with Route 202 with the intention to make a left turn (to go south on Route 202). See NYSCEF Doc. 24, p. 17:2-17.

The Defendant indicated that when he reached the intersection, he paused for thirty (30) seconds to a minute and then proceeded to make a left turn on Lake Street. See NYSCEF Doc. 24, p. 20:20-25; 21:2-5.When the defendant was about to make the left turn, he testified that "a car went flying past me on right, swerved over to the left, crossed the double-yellow line, went into the grass, and smashed into . . . a pole." NYSCEF Doc. 24. p. 22:2-6. The Defendant testified that there was no physical contact between his vehicle and the Plaintiff's vehicle. See NYSCEF Doc. 24, p. 22:21-24. The Defendant was at the scene for five minutes and checked that the Plaintiff was "okay" before the police dismissed him. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 24 p. 23:6-23.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment based upon the Plaintiff's deposition testimony, the defendant's testimony, and the certified police report. Defendant argues that there was no contact between the Defendant's car and the Plaintiff's vehicle, as the Defendant's EBT establishes that he was travelling on Lake Road at the time of the incident, and the Certified Police Report states that the Defendant's vehicle was "uninvolved."

The Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff offered three different versions of events (two orally, and another by confirming the police report) which cannot plausibly establish the Plaintiff's negligence claim. Referring to the police report, which states there was no contact between vehicles, the Defendant insists that the Defendant's left turn is a condition for the Plaintiff's accident rather than the proximate cause. Furthermore, the Defendant argues the other two (2) theories in the Plaintiff's EBT, that there was contact between the two vehicles either at a diagonal or from behind, are physically impossible because it is undisputed that the Defendant was on Route 202 and these recollections imply that the Defendant was coming from somewhere else other than Lake Street, which is simply not the case.

In opposition, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant, according to his EBT, proceeded to make a left turn onto Lake Street and therefore ignored a no left turn sign present at the time of the incident. The Plaintiff refers to a photo taken fourteen (14) days after the accident that shows a no left turn sign at the intersection of Lake Street and Route 202. In addition, the Defendant refers to images taken by the Plaintiff shortly after the accident that show red paint on the rear bumper of the Defendant's car. Considering that the Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff's car is red, the Defendant argues that the red paint marks raise a question of fact as to whether the Plaintiff and Defendant's vehicle were in contact. Alternatively, the Defendant emphasizes that no contact is required to establish the Defendant's negligence.

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case and to warrant a court to direct judgment in its favor, as a matter of law. See Civil Practice Law and Rules 3212(b); See also Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., et al, 100 NY2d 72 [2003], citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]. A defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action may generally sustain their prima facie burden "by negating a single essential element" of that cause of action. See Smith v. City of New York, 210 AD3d 53 [2d Dept. 2022]. If the moving defendant fails to meet this initial burden of setting forth evidentiary facts sufficient to establish an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the motion must be denied without considering the sufficiency of the opposing papers. See Stukas v. Streiter, 83 AD3d 18 [2d Dept. 2011]. However, once the defendant successfully establishes their prima facie burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact. See Romana v. NYRAC, Inc., 245 AD2d 498 [1997]; See also O'Lear v. Boy Scouts of Am., 33 AD3d 685 [2006]; Vesligaj v. PMT Forklift Corp., 222 AD2d 431 [1995]. Summary judgment will be granted only if there is no triable issue of fact and issue finding, rather than issue determination, is the key to summary judgment, and the papers on the motion should be scrutinized carefully in the light most favorable to the party opposing the relief. See Judice v. DeAngelo, 272 AD2d 583 [2d Dept. 2000].

Upon review, the Court finds that the Defendant has established its prima facie case establishing entitlement to summary judgment. The Defendant's EBT and the Certified Police Report undisputably establish that the Defendant was travelling on Lake Road at the time of the incident. In light of this, the Plaintiff's testimony of contact to his vehicle's passenger side with the Defendant's front bumper from a diagonal or from behind suggest that the Defendant was coming from a place other than Lake Street, but this is not established by any evidence and is contrary to the Police Report and Defendant's testimony. The photographs submitted by the Defendant, which were taken by the Plaintiff at the scene of the accident, detailing spots that are assumed to be red paint on the back of the Defendant's car cannot reasonably support the Plaintiff's theories of a collision since the Plaintiff insists in his EBT that he was hit on his passenger side by the Defendant's front bumper.

The only theory left for the Plaintiff to establish the Defendant's negligence is that the Defendant, by starting to make the turn, left the Plaintiff with no other choice but to swerve to avoid colliding with the Defendant, or in other words, the attempted left turn was a substantial cause of the events that produced the injury. See Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y3d 469 [2016]. "The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection . . . shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard." Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141; See Shashaty v. Gavitt, 158 AD3d 830 [2d Dept. 2018]. A driver with the right-of-way facing another vehicle making a left turn sets off a foreseeable chain of events that could lead the driver to take defensive measures such as swerving. See Sapienza v. Harrison, 191 AD3d 1028 [2d Dept. 2021]. Therefore, a potentially negligent turn means the driver's actions can remain the proximate cause of a crash. See id.

To this point, the Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material of fact regarding the existence of a no-left-turn sign at the intersection of Lake Road and Route 202. The Plaintiff refers to photos taken fourteen (14) days after the accident in this case. This would imply that the Defendant allegedly failed to comply with the traffic sign and that this traffic violation caused the Plaintiff to swerve and contact the pole. In reply, the Defendant refers to a Google Maps photograph of the intersection from May 2023 that shows no such no-left-turn sign, which may indicate that the no- turn sign was not in place at the time of the accident. In any case, in the absence of clear and undisputed evidence concerning the existence of a no-left-hand turn sign on February 1, 2024, this remains a genuine issue of material fact that the Court is unwilling to speculate on for the purposes of this summary judgment motion.

In arriving at this decision, the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant BARRY PETRINA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion Seq. No. 1) is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear on July 16, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. for a Settlement Conference.

The foregoing is the Court's Decision and Order as to Motion Seq. No. 1.

Dated: July 2, 2026

New City, New York

HON. JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., J.S.C.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.