BYARS v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated April 5, 2022.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Transport Workers Union of America and John Samuelsen and the defendant Barbara Deinhardt which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them.

Motion by the respondent Transport Workers Union, Local 100 to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it has been rendered academic.  By decision and order on motion of this Court dated July 3, 2024, the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is

ORDERED that the motion is granted;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed as academic;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

In September 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for certain injunctive relief which would permit her to run for president of Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (hereinafter Local 100).  The first cause of action alleged that the defendants' determination that the plaintiff was ineligible to run for office was in breach of the constitution of Transport Workers Union of America and the bylaws of Local 100.  The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.

Thereafter, Transport Workers Union of America and John Samuelsen moved, and Barbara Deinhardt separately moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them.  The Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the motions.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Courts are generally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions or ruling on hypothetical inquiries” (Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d 1087, 1090, 955 N.Y.S.2d 831, 979 N.E.2d 1158).  “Thus, an appeal is moot unless an adjudication of the merits will result in immediate and practical consequences to the parties” (id.;  see Matter of Orangetown Police Dept. v. Cashell, 238 A.D.3d 1152, 1153, 235 N.Y.S.3d 404).  “An exception to the mootness doctrine may apply, however, where the issue to be decided, though moot, (1) is likely to recur, either between the parties or other members of the public, (2) is substantial and novel, and (3) will typically evade review in the courts” (Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d at 1090, 955 N.Y.S.2d 831, 979 N.E.2d 1158;  see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714–715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876).

Here, since the election has already taken place, adjudication of the merits of this appeal will not result in immediate and practical consequences to the plaintiff or those she seeks to represent, and thus, the appeal is academic (see Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d at 1090, 955 N.Y.S.2d 831, 979 N.E.2d 1158).  Moreover, as the issues raised are not substantial and novel ones that are likely to recur and typically will evade review, an exception to the mootness doctrine is not warranted (see Matter of Smith v. Annucci, 243 A.D.3d 801, 246 N.Y.S.3d 416).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and VENTURA, JJ., concur.