GONZALEZ v. Town of Huntington, etc., et al., Respondents. (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In the summer of 2013, the infant plaintiff attended a camp operated by the defendant Town of Huntington.  On July 5, 2013, the camp went on a field trip to a roller skating rink operated by the defendant United Skates of America, Inc. (hereinafter United Skates).  While roller skating, the infant plaintiff fell.  The infant plaintiff, and his mother, suing derivatively, commenced this action against, among others, the Town and United Skates.  The Town and United Skates separately moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.  The Supreme Court granted those branches of the separate motions, and the plaintiffs appeal.

With respect to the Town, schools and camps have a duty to provide supervision to ensure the safety of those in their charge, and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately caused by the absence of adequate supervision (see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;  Butera v. Village of Bellport, 128 A.D.3d 995, 10 N.Y.S.3d 292;  DiGiacomo v. Town of Babylon, 124 A.D.3d 828, 829, 2 N.Y.S.3d 548;  Ragusa v. Town of Huntington, 54 A.D.3d 743, 864 N.Y.S.2d 441).  Here, the Town submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that it adequately supervised the infant plaintiff (see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d at 49, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263;  David v. City of New York, 40 A.D.3d 572, 573–574, 835 N.Y.S.2d 377;  Davidson v. Sachem Cent. School Dist., 300 A.D.2d 276, 751 N.Y.S.2d 300), and, in any event, that any alleged negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries (see Ponzini v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist., 166 A.D.3d 914, 916, 87 N.Y.S.3d 566;  Botti v. Seaford Harbor Elementary School Dist. 6, 24 A.D.3d 486, 808 N.Y.S.2d 236).  Where, as here, “an accident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury and summary judgment in favor of the ․ defendant[ ] is warranted” (Convey v. City of Rye School Dist., 271 A.D.2d 154, 160, 710 N.Y.S.2d 641;  see Harris v. Five Point Mission—Camp Olmstedt, 73 A.D.3d 1127, 1128, 901 N.Y.S.2d 678).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

With respect to United Skates, in support of its motion, it submitted evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the accident was not proximately caused by its allegedly negligent supervision (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572;  Jackson v. Out E. Family Fun, LLC, 79 A.D.3d 817, 818, 913 N.Y.S.2d 712).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant those branches of the separate motions of the Town and United Skates which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

SCHEINKMAN, P.J., AUSTIN, COHEN and HINDS–RADIX, JJ., concur.