IN RE: Ilda LLIGUICOTA (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner commenced this family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 against the appellant, the father of the parties' child.  After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the appellant had committed the family offenses of assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, harassment in the second degree, and stalking in the fourth degree based upon specific incidents about which the petitioner testified.  After a dispositional hearing, at which the court noted the appellant's history of criminal conduct against the petitioner as well as the appellant's violation of an interim order of protection, the court issued an order of protection directing the appellant, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner until and including November 16, 2019.

The allegations in a family offense proceeding must be “supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence” (Family Ct Act § 832;  see Matter of Saquipay v. Puzhi, 160 A.D.3d 879, 879, 74 N.Y.S.3d 329;  Matter of Shank v. Shank, 155 A.D.3d 875, 876, 63 N.Y.S.3d 719).  “The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if supported by the record” (Matter of Richardson v. Richardson, 80 A.D.3d 32, 43–44, 910 N.Y.S.2d 149;  see Matter of Henderson v. Henderson, 137 A.D.3d 911, 911, 27 N.Y.S.3d 183;  Matter of Aslan v. Senturk, 125 A.D.3d 852, 852, 1 N.Y.S.3d 827).

Here, a fair preponderance of the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing supports the Family Court's determination that the appellant committed acts constituting the family offenses of assault in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.00), menacing in the third degree (see Penal Law § 120.15), harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26[3];  see also Matter of Frimer v. Frimer, 143 A.D.3d 895, 896, 39 N.Y.S.3d 226), and stalking in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 120.45).  Contrary to the appellant's contention, the petitioner's evidence demonstrated that the order of protection issued by the court was the appropriate disposition since it was reasonably necessary to provide meaningful protection to the petitioner and to eradicate the root of the domestic disturbance (see Matter of Mayers v. Thompson, 145 A.D.3d 1010, 42 N.Y.S.3d 864;  Matter of Monos v. Monos, 123 A.D.3d 931, 932, 999 N.Y.S.2d 131).

MASTRO, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.