PEOPLE v. CHAMBERS (2019)

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of charges related to two incidents involving high speed chases through the streets of Staten Island as the defendant attempted to evade the police.  With respect to the second incident, the defendant was convicted, inter alia, of reckless endangerment in the first degree.  During that incident, the defendant fled from the police at night through mixed commercial-residential neighborhoods, consistently driving well above the speed limit and violating numerous traffic rules.  The testimony of the pursuing police officers established that, during the lengthy pursuit of approximately 5.5 miles through city streets, the defendant's vehicle struck a police vehicle, the defendant drove through numerous stop signs and red lights at dangerously excessive speeds, and he repeatedly drove in the opposing lane of travel.  The police officers further testified that the defendant caused pedestrians and other automobiles to leave the road to avoid being struck, that his vehicle sideswiped two additional moving vehicles, and that he drove down the middle of a narrow, winding, two-lane road, causing vehicles traveling in both directions to move out of his way to avoid his vehicle.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25) beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Williams, 150 A.D.3d 1273, 55 N.Y.S.3d 381;  People v. Walker, 258 A.D.2d 541, 685 N.Y.S.2d 452).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The defendant correctly contends that the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413) was an improvident exercise of discretion.  In addition, the court should not have permitted the prosecutor to elicit testimony from an off-duty police officer, who drove one of the vehicles that the defendant's vehicle sideswiped, that she was pregnant at the time of the second incident.  This information was irrelevant to any issue at trial and should have been excluded (see People v. Holiday, 142 A.D.3d 625, 36 N.Y.S.3d 520).  However, these errors were harmless.  There was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, and no significant probability that the errors contributed to his convictions (see People v. Grant, 7 N.Y.3d 421, 424, 823 N.Y.S.2d 757, 857 N.E.2d 52;  People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787;  People v. Goodwin, 95 A.D.3d 1357, 944 N.Y.S.2d 901).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

MASTRO, J.P., COHEN, HINDS–RADIX and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.