Christie Fanti, Plaintiff, v. Diane Madden, Defendant. (2026)

This is an action to recover damages for defamation. A nonjury trial was held on June 24, 2026, and June 25, 2026. This decision sets forth the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact are based, in part, on assessments of witness credibility.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Christie Fanti ("plaintiff") is an animal behavior consultant and trainer who performed services at the Town of Hempstead Animal Shelter (the "Shelter"). Defendant Diane Madden ("defendant") is an animal rights advocate who regularly commented on matters involving the Shelter, including plaintiff's qualifications, hiring, and performance.

The complaint alleges that defendant made written and oral statements accusing plaintiff of, among other things, lying about her credentials, falsifying her certification, obtaining her position through political patronage, participating in a fraudulent contract, committing criminal acts, causing injuries to employees, volunteers, members of the public, and animals, and causing "blood baths" when placing dogs in play groups (complaint ¶ 18). Those alleged statements include writings and oral statements made at Town of Hempstead Board meetings on the following dates: April 2, 2019, April 16, 2019, May 7, 2019, May 21, 2019, October 6, 2019, and October 16, 2019.

On November 11, 2019, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint. The complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) libel, (2) libel per se, (3) slander, and (4) slander per se. In December 2019, defendant interposed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint, alleging that the action was a strategic lawsuit against public participation ("SLAPP"), and asserting counterclaims for, among other things, violations of 42 USC § 1983. Discovery thereafter ensued.

In October 2021, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the action should be dismissed pursuant to Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a. She also sought "a declaration that [the anti-SLAPP statute] as amended on November 10, 2020, applies retroactively to this action" (NYSCEF Doc No. 22). Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss defendant's counterclaims.

By order dated February 23, 2023, the Court (Rademaker, J.) denied so much of defendant's motion as sought relief pursuant to the amended anti-SLAPP statute, determining that the 2020 amendments did not apply retroactively to this action. This denial was without prejudice to defendant seeking relief under the provisions of the pre-2020 anti-SLAPP statute. The Court dismissed so much of the complaint as was premised upon statements made before November 11, 2018. The Court also granted plaintiff's cross-motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims.

After the completion of discovery and the filing of a note of issue, the action was assigned to this Court for a nonjury trial. Trial commenced on June 24, 2026, and concluded on June 25, 2026. Plaintiff and defendant both testified. The following exhibits were admitted into evidence as part of plaintiff's direct case: plaintiff's resume; the "Agreement for Contract Animal Behaviorist Services" with the Town of Hempstead resolution dated February 10, 2017; plaintiff's 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 W-2s; and a document reflecting payments from an animal rescue for which plaintiff performed work in 2023. Additional documents were introduced into evidence during defendant's case.

After plaintiff rested, defendant orally moved for a directed verdict pursuant to CPLR 4401, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff failed to establish liability on the libel and libel per se causes of action because she did not submit the alleged writings or printed words into evidence. Defendant also argued that plaintiff failed to prove the particular allegedly defamatory statements, written or spoken, as required by CPLR 3016 (a) and the applicable case law. The Court reserved decision on the motion.

The parties also disputed whether plaintiff was required to prove actual malice, either because plaintiff was a public figure or limited-purpose public figure, or under Civil Rights Law § 76-a (2), as amended by the 2020 anti-SLAPP legislation.

TRIAL

Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff testified concerning her background in animal behavior and training. She attended college, studied animal science through a BOCES program, worked as a veterinary technician, performed rescue work with dogs with behavioral issues, and later worked as an animal control officer for the Town of East Hampton. She also testified that she belonged to animal behavior and dog training organizations and completed various trainings and seminars.

In 2016, plaintiff responded to a request for proposals ("RFP") issued by the Town of Hempstead for a behavior consulting contract at the Shelter. The original RFP listed CPDT-KA certification as preferred, but not required. Plaintiff did not yet have that certification when she responded to the initial RFP. Her proposed contract appeared on the Town Board agenda on September 6, 2016. Plaintiff testified that defendant spoke at that meeting and accused plaintiff of having a "kill mentality," lacking experience, being a fraud, lying about her credentials, participating in a scheme to defraud the public, and obtaining the position as a "patronage" or "union" favor. Plaintiff denied the truth of those statements.

The Town Board did not approve plaintiff's contract at the September 6, 2016 meeting. Instead, the Board tabled the resolution and the RFP was reissued. Plaintiff testified that, when the RFP was reissued, CPDT-KA certification became required. Plaintiff took the written examination in September 2016 and passed it in October 2016. She then responded to the reissued RFP, and, after further interviews, was again recommended for the contract. The Town Board approved the agreement by resolution dated February 10, 2017, and plaintiff began working at the Shelter on February 15, 2017.

Under the contract, plaintiff performed behavioral evaluations and intake assessments, assisted with play groups, trained staff and volunteers as approved by the Shelter director, developed enrichment and adoption programs, assisted with rescues and adoptions, and provided post-adoption support. Plaintiff testified that she did not have authority to direct Town employees or change Shelter policy. Her initial contract was for two years, at approximately $60 per hour for up to 35 hours per week.

Plaintiff testified that defendant continued making similar accusations about her at Town Board meetings throughout plaintiff's employment with the Town. Plaintiff specifically testified that, at a Town Board meeting on October 6, 2019, defendant accused her of committing a criminal act to obtain her job, being a patronage hire, obtaining her position through fraud or a scheme to defraud the Town, lying about her credentials, and causing people to be injured at the Shelter. Plaintiff denied those accusations and testified that the credentials listed on her resume were accurate.

After plaintiff's contract expired, the Town did not issue plaintiff a new contract. Plaintiff later took and passed an examination for an assistant director position, but the Town selected another candidate. The Town thereafter continued to employ plaintiff part time under the title of kennel worker, at $50 per hour. Plaintiff testified that she generally worked between 32 and 40 hours per week. Plaintiff introduced W-2s for 2020 through 2023, but did not introduce W-2s, tax returns, pay stubs, or other income records showing her actual earnings under the contract during 2017, 2018, or 2019.

Plaintiff also testified that she was harassed by members of the public who repeated defendant's accusations, and that defendant's statements affected her reputation. She further testified that she lost a potential contract with the Town of Oyster Bay after defendant made similar accusations there. Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from the Town in January 2023, although she testified that she did so because of defendant's continuing accusations.

Defendant's Testimony

Defendant testified that she has been involved in animal welfare advocacy since approximately 2010. She volunteered at the Shelter for approximately 10 years, advocated for audits of the Shelter, and publicly criticized what she viewed as wasteful spending and poor Shelter operations. Defendant acknowledged that she had never trained dogs professionally and had no formal education in animal husbandry or dog training.

Defendant testified that her advocacy concerning the behavior consulting contract began before plaintiff applied for the position. Defendant believed that the position should have remained within the civil service system rather than being filled by contract because, in her view, civil service would impose higher standards. Defendant recalled speaking against plaintiff's initial bid because plaintiff did not yet have the CPDT-KA certification. Defendant acknowledged, however, that plaintiff had obtained that certification by the time she ultimately received the contract in 2017.

Defendant denied having a grudge or animus toward plaintiff and testified that her statements were intended to criticize the Town's policies, not plaintiff personally. She acknowledged that she spoke often at Town Board meetings and made statements concerning plaintiff's contract and qualifications. She also acknowledged that she believed she had made statements that plaintiff was part of a "patronage scheme" and was the "same politically connected fraud who falsified her certification and lied through the hiring process." Defendant further testified that the statement, "Patronage hiring scheme has resulted in physical injuries CSEA Local 88 employees to date as well as injuries to volunteers, the public and other pets," was a statement she would have made publicly, although she could not say whether she made that statement in a social media post.

During cross-examination, plaintiff attempted to question defendant about two Facebook posts attributed to a user identified as "Diane Madden." Defendant testified that she could not authenticate the posts because of the passage of time and because statements had been attributed to her on Facebook that she did not make.¹

DISCUSSION

CPLR 4401 Motion

Pursuant to CPLR 4401, "[a]ny party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue." A motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 is appropriately granted where, upon the evidence presented, "there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party" (International Exterior Fabricators, LLC v Decoplast, Inc., 128 AD3d 1016, 1018 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Clarke v Phillips, 112 AD3d 872, 874 [2d Dept 2013]). In considering such a motion, the court must afford the nonmoving party every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the facts presented and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to that party (see Clarke v Phillips, 112 AD3d at 874).

Here, judgment as a matter of law is warranted as to the first and second causes of action for libel and libel per se. Plaintiff did not introduce the alleged Facebook posts or other alleged writings into evidence as part of her direct case. Although plaintiff later questioned defendant about two Facebook posts attributed to a user identified as "Diane Madden," the posts were not admitted as independent proof of written publications giving rise to liability for libel. Accordingly, regardless of the Court's credibility assessment concerning defendant's claimed inability to recall whether she authored the posts, plaintiff failed to prove the written publications necessary to establish libel or libel per se. The first and second causes of action are dismissed.

The Court reaches a different conclusion as to slander. Plaintiff testified that defendant repeatedly made accusations about her at Town Board meetings during plaintiff's employment with the Town. Although plaintiff's testimony did not establish every oral statement alleged in the complaint, plaintiff did establish that, during the surviving limitations period, defendant publicly accused plaintiff of lying about her credentials, falsifying her certification, lying throughout the hiring process, and being a fraud or part of a fraudulent hiring scheme. The same statements are set forth in the complaint. Accordingly, defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is otherwise denied.

Slander and Slander Per Se

"The elements of a cause of action for defamation are (a) a false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, (b) published without privilege or authorization to a third party, (c) amounting to fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and (d) either causing special harm or constituting defamation per se" (see Kasavana v Vela, 172 AD3d 1042, 1044 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "A statement is defamatory per se if it (1) charges the plaintiff with a serious crime; (2) tends to injure the plaintiff in her or his trade, business or profession; (3) imputes to the plaintiff a loathsome disease; or (4) imputes unchastity to a woman" (id.; see Stiloski v Wingate, 241 AD3d 958, 961 [2d Dept 2025]).

(a) Actionable Statements Proven at Trial

Plaintiff established that, during the surviving limitations period, defendant publicly accused plaintiff of lying about her credentials, falsifying her certification, lying throughout the hiring process, and being a fraud or part of a fraudulent hiring scheme.

The Court credits plaintiff's testimony on this point. The Court also credits defendant's testimony to the extent defendant acknowledged that she spoke often at Town Board meetings, criticized plaintiff's qualifications and contract, and believed that she had publicly stated that plaintiff was part of a "patronage scheme" and was the "same politically connected fraud who falsified her certification and lied through the hiring process." The Court therefore finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant made oral statements accusing plaintiff of falsifying her certification, lying about her credentials, and lying through the hiring process.

(b) Fact Versus Opinion

"Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only facts are capable of being proven false, it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action" (VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d 78, 91 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, "[a]n expression of pure opinion is not actionable . . . no matter how vituperative or unreasonable it may be" (Kasavana v Vela, 172 AD3d at 1045 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In distinguishing fact from opinion, the Court considers whether the specific language has a precise meaning that is readily understood, whether the statement is capable of being proven true or false, and whether the context signals that the statement is likely to be opinion rather than fact (see Stiloski v Wingate, 241 AD3d at 961-962; VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d at 91).

Here, the statements that plaintiff falsified her certification, lied about her credentials, and lied throughout the hiring process were not merely loose rhetoric, hyperbole, or nonactionable opinion. Those statements had a precise meaning, were capable of being proven true or false, and implied facts concerning plaintiff's qualifications and honesty in obtaining the Town contract. The statements therefore constituted actionable assertions of fact.

(c) Falsity

The Court further finds that those statements were false. The evidence established that plaintiff obtained the CPDT-KA certification before the Town Board approved her contract in February 2017. There was no evidence adduced at trial that plaintiff falsified the certification, misrepresented that she possessed it when the contract was approved, or otherwise misrepresented her credentials during the hiring process or during the time she worked at the Shelter.

On this record, the statements that plaintiff falsified her certification, lied about her credentials, or lied throughout the hiring process were false.

(d) Publication and Fault

The evidence also established publication. Defendant made the statements at public Town Board meetings. Defendant acknowledged that she spoke often at those meetings and raised concerns regarding plaintiff's qualifications and contract. The statements were therefore published to third parties.

Plaintiff was required to prove fault amounting at least to negligence. The credible evidence established that, by the time the Town Board ultimately approved plaintiff's contract in February 2017, plaintiff had obtained the CPDT-KA certification. Given defendant's acknowledged familiarity with plaintiff's contract and qualifications, defendant knew or reasonably should have known that plaintiff had obtained the CPDT-KA certification before the Town Board approved the contract. The record does not establish that plaintiff falsified that certification or lied about having it when the contract was approved. Defendant nevertheless publicly accused plaintiff of falsifying her certification, lying about her credentials, and lying throughout the hiring process. Under these circumstances, and particularly given defendant's acknowledged familiarity with plaintiff's contract and qualifications, plaintiff established that defendant failed to exercise reasonable care before making those accusations.

(e) Slander Per Se

The Court also finds that the statements were defamatory per se. Accusations that plaintiff falsified her professional certification, lied about her credentials, and lied throughout the hiring process directly impugned plaintiff's honesty and fitness in her trade or profession as an animal behavior consultant and trainer. The statements therefore tended to injure plaintiff in her profession. Because the statements were defamatory per se, plaintiff was not required to plead or prove special damages to prevail (see Bisogno v Libertella, 247 AD3d 830, 833 [2d Dept 2026]).

(f) Public Figure / Actual Malice

Where a plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure, the plaintiff is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defamatory statements were published with actual malice (see Worob v Campbell, 246 AD3d 851, 853 [2d Dept 2026]; Udell v NYP Holdings, Inc., 169 AD3d 954, 956 [2d Dept 2019]). "Certain individuals may be considered public figures for all purposes while others 'may invite publicity only with respect to a narrow area of interest' and may fairly be considered public figures only where the alleged defamation relates to the publicity they sought' " (Gottwald v Sebert, 40 NY3d 240, 251 [2023], quoting James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415, 423 [1976]). "One becomes such a limited-purpose public figure through some 'purposeful activity,' by which the individual has 'thrust' themself 'into the public spotlight and sought a continuing public interest in [their] activities' (id., quoting James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d at 423; see Worob v Campbell, 246 AD3d at 855; Colantonio v Mercy Med. Ctr., 135 AD3d 686, 692 [2d Dept 2016]).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that plaintiff was a public official, an all-purpose public figure, or a limited-purpose public figure. Plaintiff was a private individual who obtained a contract to provide animal behavior services at a municipal shelter. Although her work related to a public facility and became the subject of public controversy, the evidence did not establish that plaintiff had pervasive fame or notoriety, or that she voluntarily injected herself into a public controversy to influence its outcome before the defamatory statements were made. Plaintiff's later press conference, media interviews, and political donations do not transform her into a public figure for purposes of defendant's accusations. Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to prove actual malice.

(g) Anti-SLAPP Law

Nor was plaintiff required to prove actual malice under the 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute. By order dated February 23, 2023, the Court (Rademaker, J.) previously determined that the 2020 amendments upon which defendant relies did not apply retroactively to this action. Defendant did not seek appellate review of that determination and did not move to renew or reargue that branch of the prior order. In any event, even if that issue were not already resolved by the prior order, this Court would independently determine that the 2020 amendments did not alter plaintiff's burden of proof at trial.

The 2020 amendments became effective on November 10, 2020, after this action was commenced. The broadened definition of an "action involving public petition and participation" contained in the 2020 amendments does not apply retroactively to claims pending before the effective date of the amended statute (see VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d at 89; Burton v Porcelain, 223 AD3d 775, 777-778 [2d Dept 2024]). Although the law concerning retroactivity does not necessarily bar prospective application of the amended fee and damages provisions to the continuation of a qualifying action after the effective date of the amendments (see Gottwald v Sebert, 40 NY3d at 258), that principle does not mean that defendant may rely on the 2020 amendments' broadened definition of an "action involving public petition and participation" in this pre-amendment action. Defendant has not established that this action otherwise qualified under the anti-SLAPP statute so as to impose an actual malice burden on plaintiff at trial. Accordingly, plaintiff was not required to prove actual malice under Civil Rights Law § 76-a.

Damages

Although plaintiff established liability for slander per se, she did not prove substantial compensatory damages. A plaintiff claiming lost earnings must establish those damages with reasonable certainty through competent evidence, such as tax returns, W-2s, pay stubs, payroll records, or other documentation (see Tarpley v New York City Tr. Auth., 177 AD3d 929, 932 [2d Dept 2019]; Deans v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 64 AD3d 742, 744 [2d Dept 2009]; Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494, 495 [2d Dept 2007]). Unsubstantiated testimony, without supporting documentation, is insufficient to establish lost earnings (see Tarpley v New York City Tr. Auth., 177 AD3d at 932; Ferrigno v County of Suffolk, 60 AD3d 726, 728 [2d Dept 2009]).

Here, plaintiff failed to establish lost earnings with reasonable certainty. Plaintiff testified that, under her contract with the Town, she was paid $60 per hour for up to 35 hours per week, and that, after the contract ended, she continued working for the Town as a kennel worker at $50 per hour. However, plaintiff did not submit W-2s, tax returns, pay stubs, invoices, or other income records establishing her actual earnings under the contract during 2017, 2018, or 2019. The contract established plaintiff's hourly rate and maximum compensated hours, but it did not establish the amount plaintiff actually earned during the contract period.

Nor did plaintiff establish that she earned less after the contract ended. Plaintiff's W-2s reflected that she earned $94,536.75 from the Town in 2020, $84,315 in 2021, and $87,083.75 in 2022. Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient proof that those earnings represented a loss attributable to the expiration or nonrenewal of the contract, as opposed to a change in title, hours, or other employment circumstances. Plaintiff also did not present testimony from any Town decision-maker or Town record establishing that defendant's statements caused the Town not to renew the contract, not to issue a new contract, or not to appoint plaintiff to another position.

Plaintiff's claimed damages after her January 2023 resignation are likewise too speculative. Plaintiff acknowledged that she voluntarily resigned from the Town. Although plaintiff testified that she resigned because of defendant's continued accusations, plaintiff did not present sufficient proof that her post-resignation loss of Town earnings was proximately caused by defendant's actionable statements, rather than by plaintiff's voluntary resignation or other circumstances.

Plaintiff also failed to prove damages arising from the alleged Town of Oyster Bay opportunity. Plaintiff testified that she believed she would receive a contract with the Town of Oyster Bay and that defendant later made similar accusations there. However, plaintiff did not submit a written offer, proposed contract, rate schedule, payroll record, or other documentation establishing the terms, duration, or value of the alleged opportunity. Nor did plaintiff present testimony from any Town of Oyster Bay decision-maker establishing that defendant's statements caused the Town of Oyster Bay not to contract with her. Any award based on the alleged lost Oyster Bay opportunity would therefore be speculative and tenuous.

Accordingly, while plaintiff proved slander per se, she failed to prove lost earnings or other special damages with reasonable certainty. To the extent plaintiff seeks punitive damages, the Court finds that plaintiff failed to establish the type of wanton, malicious, or morally culpable conduct sufficient to support such an award. The Court nevertheless finds that defendant's accusations that plaintiff falsified her certification, lied about her credentials, and lied throughout the hiring process caused plaintiff some reputational harm, embarrassment, and personal distress. Given the limited proof of damages, the absence of competent proof of lost earnings, and the nature of the actionable statements, the Court awards plaintiff modest general damages in the amount of $1,500.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law is granted to the extent that the first cause of action for libel and the second cause of action for libel per se are dismissed, and is otherwise denied; and it is further

ORDERED that, after trial, the third cause of action for slander is dismissed for failure to prove special damages; and it is further

ORDERED that, after trial, judgment is awarded in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on the fourth cause of action for slander per se only to the extent that cause of action is based upon defendant's oral statements that plaintiff falsified her certification, lied about her credentials, and lied throughout the hiring process; and it is further

ORDERED that the balance of the fourth cause of action is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff is awarded damages against defendant in the amount of $1,500.00, together with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: June 29, 2026

Mineola, NY

Hon. Gary M. Carlton, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court found defendant's claimed inability to recall whether she authored the Facebook posts unpersuasive. Defendant recalled, with specificity, statements she made at Town Board meetings and other public statements concerning plaintiff's qualifications, hiring, and contract. Her claimed inability to recall whether she authored social media posts bearing her name and addressing the same subject matter was not credible. Her assertion that other people had posted statements in her name was conclusory and unsupported. In any event, the Court need not rely upon the Facebook posts as independent proof of libel because, as discussed below, plaintiff failed to submit, as part of her direct case, the written publications necessary to prevail on the causes of action sounding in libel and libel per se.

Gary M. Carlton, J.