PIETRAS v. MIP HOLDINGS LTD (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of gender and national origin, the defendants MIP Holdings, Ltd., French Connection Group, Inc., French Connection Holdings, Inc., John Devoto, Scott Keller, sued herein as “Scott” (Defendant whose last name is currently unknown), and Renata Polinska, sued herein as “Renata” (Defendant whose last name is currently unknown), appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kerry J. Ward, J.), dated March 10, 2025.  The order denied those defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging discrimination, retaliation, aiding and abetting, negligence, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendants MIP Holdings, Ltd., French Connection Group, Inc., French Connection Holdings, Inc., John Devoto, Scott Keller, sued herein as “Scott” (Defendant whose last name is currently unknown), and Renata Polinska, sued herein “Renata” (Defendant whose last name is currently unknown) (hereinafter collectively the appellants), alleging that, during the time the plaintiff was employed as a textile worker from June 2023 through October 2024, inter alia, she and others similarly situated were discriminated against based upon their gender and national origin and were subject to sexual assault by another employee with the knowledge of the appellants.  In the complaint, the plaintiff asserted causes of action alleging, among other things, discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (NYSHRL) (first cause of action), discrimination under Administrative Code of the City of New York, title 8, chapter 1, § 8–107 (NYCHRL) (second and third causes of action), retaliation under the NYSHRL (fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action), aiding and abetting under the NYCHRL (seventh cause of action), negligence (eighth cause of action), and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (ninth cause of action) against the appellants.

The appellants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first through ninth causes of action insofar as asserted against them.  The appellants argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over MIP Holdings, Ltd., the holding company that acquired nonparty French Connection Group, PLC, and its subsidiaries, because MIP Holdings, Ltd., was incorporated in England and Wales and has its registered office in London, England.  The appellants further argued that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against them for the first through ninth causes of action.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.

In an order dated March 10, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the appellants' motion.  This appeal ensued.

“The ultimate burden of proving a basis for personal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting jurisdiction” (Qudsi v. Larios, 173 AD3d 920, 921).  “Where, as here, a party opposes a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion to dismiss on the ground that discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction is necessary, the party ‘need only demonstrate that facts may exist whereby to defeat the motion’ ” (Qudsi v. Larios, 173 AD3d at 921 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Peterson v. Spartan Indus., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 466).  “If it appears that facts essential to justify the opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, postpone resolution of the issue of personal jurisdiction” (id.;  see CPLR 3211[d] ).  “[T]he jurisdictional issue is likely to be complex.  Discovery is, therefore, desirable, indeed may be essential, and should quite probably lead to a more accurate judgment that one made solely on the basis of inconclusive preliminary affidavits” (Doe v. McCormack, 100 AD3d 684, 684 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion by denying, as premature, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) of the complaint insofar as asserted against MIP Holdings, Ltd., for lack of jurisdiction.  Under the particular circumstances of this case, the plaintiff established that facts “may exist” to exercise personal jurisdiction over MIP Holdings, Ltd., and has made a “sufficient start” to warrant disclosure on the issue of personal jurisdiction (Doe v. McCormack, 100 AD3d at 684 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

The Supreme Court also properly denied dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) of the first through ninth causes of action insofar as asserted against the appellants.  “Pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law ․, it is an ‘unlawful discriminatory practice’ for an employer, ‘because of an individual's age, race, creed, color, national origin, [or] sex ․ to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment’ ” (Castro v. City Univ. of N.Y., 238 AD3d 1106, 1107, quoting Executive Law § 296[1][a] ).  Similarly, the NYCHRL prohibits such discrimination (see Administrative Code § 8–107[1][a] ).

Contrary to the appellants' contention, when affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting the allegations as true, and providing the plaintiff with the benefit of every favorable inference (see Ayers v. Bloomberg, L.P., 203 AD3d 872, 873), the plaintiff has stated a claim for discrimination on the basis of both sex and national origin pursuant to the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL against the appellants (see generally id. at 874;  Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 AD3d 24, 38).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) of the first through third causes of action insofar as asserted against the appellants.

Pursuant to the NYSHRL, it is unlawful for “any person engaged in any activity to which [the NYSHRL] applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person because [he or she] has ․ opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL or because he or she has] filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL]” (Executive Law § 296[7] ).  The Supreme Court properly denied dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) of the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, each alleging retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL, insofar as asserted against the appellants, as the complaint sufficiently stated those causes of action by alleging that the plaintiff's employment was terminated shortly after she took a protected action (see Moscatelli v Woodbury Med. Practice, P.C., 241 AD3d 1453, 1456).

“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYCHRL], or to attempt to do so” (Administrative Code § 8–107[6] ).  “[F]ailure to conduct a proper and thorough investigation or to take remedial measures upon a plaintiff's complaint of discriminatory conduct is sufficient to impose liability on an aiding and abetting theory” (Ananiadis v Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc., 151 AD3d 915, 918).  Here, the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to the NYCHRL for aiding and abetting against the appellants (see Oluwo v. Sutton, 206 AD3d 750, 752).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) of the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against the appellants.

“The Workers' Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who seeks damages for unintentional injuries which he or she incurs in the course of employment” (Pereira v. St. Joseph's Cemetery, 54 AD3d 835, 836 [emphasis added] ).  “While an intentional tort may give rise to a cause of action outside the ambit of the Workers' Compensation Law, the complaint must allege an intentional or deliberate act by the employer directed at causing harm to this particular employee” (Miller v. Huntington Hosp., 15 AD3d 548, 549 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Contrary to the appellants' contention, the causes of action alleging negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law, since a question of fact has been raised as to whether the appellants authorized an intentional tort on the part of its employee (see Spoon v. American Agriculturalist, 120 A.D.2d 857, 860).

Furthermore, “[t]o establish a cause of action based on negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision, it must be shown that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” (Shor v. Touch–N–Go Farms, Inc., 89 AD3d 830, 831).  “The employer's negligence lies in having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which would most probably have been spared the injured party had the employer taken reasonable care in making decisions respecting the hiring and retention of the employee” (D.T. v Sports & Arts in Schs. Found., Inc., 193 AD3d 1096, 1097 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “Causes of action alleging negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision are not statutorily required to be pleaded with specificity” (Boyle v North Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 208 AD3d 744, 745).

Here, the plaintiff contends that the appellants were aware of the propensity of the employee who sexually assaulted her to sexually assault other workers, yet continued to employ him and allow him in situations where he could continue assaulting her and others.  Contrary to the appellants' contention, the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded causes of action alleging negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (see id.).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) of the eighth and ninth causes of action insofar as asserted against the appellants.

The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., FORD, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.