DEMONTE v. VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE CENTRE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Thomas Rademaker, J.), dated November 12, 2024.  The order granted the motion of the defendant Village of Rockville Centre for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On April 21, 2018, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell on a sidewalk pedestrian ramp located in the defendant Village of Rockville Centre.  Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the Village.  The Village moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, contending, inter alia, that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defective condition.  In an order dated November 12, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the Village's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“A municipality that has adopted a prior written notice law cannot be held liable for a defect within the scope of the law absent the requisite written notice, unless an exception to the requirement applies” (Carrozzi v. Village of Sag Harbor, 242 A.D.3d 820, 821, 242 N.Y.S.3d 737 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Douglas v. City of Mount Vernon, N.Y., 226 A.D.3d 973, 974, 209 N.Y.S.3d 174).  “To be entitled to summary judgment, the municipality must first establish that it lacked prior written notice of the alleged defect” (Douglas v. City of Mount Vernon, N.Y., 226 A.D.3d at 974, 209 N.Y.S.3d 174;  see Smith v. City of New York, 210 A.D.3d 53, 69, 175 N.Y.S.3d 529).  “Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to that rule—that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality” (Douglas v. City of Mount Vernon, N.Y., 226 A.D.3d at 974, 209 N.Y.S.3d 174 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Carrozzi v. Village of Sag Harbor, 242 A.D.3d at 821, 242 N.Y.S.3d 737).  “Alternatively, a plaintiff may raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the municipality did, in fact, have prior written notice of the alleged defective condition” (Kolenda v. Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 215 A.D.3d 647, 648, 187 N.Y.S.3d 669;  see Lyons v. Inc. Vil. of Garden City, 225 A.D.3d 679, 680, 207 N.Y.S.3d 127).

Pursuant to Code of the Village of Rockville Centre § 66–1, no civil action to recover damages for injuries caused by a sidewalk defect can be maintained against the Village unless the Village's Board of Trustees (hereinafter the Board) has received prior written notice of the defective condition.  Here, the Village established, prima facie, that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defect through the affidavit of a Village official, who averred that her search of the Village's records revealed no prior written notice of a dangerous or defective condition at the subject location (see O'Brien v. Village of Babylon, 196 A.D.3d 494, 496, 152 N.Y.S.3d 24;  Loghry v. Village of Scarsdale, 149 A.D.3d 714, 715–716, 53 N.Y.S.3d 318).

In opposition, the plaintiff, who failed to show that prior written notice was given to the Board, failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  While the Village's Department of Public Works was in possession of a purchase order regarding a repair to the subject sidewalk, there was no indication that the Board, the statutory designee, had received written notice.  A written request regarding a repair which is made to any municipal agent other than a statutory designee is insufficient to meet the requirements of prior written notice (see Gorman v. Town of Huntington, 12 N.Y.3d 275, 280, 879 N.Y.S.2d 379, 907 N.E.2d 292;  La Fleur v. Janowitz, 228 A.D.3d 636, 638, 213 N.Y.S.3d 143;  Brown v. County of Suffolk, 89 A.D.3d 661, 661, 931 N.Y.S.2d 685).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the Village's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

DILLON, J.P., IANNACCI, DOWLING and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.