PEOPLE v. DANIELS (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Michael Yavinsky, J.), rendered November 6, 2023, convicting him of assault in the first degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault in the first degree and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree arising out of an incident during which the defendant attacked the complainant with a box cutter, lacerating the complainant's jugular vein, and bit his nose.  The complainant testified at trial, inter alia, that on the night of the incident he and the defendant went to the complainant's apartment, where the defendant fell asleep, and that the attack occurred when the complainant attempted to rouse the defendant and told him to leave the apartment.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's request to charge the jury on the defense of justification.  “A trial court must charge the jury with respect to the defense of justification whenever, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is any reasonable view of the evidence which would permit the jury to conclude that the defendant's conduct was justified” (People v. Williams, 238 AD3d 1074, 1074 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Brown, 33 NY3d 316). “A justification defense is negated where the defendant was the initial aggressor” (People v. Williams, 238 AD3d at 1074 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Petty, 7 NY3d 277, 285). Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the defendant, no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that the complainant, rather than the defendant, was the “initial aggressor” (Penal Law § 35.15[1][b]; see People v. Ilagorre, 166 AD3d 899; People v. Giddens, 163 AD3d 990).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in sustaining the People's objection to certain testimony of the defendant's expert as to whether, generally, intoxicated persons can develop the intent to become violent (see People v. Brooks, 31 NY3d 939). The defendant's additional contentions regarding the scope of this expert's testimony, including that the court improperly prohibited the expert from testifying on the effect of intoxication on the defendant, are unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Angelo, 88 NY2d 217, 222) and, in any event, without merit (see e.g. People v. Powell, 37 NY3d 476, 489; People v. Cronin, 60 NY2d 430, 433).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of assault in the first degree as charged under count 2 of the indictment is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491–492). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of this count beyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 120.10[2] ).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on the count of assault in the first degree as charged under count 2 of the indictment was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., GENOVESI, DOWLING and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.