Anderson Alexander, respondent, v. City of New York, appellant. (2011)

Argued-February 17, 2011

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), entered January 15, 2010, which, upon the denial of its motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the plaintiff's case, upon a jury verdict, and upon an order of the same court dated February 27, 2009, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, or to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $5,043,893.88.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) which was to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the complaint is dismissed, and the order dated February 27, 2009, is modified accordingly.

The plaintiff, a former New York City Police Department (hereinafter NYPD) Detective, accidentally shot himself in the knee in a precinct station house office.   The plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, based on a claimed violation of Labor Law § 27-a, which requires, among other things, that public employers furnish their employees with a place of employment free from hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.   Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that this incident occurred when he leaned back in a swivel chair at an NYPD station house, in order to place a fellow officer's gun in his waistband.   At trial, the plaintiff testified that, when he leaned back in the chair, he began to “fall back” and the chair “collapse[d]” or “did not hold [his] weight.”   While the plaintiff was falling, he accidentally pulled the trigger on the gun, causing it to fire.   The plaintiff did not testify that the chair or part of the chair broke off or broke apart during this incident, and he testified that the back of the chair returned to its original position after the accident.   He further testified that, prior to the accident, he had not observed any defective condition of this chair.   At trial, although evidence was presented that another police detective had fallen out of a chair at the same station house approximately one or two years prior to the plaintiff's accident, no evidence was presented to show that the chair involved in the plaintiff's accident was the same type of chair as the one involved in the prior accident or that, prior to the plaintiff's accident, any employees of the NYPD had complained to supervisors about the plaintiff's chair.   Moreover, the detective involved in the prior accident testified that he had not reported his accident, but simply replaced his chair with another.   The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Further, the Supreme Court did not err in charging the jury that the principles of comparative negligence are inapplicable to actions commenced pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e (see Guiffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 72, 83;  Mullen v. Zoebe, Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 135, 142;  O'Connor v. City of New York, 280 A.D.2d 309;  Warner v. Adelphi Univ., 240 A.D.2d 730, 731-732).

However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law.   In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether there is any “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead [a] rational [person] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499).   Here, there was no valid line of reasoning which could have led to the conclusion that the claimed violation of Labor Law § 27-a resulted from the defendant's “neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1] ).   Specifically, while a defendant's general knowledge of a recurring or similar condition may, under some circumstances, establish that the requisite notice of that condition existed for purposes of liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e (see Terranova v. New York City Tr. Auth., 49 AD3d at 17-18;  O'Grady v. New York City Hous. Auth., 259 A.D.2d 442;  Lusenskas v. Axelrod, 183 A.D.2d at 249), here, there was no evidence showing that, prior to the occurrence that underlies the plaintiff's action, the defendant had knowledge of any defects in the chair involved in the accident.   Thus, for purposes of liability pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the defendant's culpability for the alleged violation of Labor Law § 27-a (see McCullagh v. McJunkin, 240 A.D.2d at 713-714;  Infante v. State of New York, 266 A.D.2d 130).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.

COVELLO, J.P., BELEN, HALL and COHEN, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Matthew G. Kiernan

Clerk of the Court