IN RE: PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY (2008)

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award dated January 23, 2007, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), dated June 15, 2007, which denied the petition.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On December 10, 2004, Mira Duncalf, an insured of Progressive Northern Insurance Company (hereinafter Progressive) was involved in an automobile accident with an insured of Sentry Insurance A Mutual Company (hereinafter Sentry).   On or about May 16, 2005, Progressive commenced an arbitration proceeding against Sentry with Arbitrations Forum, Inc. (hereinafter the arbitrator), seeking reimbursement, through a priority-of-payment claim (hereinafter the prior claim), of the first-party benefits paid to its insured (hereinafter the prior arbitration) (see generally Insurance Law § 5105;  11 NYCRR 65-3.12[b];  65-4.11).   In a decision and award dated July 11, 2006, the arbitrator denied the prior claim.

On or about September 19, 2006, Progressive commenced a second arbitration proceeding with the arbitrator seeking the same reimbursement, albeit through a loss-transfer claim (hereinafter the instant claim), against Sentry (hereinafter the instant arbitration).   In the instant arbitration, Sentry, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of res judicata.   In a decision and award dated January 23, 2007 (hereinafter the instant award), the arbitrator denied the instant claim on that ground.   Subsequently, Progressive commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the instant award.   The Supreme Court denied the petition.   We affirm.

 The arbitrator did not exceed its authority by rendering an award in favor of Sentry (see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii] ).   It was within the arbitrator's authority to determine the preclusive effect of the prior arbitration on the instant arbitration (see Matter of City School Dist. of City of Tonawanda v. Tonawanda Educ. Assn., 63 N.Y.2d 846, 848, 482 N.Y.S.2d 258, 472 N.E.2d 34;  Board of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist. v. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 48 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 424 N.Y.S.2d 122, 399 N.E.2d 1143;  Matter of Globus Coffee, LLC v. SJN, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 713, 714, 848 N.Y.S.2d 894;  Matter of Town of Newburgh v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 272 A.D.2d 405, 707 N.Y.S.2d 225;  see also Matter of County of Jefferson [Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff's Assn.], 265 A.D.2d 802, 695 N.Y.S.2d 841;  Matter of Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Office of Contract Arbitrator, 254 A.D.2d 194, 195, 680 N.Y.S.2d 4;  Rabinovich v. Shchegol, 251 A.D.2d 25, 672 N.Y.S.2d 709;  Matter of Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Port Auth. Police Sergeants Benevolent Assn., 225 A.D.2d 503, 639 N.Y.S.2d 808;  Matter of Birchwood Mgt. Corp. v. Local 670, Stationary Engrs., RWDSU, AFL-CIO, 154 A.D.2d 531, 546 N.Y.S.2d 153;  Vilceus v. North Riv. Ins. Co., 150 A.D.2d 769, 770, 542 N.Y.S.2d 26;  Matter of Resnick v. Serlin, 119 A.D.2d 825, 501 N.Y.S.2d 449;  Matter of Board of Educ., Florida Union Free School Dist. [Florida Teachers Assn.], 104 A.D.2d 411, 411-412, 478 N.Y.S.2d 935, affd. 64 N.Y.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 938, 476 N.E.2d 337).

Moreover, it is clear that the instant claim made by Progressive arose out of the same transaction as the prior claim that was denied in the prior arbitration (see Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269;  Matter of Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bonilla, 219 A.D.2d 708, 708-709, 631 N.Y.S.2d 438;  Matter of Ulster Elec. Supply Co. v. Local 1430, Intl. Bd. of Elec. Workers, 253 A.D.2d 765, 677 N.Y.S.2d 485).   While Progressive now alleges different facts regarding how the accident occurred, and a different theory upon which reimbursement is sought, the instant arbitration and the instant claim involve the same accident and the same parties, while Progressive seeks reimbursement of the same payments, albeit on a different legal theory (see Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269;  Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 290, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1375;  Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-193, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 429 N.E.2d 746;  Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172;  Marinelli Assocs. v. Helmsley-Noyes Co., Inc., 265 A.D.2d 1, 5, 705 N.Y.S.2d 571).

 Where, as here, the facts upon which the prior claim and the instant claim are based were related in time, space, and origin, and form a convenient trial unit, and their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations (see Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 289, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1375;  Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-193, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 429 N.E.2d 746;  Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172;  Flushing Plumbing Supply Co., Inc. v. F & T Mgt. & Parking Corp., 29 A.D.3d 855, 856, 815 N.Y.S.2d 257;  Couri v. Westchester Country Club, 186 A.D.2d 715, 716, 589 N.Y.S.2d 494;  Matter of Bauer v. Planning Bd. of Vil. of Scarsdale, 186 A.D.2d 129, 130, 587 N.Y.S.2d 726), the arbitrator's decision to bar the instant compulsory arbitration (see Insurance Law § 5105) was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by a “reasonable hypothesis” (Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 224, 652 N.Y.S.2d 584, 674 N.E.2d 1349;  see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 18 A.D.3d 762, 763, 796 N.Y.S.2d 112).   Thus, the instant award was not subject to vacatur under CPLR 7511(b)(1).

Progressive's remaining contentions are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.