Claudette J. Allen, Plaintiff, v. ANGOLOA CUNNINGHAM CUNIE CUNNINGHAM JAMES JONES (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Papers

Notice of Motion, Affirmation, and Exhibits 1-11

Affirmation in Opposition and Exhibit 12-13

Affirmation in Reply 14

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Upon review of the foregoing papers and argument held on April 27, 2026, the Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR § 3212, motion sequence number 003, is as follows:

The Plaintiff Claudette J. Allen (hereinafter "Plaintiff") commenced this action claiming that on December 21, 2024, at around 10 a.m., she suffered injuries as a result of a slip and fall accident that occurred on the public sidewalk abutting Defendants', Pink Plaza Management Inc., Angoloa Cunningham, Cunie Cunningham, and James Jones's homes located at 5310 and 5306 Snyder Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11203. Pink Plaza Management Inc. is the owner of 5310 Snyder Avenue, and Angoloa Cunningham, Cunie Cunningham, and James Jones own 5306 Synder Avenue. Plaintiff claims she injured her shoulder following the slip and fall, which resulted from icy conditions on the abutting sidewalk. Defendants Cunningham, Cunningham, and Jones cross-claimed against Pink Plaza Management Inc., who they claimed was negligent in their ownership, operation, maintenance, repair, and/or control of the subject sidewalk. Defendant Pink Plaza Management Inc. has failed to appear in this action.

Defendants Cunningham, Cunningham, and Jones (collectively "Defendants") move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them, on the ground that, under the City of New York Administrative Code § 7-210, they bear no liability for the alleged icy defect and condition of the sidewalk. Plaintiff opposed, arguing the motion is premature and discovery is necessary to determine the ownership, use, and structural configuration of the subject premises.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted.

ANALYSIS:

This action arises from a slip-and-fall incident in which Plaintiff alleges she sustained injuries after falling on a sidewalk abutting the adjoining residential properties. Plaintiff contends, this motion is premature, claiming no discovery has been conducted, and facts essential to oppose the motion, including ownership, occupancy, and use of the premises, are exclusively within Defendants' knowledge, as all named Defendants owned, controlled, or maintained the area where the fall occurred. Defendants now seek dismissal of the action, asserting the property at issue qualifies as a one, two, or three-family residential dwelling that is owner-occupied and used exclusively for residential purposes, thereby exempting them from liability under Administrative Code § 7-210(b).

A movant seeking summary judgment must establish, prima facie, entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate all material issues of fact from the case. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 (1986); Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 (1985). A defendant moving for summary judgment under the § 7-210 statutory exemption bears the burden of establishing that the property falls within the exemption. Klotz v. City of New York, 9 AD3d 392 (2nd Dept. 2004).

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT THE MOTION IS PREMATURE

At the outset, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion is not premature. While no depositions have been conducted, document discovery has taken place. Boorstein v. 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703 (2nd Dept. 2012). The issues raised by Defendants' motion, namely whether the premises qualify for the § 7-210 exemption, turn on facts that are not uniquely within Defendants' control. Boorstein v. 1261 48th St. Condo., 96 AD3d at 704. ("The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant.") This includes the precise ownership structure of the adjoining properties. Leitch-Henry v. Doe Fund, Inc., 179 AD3d 655, 655 (2nd Dept. 2020). Defendants have provided the Court and Plaintiff with copies of the respective deeds for 5306 and 5310 Snyder Avenue and New York City Department of Buildings Property Profile Overview highlighting the distinctions between the two properties. Etimos v. Casa Bella Prop. Mgt., LLC, 244 AD3d 1070, 1072 (2nd Dept. 2025). These documents show, 5306 and 5310 are located on two separate tax lots and are individually characterized as B2-2 family dwellings. Plaintiff did not specify what she is seeking in discovery that is in Defendants' control, and therefore here, failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence and that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively in the knowledge and control of Defendants. CPLR § 3212(f).

APPLICABILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 7-210 EXEMPTION

Defendants established prima facie, entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject premises constitute an exempt residential property within the meaning of Administrative Code § 7-210. Mullaney v. City of New York, 125 AD3d 948, 949 (2nd Dept. 2015). Section 7-210(a) imposes liability upon owners of real property abutting public sidewalks for injuries arising from negligent failure to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. However, the statute expressly exempts "one-, two-, or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes." NYC Admin. Code § 7-210(b).

Defendants demonstrated that the subject premises and the adjoining property are separate dwellings notwithstanding their partial attachment. Specifically, the properties occupy separate tax lots, maintain separate street addresses, contain distinct entrances and independent walkways, and operate as separate residential structures. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the mere fact that the homes are partially attached does not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they constitute a single dwelling for purposes of Administrative Code § 7-210. The Second Department has repeatedly focused upon the actual use and independent residential character of the premises when applying the statutory exemption. Faulk v. City of New York, 841 N.Y.S.2d 826 (2007); Lee v. Ilyasov, 95 AD3d 1205 (2nd Dept. 2012). The record establishes that the premises are two two-family residential dwellings that are owner occupied and used exclusively for residential purposes. Defendants Angoloa Cunningham and James Jones affirmed that they resided on one floor of the premises and rented the remaining residential unit.

Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant's prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

SNOW AND ICE REMOVAL EFFORTS

Plaintiff additionally argues that Defendants may have contributed to the icy condition by shoveling snow within the fenced portion of the property, allegedly causing melted snow to refreeze on the sidewalk. Cuapio v. Skrodzki, 106 AD3d 769 (2nd Dept. 2013). It is well established, a property owner may be held liable for a hazardous snow and ice condition on the sidewalk only if he or she "undertook snow and ice removal efforts that made the naturally occurring condition more hazardous or caused the defect to occur because of a special use." Mullaney v. City of New York, 125 AD3d at 949. An abutting landowner may not be held liable for removing ice or snow in an incomplete manner. Mullaney v. City of New York, 125 AD3d at 949; John v. City of New York, 77 AD3d 792, 793 (2nd Dept. 2010). Defendants made no special use of the area of the City-owned sidewalk on which Plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell. Campos v. Midway Cabinets, Inc., 51 AD3d 843 (2nd Dept. 2008). There is no indication Defendants created the condition, caused it to occur by special use, or took affirmative steps or snow removal efforts that exacerbated the icy condition of the sidewalk. Katz v. City of New York, 18 AD3d 818 (2nd Dept. 2005); Rudloff v. Woodland Pond Condominium Assn., 109 AD3d 810, 812 (2nd Dept. 2013).

Speculation that snow removal efforts may have contributed to ice formation is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Defendants submitted sworn affidavits expressly denying that any snow or ice removal efforts were undertaken in the area of Plaintiff's accident. Meyer v. City of New York, 114 AD3d 734, 735 (2nd Dept. 2014). Plaintiff, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact and did not submit any admissible evidence establishing that Defendants engaged in snow removal activities affecting the sidewalk or that any such efforts created or worsened the alleged icy condition. John v. City of New York, 77 AD3d at 793 (2nd Dept. 2014). Plaintiff's theory that snow shoveled within the fenced property area may have melted and refrozen onto the sidewalk is entirely speculative and unsupported by the record. No witness testimony, photographs, meteorological evidence, or expert proof was submitted connecting any alleged snow removal activity to the condition of the sidewalk at the time of the accident. Soussi v. Gobin, 87 AD3d 580, 581 (2nd Dept. 2011). Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant affirmatively created or exacerbated the alleged hazardous condition.

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the complaint and all relevant cross-claims are hereby dismissed against Defendants Cunningham, Cunningham, and Jones.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: June 16, 2026

Brooklyn, NY

HON. NORMA J. JENNINGS, J.S.C.

Norma J. Jennings, J.