Samuel Anokye, Plaintiff, v. SMA NESTOR POLANIA (2026)

The following papers efiled on NYSCEF were used on this motion: NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1, 8-10, 12-34.

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument,¹ and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows.

Question Presented

May a plaintiff confronted with the defendants' request for a CPLR 3017 (c) supplemental demand setting forth the total damages to which he deems himself entitled condition his own compliance on discovery being exchanged?

Background

On October 28, 2025, Plaintiff Samuel Anokye ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against defendants Nester J. Polania and SMA Raza, Inc (collectively "Defendants") to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a rear-end collision that occurred on November 11, 2024. Plaintiff sought general relief in excess of the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction but, consistent with New York pleading procedure governing personal injury actions, the complaint did not specify the total monetary relief sought (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1, ¶ 25.)

On February 18, 2026, Defendants filed their answer and separately requested of Plaintiff that within 15 days he provide a supplemental demand setting forth the amount of damages to which Plaintiff deemed himself entitled, pursuant to CPLR 3017 (c) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 9). Plaintiff objected to Defendants' "improper" demand on February 26, 2026, stating that "Plaintiff reserves his right to provide total damages at a later date in the case" (NYSCEF Doc No. 31).

Thereafter, Defendants' attorney replied to Plaintiff's objection via email with an ultimatum: either stipulate to cap damages at $74,999.99 or Defendants would remove the action to federal court (see NYSCEF Doc No. 14). Plaintiff's attorney rejected Defendants' proposal, maintaining that Plaintiff's compliance with Defendants' request for a supplemental demand was conditional on Defendants first serving discovery demands, including a demand for a verified bill of particulars (see NYSCEF Doc No. 15).

Following through on their ultimatum, Defendants removed this action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (see NYSCEF Doc No. 10). After the federal court's consideration, however, the case was remanded back to Supreme Court for failing to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement (see NYSCEF Doc No. 16).

Upon remand back to this court, Defendants moved, by order to show cause, to compel Plaintiff to meaningfully respond to its request for a supplemental demand pursuant to CPLR 3017 (c) (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 19, 24). Defendants contend, based on the plain meaning and overall procedural purpose of CPLR 3017 (c), that, since Plaintiff failed to provide an appraisal of total monetary damages within fifteen days of service of the request for a supplemental demand, the court should compel Plaintiffs to furnish "a meaningful written statement setting forth the total amount of monetary damages the plaintiff plans to seek in this action" (NYSCEF Doc No. 19 ¶ 18).

In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that compelling compliance with Defendants' request for a supplemental demand before any discovery has been exchanged would be "premature and improper" (NYSCEF Doc No. 29 ¶ 11). Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are attempting to "forum shop" and frustrate the discovery process (see NYSCEF Doc No. 29 ¶ 10).

Discussion

Demands for relief in personal injury and wrongful death actions "shall contain a prayer for general relief but shall not state the amount of damages to which the pleader deems himself entitled" (CPLR 3017 [c]). However, CPLR 3017 (c) provides an exception:

Provided, however, that a party against whom an action to recover damages for personal injuries or wrongful death is brought, may at any time request a supplemental demand setting forth the total damages to which the pleader deems himself entitled. A supplemental demand shall be provided by the party bringing the action within fifteen days of the request. In the event the supplemental demand is not served within fifteen days, the court, on motion, may order that it be served.

Trial courts in the First and Second Departments have given the operative language of CPLR 3017 (c) its plain meaning. For example, the Court in Ardelean v Affuso (35 Misc 3d 476, 477 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012]) held that a plaintiff's response to a supplemental demand that "[a] jury will decide the total damages to which the [p]laintiff is entitled to at the time of trial" was insufficient to comply with CPLR 3017 (c). The Court reasoned that "the plain language of the statute requires that the plaintiff provide a specific sum when met with a demand from defendants" (Ardelean, 35 Misc 3d at 477). Moreover, the Court in Doe v Dowling (2025 WL 2577649 [Sup Ct, NY County 2025]) held, based in part on the reasoning in Ardelean, that "compliance with CPLR 3017(c) is not discretionary and does not turn on procedural posture"; rather, compliance with a supplemental demand is required in all cases upon presentation of a proper demand made "at any time" in a personal injury or wrongful death action.²

Here, Defendants requested a supplemental demand for total monetary damages pursuant to CPLR 3017 (c) on February 18, 2026, to which Plaintiff has yet to comply (see NYSCEF Doc No. 9). The plain language of CPLR 3017 (c) does not make compliance conditional; rather, the statute's operational language that "[a] supplemental demand shall be provided by the party bringing the action within fifteen days of the request" commands unconditional compliance (CPLR 3017 [c] [emphasis added]).

Further, Plaintiff's argument that initial discovery requests must be first met by Defendants before Plaintiff can provide a supplemental demand is an unavailing one. For one, CPLR 3017 (c) is located within Article 30 of the CPLR, titled: "Remedies and Pleadings." CPLR 3017 governs remedies and pleadings—not rules of discovery disclosures as governed by CPLR Article 31. Turning to the construction of CPLR 3017 (c), the adjective, "supplemental," precedes the noun, "demand," indicating that the function of a "supplemental demand" is to amplify the "general demand for relief" which CPLR 3017 (c) requires for personal injury actions. In sum, CPLR 3017 (c) governs solely the pleader's damages, which is entirely within the purview of the pleader himself, vitiating any need for discovery from the opposing party.

The purpose of CPLR 3017 (c)—to ascertain an amount in controversy for removal of personal injury and wrongful death actions—is also instructive. To effectuate removal for diversity actions, the requisite amount in controversy must be known with explicit specificity (see 28 USC § 1446 [b ][3] ["if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable"]; Moltner v Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F3d 34, 38 [2d Cir 2010] [adopting a "bright line rule" by holding that the clock for removal does not start to run until the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought]). Since plaintiffs in personal injury actions are prohibited from pleading specific monetary damages, CPLR 3017 (c) has been widely invoked by defendants in removable personal injury actions, like the present defendants, to ascertain an amount in controversy (see David D. Siegal & Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 619 at 1225-26 [6th ed 2018]). CPLR 3017 (c), therefore, provides a vital procedural mechanism for the defendants in this case to ascertain the amount in controversy which is a precondition for removal to federal court. Moreover, in light of the fact that this case was already remanded due to the lack of ascertainment of the amount in controversy, holding that compliance with a supplemental demand may be made conditional would, in effect, encourage procedural gamesmanship geared toward frustrating a defendant's time-sensitive right  ³ to remove an action to federal court.

The motion by Defendants SMA Raza, Inc. and Nester J. Polina, seeking to compel Plaintiff Samuel Anokye to respond to Defendants' request for a supplemental demand pursuant to CPLR 3017 (c), is, therefore, granted.

Conclusion

It is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants' motion to compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiff shall serve a formal written response to the Defendants' CPLR 3017 (c) request which sets forth the total, definitive amount of monetary damages that the Plaintiff deems himself entitled to within twenty (20) days of service of this Decision and Order with notice of entry.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   Counsel are reminded of the provisions requiring that an opinion or decision be included in the record on appeal should one be taken (see CPLR 5526; 22 NYCRR 1250.7 [b] [4], [d] [1] [iii]). Transcripts may be procured from the court reporter (see Matter of Lewandowski v Office of Ct. Admin., 173 Misc 2d 335 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1997]).

2.   In Doe v Dowling, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's request for a supplemental demand because the defendants had not yet served an answer or filed a formal notice of appearance when the demand was made.

3.   28 USC 1446 (c) (1) provides: "A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action."

Aaron D. Maslow, J.* FN* This Court acknowledges the assistance of Nicholas Frosina, judicial intern and second year student at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, in the preparation of this decision.