FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS INC ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES SERIES 2004 v. IF LIVING THEIR RESPECTIVE HEIRS AT LAW NEXT OF KIN DISTRIBUTEES EXECUTORS ADMINISTRATORS TRUSTEES DEVISEES LEGATEES ASSIGNEES LIENORS CREDITSO AND SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST AND GENERALLY ALL PERSONS HAVING OR CLAIMING UNDER BY OR THROUGH SAID DEFENDANTS WHO MAY BE DECEASED BY PURCHASE INHERITANCE LIEN OR OTHERWISE ANY RIGHT TITLE OR INTEREST IN AND TO THE PREMISE DESCRIBED ALL OF WHOM AND WHOSE NAMES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE ARE UNKNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MAPLE BROOK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THERESA ROMONA JACKSON TANYA CATHERINE STEWART TANYA CATHERINE STEWART MCMILLAN BRIDGE STEWART ARNOLD MCMILLAN SR (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In this underlying foreclosure action, defendant Board of Directors of Maple Brook Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Board) cross-moves pursuant CPLR 3215 for a default money judgment against "Stewart Defendant," in the amount of $32,943.22 plus interest from January 1, 2023, plus attorneys' fees and disbursements.

Papers Considered NYSCEF Doc No. 93-101

1. Notice of Cross Motion/Affirmation of Steven E. Waldinger, Esq./Exhibits 1-3/ Affirmation of Justine Broderick/ Exhibits A-B/ Affirmation of Service

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on July 11, 2023 by filing a summons and complaint, certificate of merit and notice of pendency. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on June 12, 2025. Plaintiff brought this underlying action to foreclose a mortgage dated January 27, 2004 executed by borrower Sherri L. Stewart to secure a loan against real property located at 211 Sand Piper Court, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Sherri L. Stewart breached her obligation by failing to tender the installment which became due and payable on October 1, 2022.

In brief, the borrower/mortgagor, Sherri L. Stewart, was served with the summons and complaint on July 18, 2023. Stewart did not answer the complaint or appear in this action in any way. Stewart passed away on October 18, 2023. At the time of her death Stewart was in default in appearing in this action. Plaintiff alleged that upon information and belief, Stewart died intestate as a search did not disclose any probate or administration proceedings in the County where the mortgagor last resided. Plaintiff also alleged that it was unaware of any appointment of any estate representative, and sought to proceed against the deceased's heir's at law. According to plaintiff, as this is a proceeding in rem, and plaintiff seeks to amend the Complaint to remove any claim against Stewart or the estate personally, an estate representative is not a necessary party to this action.

Pursuant to a decision and order dated June 2, 2025, this Court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem for the unknown heirs and distributees.

The Board filed an answer to the amended complaint and cross claims on June 16, 2025. The answer alleges that Defendant Stewart Estate is the record owner of the property designated as Unit No. 211 Sand Piper Court, Yorktown Heights, NY. Further, Defendant Stewart Estate, as owner of the unit, failed to pay common charges duly assessed by the Board against the Unit. According the Board, Real Property Law provides the Board with a continuing lien for unpaid common charges.¹ The answer alleges that, as of June 1, 2025, defendant Stewart Estate owed $28,418.22 for common charges. The Board's first cross claim seeks to secure a money judgment against Defendant Stewart Estate for unpaid common charges and other assessments. The second cross claim seeks to foreclose the Board's lien upon proper motion, in the event that the plaintiff fails to diligently prosecute this action or the Court finds the Board's lien is superior to the plaintiff's.

In motion sequence 003, plaintiff moved for summary judgment and an order of reference in the foreclosure action. In motion sequence 005, plaintiff moved to discontinue the action, discharge the Guardian Ad Litem and cancel the notice of pendency. Pursuant to a decision and order dated June 22, 2026, this Court granted the motion to discontinue. As a result of discontinuing the action, the motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. The Court specifically held that the discontinuance of plaintiff's action shall not affect the cross claims asserted by the Board, which remain pending and will be addressed in motion sequence 004.

Instant Motion

The Board now cross-moves for default judgment. The Board alleges that it has asserted cross claims for a money judgment against Stewart Defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay duly assessed common charges and other fees. Further, defendant failed to answer the cross claims and is now in default.

In support of the cross motion, the Board submits an affirmation from Justine Broderick, property manager. Broderick affirms that she is submitting the affirmation in support of the cross motion against defendant Unknown Heirs at Law of Sherri L. Stewart, et al. Broderick affirms that pursuant to the Declaration and the By Laws, which are annexed to the motion, the Board is charged with the duty of collecting common charges from unit owners. The Board delegated the duty to the managing agent. Broderick affirms that Stewart Defendant is the owner of the unit. Broderick submits an account history showing that Stewart Defendant owes $32,943.22 for unpaid common charges, assessments, late fees and attorneys' fees through January 15, 2026. Broderick also affirms that the Board has incurred $900.00 in legal fees as a result of the defendant's continued delinquency and that the Board is entitled to these fees pursuant to the relevant contracts. The owner payment history lists Sherri LaVette Stewart as the unit owner.

In sum, the Board argues that it is entitled to a default judgment as Stewart Defendant failed to answer or appear and it has demonstrated that Stewart Defendant breached her contract with the Board by failing to pay common charges and other charges. The Board is seeking a money judgment in the amount of $32,943.22 plus $9,170.85 in statutory interest against Stewart Defendant.

The motion is unopposed.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to CPLR 3215 (a), "[w]hen a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial, . . . the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him." In support of a default judgment, in relevant part, a plaintiff "shall file proof of service of . . . a summons and notice serviced pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 . . . , and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due by affidavit made by the party . . . ." CPLR 3215 (f. "The standard of proof is not stringent, amounting only to some firsthand confirmation of the facts." Feffer v Malpeso, 210 AD2d 60, 61 (1st Dept 1994).

"[D]efaulters are deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that flow from them." Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 71 (2003). However, "CPLR 3215 does not contemplate that default judgments are to be rubber-stamped once jurisdiction and a failure to appear have been shown. Some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action." Guzetti v City of New York, 32 AD3d 234, 235 (1st Dept 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the Board has submitted an affirmation and documentation showing defendant's responsibility to pay the common charges and defendant's responsibility to pay attorney's fees and costs resulting from the failure to do so. Detailed account statements were provided showing defendant's failure to pay the common charges.

Given the record, the Board has established the existence of unpaid common charges/assessments in breach of the declaration and bylaws and also the default of the defendants. However, the Board has failed to establish its entitlement to a money judgment against any identified defendant. The Board's cross motion seeks a default money judgment against "Stewart Defendant," which is defined in the pleadings as unknown heirs, distributees, executors, administrators and other persons claiming an interest in the premises. Similarly, the cross claims are asserted against "Defendant Stewart Estate," also defined by the Board as defendant unknown heirs at law of Sherri L. Stewart. To the extent that the unit owner died during the pendency of the action, in general, substitution of a personal representative is required before claims may proceed. See CPLR 1015 (a); see also Jordan v City of New York, 23 AD3d 436, 437 (2d Dept 2005) ("A party may not commence a legal action or proceeding against a dead person, but must instead name the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Nor can a party enter a personal judgment against a decedent").

In any event, while a defaulting defendant is deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint, the Board has not demonstrated that a representative of the unit owner's estate has been appointed or, in the alternative, that any named defendant remains personally liable for the debt. Accordingly, the cross motion seeking a default money judgment is denied, as the Board failed to establish entitlement to a money judgment against a proper party.

Although the cross motion seeking a default money judgment is denied without prejudice, the Court makes no determination herein concerning the Board's remaining cross claims related to lien foreclosure or any other relief not sought in the present motion.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant Board of Directors of Maple Brook Homeowners Association, Inc.'s cross motion pursuant CPLR 3215 for a default money judgment against "Stewart Defendant," is denied.

Dated: June 22, 2026

White Plains, New York

HON. WILLIAM J. GIACOMO, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Real Property Law 339-z is part of the Condominium Act and is inapplicable to homeowner's associations. This distinction is irrelevant for this motion, as a contractual lien may still arise under the Declaration.

William J. Giacomo, J.