RAMON v. RAMON (2008)

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered June 28, 2005, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), entered November 6, 2006, as, without a hearing, denied that branch of his motion which was to modify a provision of the parties' stipulation of settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into the parties' judgment of divorce, by imposing a cap on the amount of combined parental income upon which annual modifications of his child support obligations may be based.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

 A stipulation of settlement in a matrimonial action is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation (see Petrovich v. Obradovic, 40 A.D.3d 1063, 1065, 837 N.Y.S.2d 265;  Clark v. Clark, 33 A.D.3d 836, 837, 827 N.Y.S.2d 159;  Sieratzki v. Sieratzki, 8 A.D.3d 552, 779 N.Y.S.2d 507;  DeLuca v. DeLuca, 300 A.D.2d 342, 751 N.Y.S.2d 766).   Where the stipulation is “clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from within the four corners of the instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence” (Rainbow v. Swisher, 72 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 531 N.Y.S.2d 775, 527 N.E.2d 258;  see Perry v. Perry, 13 A.D.3d 508, 509, 787 N.Y.S.2d 105;  Douglas v. Douglas, 7 A.D.3d 481, 482, 776 N.Y.S.2d 90).

 In this case, the child support provisions of the parties' stipulation of settlement, which were incorporated but not merged into the parties' divorce judgment, provided that the child support obligation would be adjusted annually to reflect “income changes and major financial changes” of the parties “according to the Child Support Standards Act” (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b] ).  The stipulation set forth both the initial annual and monthly payments of child support to be made by the defendant-amounting to the statutory guideline percentage rate of 17% applicable to his total income, less certain deductions (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b] [b] [3][I] )-and set forth his income as of the date of the stipulation, which substantially exceeded $80,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][c] ).

The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant failed to establish that the stipulation was unfair or inequitable at the time it was made, or that a substantial, unanticipated, and unreasonable change in circumstances had occurred resulting in a concomitant need (see Merl v. Merl, 67 N.Y.2d 359, 362, 502 N.Y.S.2d 712, 493 N.E.2d 936;  Matter of Davis v. Davis, 13 A.D.3d 623, 624, 787 N.Y.S.2d 113;  Rich v. Rich, 234 A.D.2d 354, 651 N.Y.S.2d 107), so as to warrant its modification.

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in failing to impose a cap on the combined parental income, upon which his child support obligation may be based, is without merit.   The stipulation of settlement contains no provision for such a cap (see Phillips v. Phillips, 300 A.D.2d 642, 644, 754 N.Y.S.2d 297).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.