LAURA WW v. PETER WW (2008)

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Peckham, J.), entered August 8, 2007 in Delaware County, which granted plaintiff's application for counsel fees, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.

In this action, after entry of a judgment of divorce, plaintiff moved for an order directing defendant to pay her counsel fees.   After a hearing, Supreme Court granted the motion and entered a judgment in the amount of $5,047.50.   Defendant appeals, and we now affirm.

 The facts of this case are more completely set forth in our decision affirming the judgment of divorce (Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 51 A.D.3d 211, 856 N.Y.S.2d 258 [decided herewith] ).   Defendant does not challenge the calculated amount of fees, but argues that Supreme Court abused its discretion in finding that he should bear the cost of those fees because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not pay them herself.   It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to award counsel fees in a matrimonial action (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a];  Bellinger v. Bellinger, 46 A.D.3d 1200, 1203, 847 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2007];  Farrell v. Cleary-Farrell, 306 A.D.2d 597, 600, 761 N.Y.S.2d 357 [2003] ).   Where the trial court has considered all relevant factors, the determination should not be disturbed unless the award is clearly unjustified (see Holterman v. Holterman, 307 A.D.2d 442, 444, 762 N.Y.S.2d 152 [2003], affd. 3 N.Y.3d 1, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765 [2004];  Vicinanzo v. Vicinanzo, 193 A.D.2d 962, 966, 598 N.Y.S.2d 362 [1993] ).

 Here, Supreme Court appropriately considered the relevant factors, including the relative disparity in the parties' income, even after child support was subtracted from defendant's income and added to plaintiff's income, the balanced equitable distribution of the marital assets, and the parties' other resources and obligations. Defendant's reliance on the fact that plaintiff took title to the marital home is unavailing;  “[t]he fact that [the prevailing party] is employed and has some financial resources of [his or] her own is not dispositive” (Mac Murray v. Mac Murray, 187 A.D.2d 840, 841, 589 N.Y.S.2d 708 [1992];  see Harrington v. Harrington, 300 A.D.2d 861, 864-865, 752 N.Y.S.2d 430 [2002] ).   Under these circumstances, we cannot find that Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding counsel fees (see Coon v. Coon, 29 A.D.3d 1106, 1112, 814 N.Y.S.2d 781 [2006];  Holterman v. Holterman, 307 A.D.2d at 444, 762 N.Y.S.2d 152;  Zielinski v. Zielinski, 252 A.D.2d 800, 801, 676 N.Y.S.2d 252 [1998] ).

ORDERED that the order and judgment are affirmed, without costs.

SPAIN, J.

CARDONA, P.J., CARPINELLO, KAVANAGH and STEIN, JJ., concur.