Cecil Pressley, Plaintiff, v. GREENBURGH GRAHAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GREENBURGH GRAHAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2026)

The following papers were read on the above referenced motion:

PAPERS/NUMBERED

Motion Seq. No. 1 7-13, 24-27, 39-41

Motion Seq. No. 2 14-18, 28-31, 34-38

In Motion Sequence No. 1, Defendant GRAHAM WINDHAM (hereinafter, "Graham-Windham") moves for an Order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5), to dismiss the Verified Complaint against it since it is time-barred.

In Motion Sequence No. 2, Defendants GREENBURGH-GRAHAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT; and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GREENBURGH-GRAHAM UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT (collectively, the "School District") move for an Order pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(5), to dismiss the Verified Complaint against them since it is time-barred.

Background

On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action by Summons and Verified Complaint, pursuant to the New York Child Victims Act of 2019 (hereinafter, "CVA"). The Verified Complaint alleges Plaintiff, who was born in July 2002, was 13 years old in 2016 attending The Graham School, when he was sexually abused by "John Doe," Defendants' employee. Plaintiff was not of age when the CVA statute became effective on February 14, 2019. The Plaintiff turned 18 years old in July 2020.

Argument

Motion Sequence No. 1

In support of its pre-answer motion to dismiss, Graham-Windham argues, since the incident occurred in 2016, the statute of limitations that existed prior to enactment of the CVA should apply and the action is time-barred. Since Plaintiff's claims are for sexual offenses which fall within the former CPLR § 213-C, Graham-Windham argues Plaintiff only has three-years after he turned 18 to commence this action. The Defendant argues the statute of limitations ran out in July 2023, pursuant to CPLR § 208, when Plaintiff turned twenty-one, barring him from filing this action. Defendant argues, even if Plaintiff received a benefit due to the Covid-19 pandemic moratorium, the Plaintiff could have filed his lawsuit by November 6, 2023, and did not.

Defendant further argues, the legislative intent behind the amended statute CPLR § 208(b) is to prospectively allow victims of sexual abuse, after enactment of the statute, to file claims up to the age of 55. Since amended CPLR § 208(b) is silent on retroactivity, Defendant argues the revised statute only applies to CVA claims accruing after its enactment on February 14, 2019.

Plaintiff argues Defendant misapplies the law and its legislative intent, asserting the plain meaning of the CVA establishes the amended CPLR § 208(b) extension to age 55 applies to all viable claims at the time of its enactment. Since the Plaintiff maintained a viable claim at the time the statute was enacted, and turned 18 after, he has the right to commence the instant lawsuit until he turns fifty-five.

Plaintiff further argues, when examining its legislative history, the purpose of the CVA was to expand access to justice to victims similarly situated. To prevent CVA victims to commence actions within 3 years after turning 18 would contradict the Legislature's intent to make victims of sexual assault whole. Allowing victims until 55 years of age to commence a CVA action would help victims ascertain the long-term effects of the childhood trauma, which may not manifest until late in one's life.

Motion Sequence No. 2

The School District also contends the pre-CVA, three-year statute of limitations determines Plaintiff is time-barred from commencing the underlying action. Defendant argues the statute of limitations under former CPLR § 208 must apply, since the alleged abuse occurred in 2016, before the CVA was enacted. Defendant claims the statute of limitations expired in July 2023, on Plaintiff's twenty-first birthday, precluding him from thereafter filing this action.

The School District also argues the legislative intent of amended CPLR § 208(b) demonstrates the statute must receive proactive, not retroactive, application. Defendant asserts Plaintiff's claims accrued before the statute's enactment and he cannot benefit from the expanded statute of limitations.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant misapplies the law and its legislative intent, asserting the plain meaning of the CVA establishes the amended CPLR § 208(b) extension to age 55 applies to all existing viable claims at the time of its enactment. Since Plaintiff maintained a viable at the time of enactment, he has the right to file the instant lawsuit until he turns 55 years of age. Plaintiff argues the legislative record confirms the CVA was enacted to expand access to justice to victims like him, and an exclusion of Plaintiff's claims would frustrate the remedial design and create a divide among sexual abuse survivors.

Discussion

" 'To dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie that the time in which to sue has expired.' " (Swift v. New York Med. Coll, 25 AD3d 686, 687 [2d Dep't 2006]; citing Savarese v. Shatz, 273 AD2d 219, 220 [2d Dep't 2000]). "In order to make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued." (Id.). " 'The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations' or whether the statute of limitations has been tolled.' " (BCVAWCA-DOE v. Cerone, 243 AD3d 866, 867 [2d Dep't 2025]; citing Cammarato v. 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC, 216 AD3d 903, 904 [2d Dep't 2023]; quoting Osborn v. DeChiara, 165 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2d Dep't 2018]).

Effective February 14, 2019, the Child Victims Act, amended the statute of limitations to commence civil actions against any party for physical, psychological, or other injury suffered as a result of conduct that would constitute a sexual offense under certain specified sections of the Penal Law committed against a minor. "Prior to enactment of the CVA, the applicable statute of limitations for such actions typically would begin to run when the victim reached the age of 18," due to their infancy when the abuse occurred. (Meyer v. State of New York, 213 AD3d 753, 754 [2d Dep't 2023]; see former CPLR 208 [L 1986, ch 485, § 1]). Under the old CPLR § 208, the statute of limitations expired three years after the victim turned 18 years old. (Id.).

"The CVA, inter alia, [amended] the statute of limitations in two respects. First, the CVA amended CPLR 208 to add subdivision (b), which provides that civil actions brought for injuries 'suffered . . . as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense' that was committed against a person younger than 18 years of age, may be commenced by that person until the plaintiff reaches age 55." (BCVAWCA-DOE v. Cerone, 243 AD3d 866, 868 [2d Dep't 2025]; citing amended CPLR § 208 [b]). In addition, the legislature passed CPLR § 214-g  ¹ , which provided for a "revival window" for claims which were previously barred by the statute of limitations.

The issue in the underlying motions is whether the extension of the statute of limitations, pursuant to the amended CPLR § 208(b), applies retroactively to plaintiffs who allege sexual abuse occurring prior to the statutory effective date of February 14, 2019, and turned 18 after said date. "The general rule for retroactive application of a statute is that statutes are construed as prospective, unless the language of the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, requires that it be given a retroactive construction. But '[remedial] statutes constitute an exception to the general rule that statutes are not to be given a retroactive operation, but only to the extent that they do not impair vested rights' (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes [hereafter Statutes], § 54, subd a). Remedial statutes are those 'designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by generally giving relief to the aggrieved party' (Statutes, § 35)." (Coffman v. Coffman, 60 AD2d 181, 188 [2d Dep't 1977]).

' "It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.' " (Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]) (internal citations omitted). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof." (Id.). " 'In construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning." (Id.) (internal citations omitted).

Amended CPLR § 208(b) states, in relevant part:

. . . [W]hich conduct was committed against such person who was less than eighteen years of age, such action may be commenced, against any party whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of said conduct, on or before the plaintiff or infant plaintiff reaches the age of fifty-five years . . . (NY CLS CPLR § 208(b)).

The language of the statute does not explicitly state whether it should be applied proactively or retroactively. "Whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retroactively generally requires determination of legislative intent." (Duell v. Condon, 84 NY2d 773, 783 [1995]) (internal citations omitted).

The Legislative Memorandum justifying passage of the CVA states, in relevant part:

. . . This legislation would open the doors of justice to the thousands of survivors of child sexual abuse in New York State by prospectively extending the statute of limitations to . . . age 55 for bringing civil actions for physical, psychological or other injury suffered as a result of child sexual abuse against any party whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the abuse . . . (Senate Introducer's Memo in Support, Bill Jacket, S2440, L 2019, ch 11 at 7).

The Legislature recognized the victims do not process their childhood sexual abuse until well into middle age. The Legislature intended to remedy the original tolling period under CPLR § 208 by extending it, from three years after the victim turns 18, to the age of 55 years old. The beneficial purpose of this remedial statute is to extend the time for victims of childhood sexual abuse to decide to pursue a right of action against their abusers after they have processed their physical, mental and emotional trauma.

Since in torts, a cause of action accrues at the time of the injury (see Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 93 NY2d 525, 529 [1999]), this Court finds CPLR § 208(b) should be applied retroactively to claims which accrued as of the date of enactment but were tolled due to infancy. "[E]ven though the amended statute does not explicitly speak to retroactivity, its language is indicative of a legislative intent [to] have retroactive application." (In re OnBank & Trust Co., 90 NY2d 725, 730. [1997]).

Plaintiff was thirteen years old in 2016 when his claims allegedly accrued. Under the prior statute of limitations, those claims were tolled until his 18th birthday, which was in July 2020. Since Plaintiff was not yet 18 years old when the CVA was enacted on February 14, 2019, Plaintiff was entitled to the extended tolling of the statute of limitations up to the age fifty-five. The Defendants have not met their prima facie burden of proving the statute of limitations expired, as Plaintiff was not yet 55 years old when this action was commenced.

Any contentions or allegations of the parties not specifically addressed herein have been considered and are without merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Verified Complaint as time-barred, are denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: June 15, 2026

White Plains, New York

E N T E R:

HON. DORIS M. GONZALEZ, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   CPLR § 214-g originally opened a one-year revival window commencing August 14, 2019, for any acts of sexual abuse, regardless of when they occurred. By legislative act and executive order, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, that window was extended to 2021. Since the underlying action was commenced by Summons and Complaint in 2025, approximately four years after the revival window closed, Plaintiff would not have timely commenced this matter under CPLR § 214-g.

Doris M. Gonzalez, J.