Vanessa Rawlins, Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC (2026)

Introduction

This matter arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on February 9, 2019. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred on Belmont Avenue at or near its intersection with Hinsdale Street in Kings County, New York. Plaintiff claimed she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband, Anderson Newlin Rawlins, which was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Defendant Soe Myint, who was logged in to the ride-sharing app of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. The latter denied the allegations of the complaint, specifically allegations pertaining to its being vicariously liable for Defendant Soe Myint's negligence. The matter was assigned to this Court for trial.

On November 7, 2022, an order was issued granting Plaintiff summary judgment on liability with respect to Defendant Soe Myint, i.e., he was held liable for the occurrence of the subject accident. As such, Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against Uber Technologies, Inc. was the only claim at issue in the liability phase of this trial.

Alternate Juror No. 4 submitted a note to the Court after testimony concluded on the first day of the trial, June 8, 2026. He informed the Court that he had been scheduled to speak at a Zoom webinar which would occur during the second day of the trial, June 16, 2026. He also mentioned that he was the best man for a wedding and had planned a bachelor party for July 3rd through the 11th. On June 9, 2026, the Court held a virtual conference with the attorneys for the parties, and none of the attorneys opposed the excusal of Alternate Juror No. 4. Following the conference, the Court issued an order on June 9th that Juror No. 4 was excused.

Discussion

There is no provision in the law specifically addressing the excusal of an alternate juror. Rather, the relevant statutes and case law address the excusal of regular jurors. Therefore, the Court will apply the same criteria for excusing an alternate juror that the statute provides with respect to a regular juror.

Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 4106 provides, with respect to excusing jurors: "At any time, before or after the final submission of the case, if a regular juror dies, or becomes ill, or is unable to perform the duties of a juror, the court may order that juror discharged and draw the name of an alternate, or retained alternate, if any, who shall replace the discharged juror, and be treated as if that juror had been selected as one of the regular jurors. Once deliberations have begun, the court may allow an alternate juror to participate in such deliberations only if a regular juror becomes unable to perform the duties of a juror." It is clear from Alternate Juror No. 4's note that the only basis on which he could be excused under CPLR 4106 is if he was "unable to perform the duties of a juror," as neither death nor illness applied.

To determine what may constitute an inability to perform the duties of a juror, the Court first looks to Holmes v Weissman (251 AD2d 1078 [4th Dept 1998]). The court in Holmes held: "Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in discharging a juror during plaintiff's direct case because of a demonstrated financial hardship (see, CPLR 4106). The juror provided the sole financial support for his family and could not suffer the loss of salary for the anticipated duration of the trial. Under the circumstances, serving on the jury would have been more than an inconvenience (see, People v. Edmonds, 223 AD2d 455, lv denied 88 NY2d 984." Holmes provides an example of a circumstance, financial hardship, that may render a juror unable to perform the duties of a juror, even though the circumstance does not involve death or illness. Similarly, Alternate Juror No. 4's scheduling conflicts fell within the category of circumstances that made him unable to perform the duties of a juror.

Mark v Colgate University (53 AD2d 884 [2d Dept 1976]) also examines the phrase in CPLR 4106 allowing excusal where a juror is unable to perform the duties of a juror. In Mark, a juror unleashed an outburst against an attorney in the middle of trial. The attorney made an application for the juror to be excused, which the trial court denied in error. The juror's outburst was an example of a circumstance that prevented the juror from performing the duties of a juror under the general exception in CPLR 4106. The Appellate Division in Mark held that the general exception is not limited to reasons similar to death or illness; rather, it may include any reason that prevents a juror from performing the duties of a juror. Applied to the facts of this case, Alternate Juror No. 4's unavailability likewise fell within the general exception in CPLR 4106.

In contrast, Troutman v. 957 Nassau Rd., LLC (70 AD3d 672, 673-74 [2d Dept 2010]) demonstrates that a juror may not be excused based on mere speculation. In Troutman, the juror stated that she knew one of the witnesses and would occasionally say hello to her but also stated that she did not believe this would make her biased. Defense counsel made an application to replace her with an alternate, which the court granted in error. The Appellate Division held that it was speculative to assume bias might arise in the future when there was no evidence that the juror was biased. Here, unlike in Troutman, the basis for excusing Alternate Juror No. 4 is not speculative. His note identified concrete scheduling conflicts that prevented him from being available during trial.

In Caldwell v. New York City Tr. Auth. (203 AD3d 6 [2d Dept 2021]), the Appellate Division emphasized that courts should exercise greater caution when excusing jurors after deliberations have begun. The court in Caldwell held that defendants were deprived of the constitutional and statutory right to a civil jury trial of six persons who deliberated on all matters, as well as the right to poll each of jurors whose votes were counted as part of verdict, when the trial court permitted a regular juror to be substituted with an alternate juror after deliberations had begun without instructing the jurors to restart their deliberations from the beginning with the substituted juror. Thus, Caldwell demonstrates that once deliberations have commenced, the court must take care to protect the parties' right to a verdict rendered by the jurors who fully participated in deliberations.

Similarly, in Avila v City of New York (73 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2010]), a juror became distressed, fearing that another juror was physically threatening her, and expressed concern about her ability to render a fair verdict. The trial court excused her without interviewing all the jurors and without the consent of the defense. The Appellate Division held that this decision constituted error. As in Caldwell, the court expressed particular concern with excusing a juror after deliberations had begun and indicated that greater effort should be made to avoid excusal at that stage.

As Caldwell and Avila demonstrate, case law reflects heightened concern when a juror is excused after deliberations have begun. Here, however, deliberations had not yet begun. Therefore, excusing Alternate Juror No. 4 did not raise the same concerns about infringing on any party's right to a verdict from six jurors who were present for the entirety of deliberations.

Even after deliberations have begun, there are some circumstances in which a court may excuse a juror. For example, in Kraemer v. Zimmerman (249 AD2d 159 [1st Dept 1998]), a juror repeatedly stated that he had already made up his mind about the verdict, and was properly excused. Thus, the Court retains discretion to excuse a juror both before and after deliberations, though that discretion is more constrained once deliberations have commenced.

In this case, because deliberations had not yet begun, it was within the Court's discretion to excuse Alternate Juror No. 4 pursuant to the general exception in CPLR 4106 and in accordance with the relevant case law. Participation in a Zoom meeting can be of importance. Being a best man and attending a bachelor party can be a major event within one's friendship circle, and there are times where flexibility is called for on the part of a Court in determining whether to treat a proffered excuse as falling within the ambit of "unable to perform the duties of a juror" (CPLR 4106). This flexibility should be applied more so when an alternate juror, as opposed to a juror, is seeking excusal, as was the situation herein. In addition, three other alternate jurors were available if a juror had to be excused.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court determined that it was proper and in conformity with law to excuse Alternate Juror No. 4.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

Aaron D. Maslow, J.* FN* This Court acknowledges the assistance of Stella Buch, judicial intern and junior at the University of Chicago, in the preparation of this decision.