Delphine Pierre, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE (2026)

The following papers efiled on NYSCEF were used on this motion: 59-65, 84-92, 94.

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument, and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows.

Background

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident on October 28, 2023, near the intersection of Steinway Street and 30th Avenue, in Astoria, New York. Delphine Pierre ("Plaintiff") testified at her deposition that she was traveling on her moped toward 30th Avenue, on a two-way roadway, when she collided with the open car door of Michael Krupnik's ("Defendant") black Acura, falling to the ground and sustaining permanent personal injuries as a result. John Doe is a fictitious name intended to be the defendant-operator of the vehicle at the time of the incident. Issue was joined on or about January 10, 2024. Defendant and Karina Krupnick ("Non-Party Witness," a passenger) denied the Plaintiff's recollection of events via deposition testimony. Defendant moves for summary judgment and dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish negligence on the part of Defendant. Testimony has established that Defendant and Non-Party Witness were around the area of the alleged accident using the vehicle. (See NYSCEF Doc Nos. 59-62, 84.)

Movant's Contentions

Defendant contends that to sustain a negligence cause of action, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant owed a duty of care, that Defendant breached that duty, and that Plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of that breach. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's complaint fails to specify the negligence alleged, making it impossible to determine whether the conduct at issue fell within the scope of any duty owed by Defendant. Defendant contends that the unidentified passenger who allegedly opened the door must be named in the pleadings for the action to proceed. Defendant also maintains that his deposition testimony and that of Non-Party Witness, his wife, establish that neither Defendant nor his vehicle was involved in any accident, citing to his Exhibits C and D. As such, Defendant submits that summary judgment should be granted in his favor. (See NYSCEF Doc Nos. 61, 94.)

Opposition

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that conflicting deposition testimony creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant is liable for the accident. Plaintiff argues that the existence of conflicting accounts of the accident is sufficient to defeat summary judgment, which is a drastic remedy that should only be granted when there is no doubt as to the absence of any triable issue of fact. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, which alone requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has not established a lack of negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1214 and 388 (1). (See NYSCEF Doc No. 84.)

Discussion

In order to sustain a cause of action in negligence, Plaintiff must establish that, (1) the defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of that breach. (See Arnold v Shepitka, 231 AD3d 1105 [2d Dept 2024]). Here, Defendant improperly argues that the complaint failed to specify the duty and negligence alleged. The complaint alleges negligence in coming into contact with the plaintiff at the time of the incident and duty is presumed. Dismissal based on the failure to state a cause of action is denied.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]). The party moving for summary judgment must present a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact, and the failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Smalls v AJI Industries, Inc., 10 NY3d 733 [2008]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853). Once a prima facie showing has been made, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution or tender an acceptable excuse for the failure to do so; mere expressions of hope are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560 [1980]). If there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (see Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (see Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310, 314 [2024]).

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1214 provides: "No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so, and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers." The vehicle driver and owner are responsible for the negligent acts of a passenger in opening a door (see O'Melveny v Hamani, 2021 WL 4895312 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2021); see also Cohn v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 699 [2d Dept 2001]).

Here, the parties offer directly conflicting accounts of what occurred on the evening of October 28, 2023. Plaintiff testified that as she traveled southbound on Steinway Street on her moped, the rear passenger door of Defendant's black Acura suddenly opened and struck her, causing her injuries. She memorized the vehicle's license plate number as it drove away. Defendant and Non-Party Witness both deny that any door of their vehicle made contact with Plaintiff or her moped. However, both confirmed that Defendant was driving their black Acura on Steinway Street in the vicinity of 30th Avenue that same evening with other passengers inside. Therefore, Defendant has failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact (see Price v Tasber, 145 AD3d 810 [2d Dept 2016] [driver and passenger failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether passenger was negligent in opening the door when it was not reasonably safe to do so, and in allegedly failing to see what, by the reasonable use of his senses, he should have seen]; Fernandez v Morales, 80 Misc 3d 1207[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50933[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [defendant's summary judgment denied where presence at location is disputed]), and his motion for summary judgment is denied.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint is denied. It is So Ordered.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

Aaron D. Maslow, J.* FN* This Court acknowledges the assistance of Adelisa Cekic, judicial intern and student at Brooklyn Law School, in the preparation of this decision.