IN RE: YASIN H. (Anonymous) (2006)

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Bogacz, J.), dated June 9, 2005, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated April 21, 2005, made after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of public lewdness, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 20 months.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

 On appeal, the appellant contends the proper disposition should have been an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.   The Family Court has broad discretion in entering dispositional orders (see Matter of Jarel S., 282 A.D.2d 681, 723 N.Y.S.2d 693;  Matter of Naiquan T., 265 A.D.2d 331, 696 N.Y.S.2d 79;  Matter of Tristan W., 258 A.D.2d 585, 685 N.Y.S.2d 477;  Family Ct. Act § 141).   Great deference is given to the Family Court's determination because it had the opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor (see Matter of Stephone M.H., 11 A.D.3d 464, 782 N.Y.S.2d 786;  Matter of Severn J., 250 A.D.2d 682, 672 N.Y.S.2d 894).   Here the record demonstrates that the Family Court did “consider the needs and best interests of the [appellant] as well as the need for protection of the community,” and that it ordered “the least restrictive available alternative” which was consistent with such needs and interests (Family Ct. Act § 352.2[2];  see Matter of Carliph T., 26 A.D.3d 440, 808 N.Y.S.2d 909).   Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's contention, he was “not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal on the ground that this was his first ‘brush with the law’ ” (Matter of Steven L., 21 A.D.3d 962, 963, 800 N.Y.S.2d 632, quoting Matter of Nikita P., 3 A.D.3d 499, 501, 769 N.Y.S.2d 602).

Accordingly, based upon all the circumstances of this case, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent and imposing a 20-month period of probation (see e.g. Matter of Jeffrey V., 185 A.D.2d 241, 586 N.Y.S.2d 18;  Matter of Paul R., 131 A.D.2d 764, 516 N.Y.S.2d 790).