DILLON v. CITY OF NEW YORK (1997)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Greenstein, J.), dated October 31, 1995, as granted the separate motions of the defendants H.B. Singer, Inc., Automatic Fire Sprinkler Installations, Inc., and the City of New York for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-a.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

 In an action under General Municipal Law § 205-a, it is not necessary to demonstrate the same degree of proximate cause as is required in a common-law negligence action (see, Jantzen v. Edelman of N.Y., 221 A.D.2d 594, 595, 634 N.Y.S.2d 551).   Rather, liability is imposed “in any case where there is any practical or reasonable connection between a [statutory or code] violation and the injury or death of a fire[fighter]” (Mullen v. Zoebe, Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 135, 140, 630 N.Y.S.2d 269, 654 N.E.2d 90;  Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 N.Y.2d 423, 441, 626 N.Y.S.2d 23, 649 N.E.2d 1167;  McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 195, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698, affd. 20 N.Y.2d 921, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274, 233 N.E.2d 289).

 Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff firefighter was injured when the fire hose he was using to extinguish a fire burst, throwing him to the ground.   Accordingly, even if, as the plaintiff claimed, the sprinkler system failed to operate, there is no reasonable or practical connection between the plaintiff's injuries and the violation alleged (see, Patsos v. Suffolk Charles Assoc., 226 A.D.2d 608, 641 N.Y.S.2d 370;  Billups v. Wickers, 205 A.D.2d 723, 613 N.Y.S.2d 706;  Murphy v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 202 A.D.2d 238, 608 N.Y.S.2d 448;  Schwarzrock v. Thurcon Dev. Co., 193 A.D.2d 357, 597 N.Y.S.2d 41).

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.