JAEGER v. Paul Prentice, et al., respondents. (1999)

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and defamation, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Jiudice, J.), dated November 21, 1997, as granted the motion of the defendants Paul Prentice and Andrew Strupp for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff's causes of action to recover damages for defamation, prima facie tort, and tortious interference with prospective business relations, insofar as asserted against the defendants Paul Prentice and Andrew Strupp, were properly dismissed.   The allegedly defamatory statements, which were the basis of all three claims, were made by Prentice and Strupp in their official capacity as members of the Hyde Park School Board and the statements related to the plaintiff's qualifications and performance in the public office of Superintendent of Schools of the Hyde Park Central School District.   As such, the statements were absolutely privileged (see, Clark v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 613, 427 N.Y.S.2d 740, 404 N.E.2d 1283;  Stukuls v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 397 N.Y.S.2d 740, 366 N.E.2d 829;  Patane v. Griffin, 164 A.D.2d 192, 562 N.Y.S.2d 1005).

Moreover, the plaintiff did not present a triable issue of fact that the allegedly defamatory statements were made maliciously by Prentice and Strupp.   Therefore, the plaintiff's further claim that there is an issue of fact as to whether Prentice and Strupp violated an “executory accord” not to make the alleged statements is without merit.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.