FRANK v. Lawrence H. Pinner, d/b/a Pinner Associates, appellant. (2006)

In a consolidated action, inter alia, to recover damages for professional malpractice, the defendant Lawrence H. Pinner, d/b/a Pinner Associates, appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dorsa, J.), dated July 11, 2005, as denied that branch of his motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and 214(6) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time barred.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

 A cause of action to recover damages for professional malpractice against an architect for defective design or construction accrues upon the actual completion of the work to be performed and the consequent termination of the professional relationship (see Brushton-Moira Cent. School Dist. v. Thomas Assoc., 91 N.Y.2d 256, 261, 669 N.Y.S.2d 520, 692 N.E.2d 551;  County of Rockland v. Kaeyer, Garment & Davidson Architects, 309 A.D.2d 891, 766 N.Y.S.2d 359;  IFD Constr. Corp. v. Corddry Carpenter Dietz & Zack, 253 A.D.2d 89, 92, 685 N.Y.S.2d 670;  Board of Mgrs. of Yardarm Beach Condominium v. Vector Yardarm Corp., 109 A.D.2d 684, 686, 487 N.Y.S.2d 17;  N.R.S. Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 82 A.D.2d 876, 440 N.Y.S.2d 318).   The completion of an architect's obligations must be viewed in light of the particular circumstances of the case (see Board of Educ. of Tri-Va. Cent. School Distr. at Grahamsville v. Celotex Corp., 88 A.D.2d 713, 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d 290, affd. 58 N.Y.2d 684, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542, 444 N.E.2d 1006).   Here, the appellant, the architect who designed the plaintiffs' one-family home, was obligated to obtain a certificate of occupancy (see Board of Mgrs. of Yardarm Beach Condominium v. Vector Yardarm Corp., supra;  cf. Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas v. EnergyPro Constr. Partners, 271 A.D.2d 233, 234, 707 N.Y.S.2d 30;  Matter of Kohn Pederson Fox Assoc., P.C., 189 A.D.2d 557, 558, 592 N.Y.S.2d 16).   Moreover, the record demonstrates that the appellant applied for the certificate of occupancy after construction was completed and thereafter made a supplemental submission in support of the application.   Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs' claims against the appellant did not begin to accrue for statute of limitations purposes until the issuance of the certificate of occupancy on December 20, 2001.   Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the claims which were asserted against the appellant on October 14, 2004, were not time barred pursuant to CPLR 214(6).

The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.