PEOPLE v. BRIEN (2008)

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Kahn, J.), rendered April 12, 2005, convicting him of criminal sexual act in the second degree (3 counts), endangering the welfare of a child, and possessing a sexual performance by a child (10 counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

 The defendant's contention that the County Court improperly refused to honor the sentencing promise made to him by another judge at a prior plea hearing is unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant made no objection at sentencing when the County Court indicated it would not honor the promise (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Marinaro, 45 A.D.3d 867, 868, 846 N.Y.S.2d 344).   In any event, the contention is without merit.   A court is under no obligation to adhere to a sentencing promise after receiving information affecting the sentence, provided the court affords the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea (see People v. Wood, 207 A.D.2d 1001, 1001, 617 N.Y.S.2d 248;  see also People v. Fludd, 137 A.D.2d 764, 765, 524 N.Y.S.2d 839).   Here, the presentence investigation report provided a sufficient basis for the County Court's refusal to honor the sentencing promise (see People v. Jones, 287 A.D.2d 741, 742, 732 N.Y.S.2d 246;  People v. Richards, 158 A.D.2d 627, 627, 551 N.Y.S.2d 597;  People v. Burton, 133 A.D.2d 276, 277, 519 N.Y.S.2d 65).   Accordingly, the County Court's determination to afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty to all counts of the indictment, rather than impose the promised sentence, was not an improvident exercise of its discretion (see People v. Fludd, 137 A.D.2d at 765, 524 N.Y.S.2d 839;  see also People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 241, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822;  People v. Wood, 207 A.D.2d at 1001, 617 N.Y.S.2d 248).

 The defendant's contention that certain portions of the testimony of the People's expert witness constituted impermissible bolstering of the complainant's testimony is also unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Garcia, 205 A.D.2d 554, 555, 613 N.Y.S.2d 51;  People v. Naranjo, 194 A.D.2d 747, 748, 600 N.Y.S.2d 81).   In any event, the County Court did not err in admitting the testimony at issue since it pertained to matters beyond the ken of the typical juror (see People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 422, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 502 N.E.2d 577) and helped the jury draw conclusions based on facts adduced at trial (id.;   see People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 433, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110, 458 N.E.2d 351).   In addition, the court gave a proper limiting instruction (see People v. Sturdivant, 277 A.D.2d 607, 608, 714 N.Y.S.2d 839;  People v. Kukon, 275 A.D.2d 478, 479, 711 N.Y.S.2d 870).   Moreover, the testimony was properly admitted to rebut the defendant's attempt, on cross-examination, to impair the complainant's credibility in the face of inconsistencies in his testimony (see People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084;  People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d 131).   To the extent the defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly relied upon the challenged portions of the expert testimony during his summation, the claim is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ).   In any event, the claim is without merit.

 The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83-85, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).   The record establishes that, in determining the sentence, the County Court properly considered appropriate sentencing factors (see generally People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305-306, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 419 N.E.2d 864).   Moreover, the sentence imposed fell within statutory parameters (see People v. Hobson, 43 A.D.3d 1179, 1180, 843 N.Y.S.2d 146;  People v. Drakes, 159 A.D.2d 718, 719, 553 N.Y.S.2d 1013), and consecutive sentences were authorized since each count for which they were imposed constituted a separate and distinct act (see Penal Law § 70.25[2];  People v. Dallas, 31 A.D.3d 573, 573-574, 817 N.Y.S.2d 535;  People v. Harrington, 3 A.D.3d 737, 739, 770 N.Y.S.2d 792).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.