DELAYHAYE v. Nakia Trent Griffin, et al., defendants-respondents. (2008)

In a consolidated action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Caledonia Limo & Car Service, Inc., and Lincoln O. Phillips appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated July 11, 2007, as denied their motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

 “A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision” (Ahmad v. Grimaldi, 40 A.D.3d 786, 834 N.Y.S.2d 480;  see Russ v. Investech Sec., 6 A.D.3d 602, 775 N.Y.S.2d 867).   Here, the defendants Caledonia Limo & Car Service, Inc., and Lincoln O. Phillips (hereinafter the defendants) established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by showing that the vehicle of the codefendants, Nakia Griffin and Yaneen Griffin, struck the rear of their stopped vehicle.   However, in opposition, the codefendants rebutted the prima facie showing by adducing evidence that the defendants' vehicle suddenly and without warning stopped in the lane of traffic without adequate explanation (see Brodie v. Global Asset Recovery, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 390, 783 N.Y.S.2d 832;  Moran v. Singh, 10 A.D.3d 707, 708, 782 N.Y.S.2d 284;  Purcell v. Axelsen, 286 A.D.2d 379, 380-381, 729 N.Y.S.2d 495;  Colonna v. Suarez, 278 A.D.2d 355, 718 N.Y.S.2d 618;  Maschka v. Newman, 262 A.D.2d 615, 692 N.Y.S.2d 472).   Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.