Henry Spencer, Plaintiff, v. SOMMER SAMUEL (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219[a], of the papers considered in the review of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability:

Plaintiff's Notice of Motion, dated March 16, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 19), Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, dated March 16, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20), Affirmation of Michael Cohan, Esq., dated March 16, 2026, with annexed exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 21-25), Affirmation of Steven A. Levy, Esq., dated March 20, 2026, in Opposition with exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 26-28), Defendant Torregrossa's Statement of Material Facts, dated March 20, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29), Affirmation of David Park, Esq., dated April 9, 2026, in Opposition (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 36), Defendant Samuel's Response to Statement of Material Facts, dated April 9, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 37), and Affirmation of Michael Cohan, Esq., dated April 23, 2026, in Reply (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 38).

Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff Henry Spencer moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment on the issue of liability against defendants Jennifer Torregrosa and Sommer Samuel. The motion is determined as follows.

The Court has considered the Notice of Motion, the affirmation in support, the affidavit of plaintiff Henry Spencer (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23), the Statement of Material Facts submitted pursuant to Uniform Rule 202.8-g, the affirmations in opposition submitted on behalf of defendants Jennifer Torregrosa and Sommer Samuel, together with the opposing statement of material facts and exhibits annexed thereto, and the reply papers submitted. Oral argument was completed on May 13, 2026.

II. Findings of Fact

This negligence action arises out of a three-vehicle rear-end chain collision which occurred on April 29, 2025, at approximately 6:35 a.m., at or near the intersection of Fountain Avenue and Flatlands Avenue, County of Kings, City and State of New York. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 21; 23; 26; 36). Plaintiff Henry Spencer alleges that he was lawfully operating a 2024 MI/BI motor vehicle bearing New York State license plate number 11674SVV when his vehicle was struck in the rear. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20 at ¶2).

The action was commenced by the filing and service of a Summons and Complaint dated October 24, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22). Issue was joined on behalf of defendant Jennifer Torregrosa by service of a Verified Answer dated January 9, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24), and on behalf of defendant Sommer Samuel by service of a Verified Answer dated February 9, 2026. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25).

In support of the instant motion, plaintiff submits, inter alia, an attorney affirmation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 21), plaintiff's affidavit (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23), and a Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Uniform Rule 202.8-g (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20). Plaintiff avers that at the time of the occurrence he was lawfully stopped when defendants' vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23 at ¶7). Plaintiff further avers that he did nothing to contribute to the happening of the accident and that he was entirely free from culpable conduct. (see id at ¶9).

The moving papers further state that defendant Jennifer Torregrosa was operating a 2024 Nissan motor vehicle bearing New York license plate number Z36UJH and that defendant Sommer Samuel was operating a 2006 Toyota motor vehicle bearing New York license plate number GVM3282. (see id at ¶5). Plaintiff maintains that defendants' vehicle rear-ended plaintiff's stopped vehicle. (see id).

In opposition, defendant Jennifer Torregrosa contends that the accident constituted a chain-reaction collision and that her vehicle had been stopped behind plaintiff's vehicle at a red light when the vehicle operated by co-defendant Sommer Samuel struck the Torregrosa vehicle in the rear, thereby propelling it into plaintiff's vehicle. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28). Defendant Torregrosa submits an affirmation in opposition (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 26), an opposing statement of material facts (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29), and references a police accident report which purportedly reflects statements from the involved operators (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 27).

Specifically, defendant Torregrosa asserts that both plaintiff's vehicle and her own vehicle were sequentially stopped at a red light on Fountain Avenue before the Samuel vehicle struck her vehicle from behind. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28 at ¶6). Defendant Torregrosa further avers that she did nothing to contribute to or cause the subject occurrence. (see id at ¶9).

Defendant Sommer Samuel likewise opposes the motion, arguing that the application is premature inasmuch as depositions have not yet been conducted and asserting that triable issues of fact remain concerning comparative negligence and proximate cause. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 36). Defendant Samuel further argues that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and contends that issues of credibility and fault should be resolved by a jury. (see id).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither defendant disputes that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped at the time of impact. Nor do the opposing submissions raise any competent evidentiary proof that plaintiff engaged in negligent conduct contributing to the happening of the accident. Rather, the opposition papers principally concern the respective culpability of the defendants inter se.

III. Conclusions of Law

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be granted only where the movant establishes entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to eliminate any material issue of fact from the case (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Once such a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues requiring a trial (see id; Alvord & Swift v Muller Constr. Co., 46 NY2d 276 [1978]). Mere conclusions, expressions of hope, or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment (see Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553 [1st Dept 2010]).

The Court is mindful that summary judgment was designed to expedite civil litigation and should not be withheld where no genuine issue of material fact exists requiring trial (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). Courts are cautioned not to strain to discover feigned issues for the purpose of defeating an otherwise meritorious application (see Kaye v Hickman, 38 AD2d 754 [2d Dept 1972]).

It is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle and imposes upon that operator the burden of providing a non-negligent explanation for the occurrence (see Johnson v Phillips, 261 AD2d 269 [1st Dept 1999]; Somers v Condlin, 39 AD3d 289 [1st Dept 2007]).

Here, plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment through competent evidence demonstrating that his vehicle was stopped when it was struck in the rear. Plaintiff's submissions were sufficient to invoke the presumption of negligence applicable to rear-end collisions.

The Court further finds that defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to plaintiff's freedom from negligence. To the contrary, the opposing submissions expressly acknowledge that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped at a red light when the collision occurred. Defendant Torregrosa specifically contends that her vehicle was itself stopped behind plaintiff's vehicle before being propelled forward by the impact from the Samuel vehicle. Such submissions, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing parties, do not rebut plaintiff's showing that he was an innocent operator free from culpable conduct.

The Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendants' contention that the motion is premature. Summary judgment may properly be granted prior to the completion of discovery where the opposing party fails to demonstrate that further discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition are exclusively within the movant's knowledge (see Rodgers v Yale Univ., 283 AD2d 415 [2d Dept 2001]; Belle-Oudry v Still, 1 AD3d 391 [2d Dept 2003]; Anzel v Pistorino, 105 AD3d 784 [2d Dept 2013]). Mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment might later be uncovered during discovery is insufficient to deny the motion.

Moreover, it is well settled that an innocent operator's entitlement to summary judgment is not defeated by unresolved issues of comparative negligence existing between co-defendants (see Garcia v Tri-State Ambulette, 282 AD2d 206 [1st Dept 2001]; Mello v Narco Cab Corp., 105 AD3d 634 [1st Dept 2013]; Kaplan v Tsirlin, 164 AD3d 1150 [2d Dept 2018]). As articulated by the Appellate Division in Garcia v Tri-State Ambulette, "the right of an innocent owner and operator to summary judgment is not in any way restricted by potential issues of comparative negligence as between the drivers of the two motor vehicles" (282 AD2d 206 [1st Dept 2001]).

Similarly, in Kiernan v Edwards, (97 AD2d 750 [2d Dept 1983]), the Court held that "[t]o the faultless owner and operator, the degrees of comparative negligence which may exist between [the defendants] are not material."

The authorities cited by defendant Samuel concerning sudden stops and comparative negligence are inapposite under the facts presented herein. There is no competent evidentiary proof that plaintiff stopped suddenly, improperly, or without signaling. Indeed, the opposition submissions uniformly describe plaintiff's vehicle as already stopped at a red traffic signal prior to impact.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff has established entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability as against defendants Jennifer Torregrosa and Sommer Samuel as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff Henry Spencer's motion pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment on the issue of liability is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court finds plaintiff Henry Spencer free from comparative negligence in connection with the motor vehicle accident occurring on April 29, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that the issue of damages, together with any apportionment of liability as between defendants Jennifer Torregrosa and Sommer Samuel, shall continue; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for such further proceedings as previously directed by the Court.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: June 1, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.