F.H., Plaintiff v. J.H., Defendant (2026)

Procedural History

By Summons with Notice filed May 2, 2022, Plaintiff F. H. (hereinafter "Husband") commenced the present action for divorce against Defendant J. H. (hereinafter "Wife"). A Verified Complaint was filed by Husband on September 27, 2022. Wife neglected to file an Answer to Husband's Complaint until July 1, 2025. At commencement both parties were represented by counsel. Husband was represented by Mary Grace Condello Esq. and Wife was represented by Harry Chiu Esq. Shortly after commencement Mr. Chiu was substituted by Adelola Sheralynn Dow Esq. Ms. Dow, and her associate Loui-Ann MacKnight Esq., represented Wife through trial. On or about November 4, 2024, Ms. Condello filed an Order to Show Cause (Seq. No. 013) seeking to withdraw as counsel alleging a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Ms. Condello's motion was granted, on consent, by Order dated December 11, 2024. Husband has represented himself on all issues other than civil contempt since December 2024. By Order of Appointment dated April 21, 2025, Michele Sileo Esq. was appointed to represent Husband at trial in relation to the contempt motion filed against him (Mot. Seq. No. 014). The present case was originally assigned to Part MP3 of this Court, presided over by the Hon. Paul Marrone, Jr. The matter was transferred to this Part for trial in or around January 2025.

The parties were married on September 11, 2001, in a civil ceremony performed in Las Vegas Nevada. There are two children of this marriage: F. L. H. ("F. L.") (d.o.b. */*/2004); and N. H. (d.o.b. */*/2008). Wife is currently 50 years old; Husband is currently 46 years old. By Preliminary Conference Order dated March 7, 2023, the parties agreed that Husband would be granted a divorce on the grounds that the marriage had broken down irretrievably for a period of six months pursuant to DRL § 170(7). By Short Form Order dated April 7, 2025, the parties resolved the issue of maintenance via mutual waiver. By separate Short Form Order dated April 7, 2025, the parties resolved the issues of custody and visitation as they relate to N.H.. Wife was granted sole legal and residential custody with parenting time with Husband to be determined upon mutual agreement. F. L. reached the age of 18 and aged out of the custody jurisdiction of this Court on August 2, 2022. F.L. reached the age of 21 and aged out of the child support jurisdiction of this Court on August 2, 2025. However, for retroactivity purposes, it is undisputed that F.L. has resided with his father during the pendency of this action (see PC Order dated 3/7/23).

The issues of child support, equitable distribution, and counsel fees were tried before this Court over the course of six days between September 4, 2025, and January 5, 2026.¹ In addition to these trial issues, testimony was heard in relation to Wife's motion (Seq. No. 014) to hold Husband in civil contempt for his alleged failure to comply with various Court Orders issued during the pendency of this action. At trial, Husband testified on his own behalf and called no other witnesses. Husband offered fourteen documents into evidence, eleven of which were accepted. Wife testified on her own behalf and called a real estate expert, Mr. Richard Sheeler, who testified as to his appraisal of the former marital home and Wife's property on 36th Street in Brooklyn. Wife offered twenty-one documents into evidence, nineteen of which were accepted. Judicial Notice was taken of several orders. Post-trial written summations were submitted by both parties with a separate summation submitted by Ms. Sileo in her role as Husband's attorney on the issue of civil contempt.

An Inquest on the issue of grounds was held on the first day of trial. Husband was granted a Judgment of Divorce on the grounds that the marriage had broken down irretrievably pursuant to DRL § 170(7). The Judgment was held in abeyance until the remaining issues in this divorce were adjudicated as required by this statute.

The Parties' Positions

Wife's requests for relief are detailed in her Statement of Proposed Disposition and in her written Summation after trial. Wife seeks an award of prospective and retroactive child support for the subject child N.H. who resides with her. Wife argues that Husband should have an income of at least $223,808 imputed to him for the purpose of child support calculations. Wife seeks the distribution of several assets and debts including the former marital home located at *** Lighthouse Avenue, Staten Island, New York. By Order dated January 7, 2026, this Court appointed Adam Kalish Esq., a Part 36 approved Real Estate Broker, to sell the marital home with any resulting proceeds to be held in escrow until the issue of equitable distribution is resolved. Wife also seeks the distribution of her equitable interest in the marital business, Harborview Restoration LLC ("Harborview"). although she argues that her ability to value the same has been frustrated by Husband's failure to pay the court appointed business evaluator. Wife further seeks an allocation of marital debt which she argues should be attributed 100% to Husband. Wife seeks a finding of civil contempt against Husband for his alleged failure to comply with various Orders of this Court. Finally, Wife seeks an award of counsel fees in the sum of $239,261 arguing that Husband is the more monied spouse, and that his non-compliance with Court Orders and frivolous positions during this proceeding have resulted in Wife incurring counsel fees that would have been otherwise unnecessary.

By Order dated August 13, 2025, both parties were ordered to file several pre-trial documents including updated Statements of Net Worth and Statements of Proposed Disposition. See 22 NYCRR 202.16. Wife filed her pre-trial documents on September 3, 2025. Husband failed to comply with any aspect of the Order. Husband's non-compliance frustrated both Wife's ability to prepare for trial, and this Court's ability to determine the relief he is requesting. By post-trial Order dated January 7, 2026, both parties were directed to file written summations. Wife's twenty-two-page summation was filed on March 30, 2026, and included citation to the trial record and legal authority. Husband's four-page pro se summation was filed on March 2, 2026, and offered only conclusory statements as to his requested relief, much of which was not addressed at trial. Husband's summation failed to cite the trial record and failed to cite a single case as authority.²

At trial, Husband identified many of the same assets and debts as Wife but argues for a different disposition. In addition to the distribution of the equity in the former marital home and a division of marital debt, Husband alleged that Wife dissipated approximately $400,000 in marital funds from joint accounts and removed jewelry from the marital home. Husband further seeks a distributive award related to the appreciation in value of separate real property owned by Wife at *** 36th Street in Brooklyn, New York. Husband also seeks an award of retroactive child support for F.L. from the date of commencement to when he reached the age of twenty-one on August 2, 2025. Finally, Husband seeks reimbursement for Wife's alleged failure to comply with her pendente lite obligation to pay a pro rata share of F.L.'s college tuition.

Adverse Inferences

On or about September 3, 2025, Defendant Wife filed an Order to Show Cause in limine (Seq. No. 016) seeking to preclude Husband from offering evidence at trial due to his failure to pay his share of court ordered appraisal fees for the marital home and the marital business. Wife further argued that preclusion was warranted because Husband failed to comply with any aspect of the Pre-Trial Conference Order. On October 27, 2025, Husband indicated that he had paid the real estate appraiser and was in the process of paying the business evaluator. By Short Form Order dated October 17, 2025, Husband was granted a final opportunity to pay his portion of the business evaluator's fees, in the sum of $4,195, on or before November 15, 2025. When Husband failed to make the required payment Wife's motion was granted, in part.

Specifically, by Order dated December 17, 2025, this Court found that preclusion was an inappropriate sanction to remedy Husband's failure to comply with Court Orders. Rather, this Court determined that the proper remedy was an "adverse inference" against Husband, and "issue resolution" in Wife's favor, where appropriate. See Casillas v. Moore, 243 AD2d 878 (2d Dept. 2025). As set forth in the December 17th Order, adverse inferences were drawn against Husband in relation to the marital business, his income, his overall financial condition, and on the issue of counsel fees. An "adverse inference" allows the finder of fact to conclude that if the missing evidence at issue had been provided, that evidence would have supported the aggrieved party's position and would not have supported the offending party's position. See NY PJI 1:77-1:77.2; see also HMS Holdings Corp. v. Arendt, 17 N.Y.S.3d 383 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Cty. 2015). In the context of the present matrimonial action, the adverse inferences drawn against Husband allow this Court to assume that if he had provided an updated Statement of Net Worth and had paid for business evaluation report, those documents would have supported Wife's positions at trial. See 22 NYCRR 202.16(k)(5)(1); see also Gering v. Tavano, 50 AD3d 299 (1st Dept. 2008); Charpie v. Charpie, 271 AD2d 169 (1st Dept. 2000).

The Marriage

The parties' pre-marital courtship was abrupt as they met in February 2001 and were married in Las Vegas Nevada on September 11, 2001. The parties lived together as a married couple for approximately twenty years until Wife decided that she wanted a divorce in June 2021. The parties first divorce action (Index No. 55465/2021) was commenced by the filing of a Summons with Notice on July 15, 2021. Wife discontinued that divorce on April 29, 2022, after the filing of a request for judicial intervention, but before a preliminary conference was held. Husband commenced the present action for divorce on May 2, 2022. During their marriage the parties had two children, F. L. H. born August *, 2004, and N. H. born March *, 2008.

When the parties met, Husband was unemployed, and Wife was employed in the legal staffing field. Wife claims that when she met Husband his only source of income was from the illicit sale of pain medication (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 93). During their marriage the parties became jointly engaged in the construction field, specifically in the area of disaster restoration and remediation. The restoration work was initially focused in New Jersey under the trade name "Harbor View d/b/a F. H." In or around 2014, the parties were forced to relocate their business to New York after the New Jersey Attorney General accused them of fraud for allegedly overcharging homeowners for restoration work after Hurricane Sandy. The New Jersey fraud case was settled with Husband and Wife jointly agreeing to pay $130,000 in restitution. They did so by taking out a private "Lifestream Loan." As part of their agreement with the New Jersey Attorney General, the parties were allegedly instructed that any further restoration work would have to be conducted under a registered Limited Liability Company (LLC).

In or around 2015, the parties jointly created Harborview Restoration LLC. and opened a business office in the basement of the marital home in Staten Island. Husband credibly testified at length as to the activities of the business, and its management structure. Harborview was primarily involved in the restoration of real property after a disaster, such as a flood or fire. Harborview would handle the restoration of a property from the preparation of an estimate, through negotiations with insurance companies, and then by performing the contracting work necessary to return the property to its "pre-loss condition."

Husband considered Wife to be his "partner" in the business. The trial record is unclear as to whether Wife was ever attributed an actual ownership interest in the company. Although the business tax returns indicated that Wife owned a 20% interest, Husband testified that the parties' "lied" on the tax return and that in reality he owned 100% of the business (Tr. 9/5/25, pgs. 191-192). Both parties were intricate in operating the business. Husband explained that "she ran the office, and I worked in the street." Wife's tasks included "handling the books and records, going to the bank, issuing checks, collecting accounts receivable, scheduling, dealing with customers, dealing with insurance companies . . . everything it would take to run an office in a construction company." (Tr. 9/4/25, pg. 37). Husband acted as a construction manager, preparing estimates and overseeing on site work performed by its employees. Although Husband was technically in charge, he credibly testified that both parties made business decisions jointly. Husband considered Wife to be an equal partner in the business. In addition to Husband and Wife, the business had six or seven employees, including Husband's brother. Both parties acknowledge that many of their personal living expenses were funneled through Harborview as "business expenses." Wife testified that if she had to approximate the amount of money they withdrew from the business in a year, it would likely be between $225,000 and $275,000(Tr. 1/5/26, pg. 25).

After the parties separated, they continued to run the business as distant partners until June 2023. On or about June 1, 2023, Husband voluntarily entered into an inpatient drug rehabilitation program to address his opioid addiction. Husband credibly testified that his substance abuse problem originated after being prescribed Oxycodone for an injury to his back. Husband was initially treated in an outpatient program with medication. However, this treatment made him dependent on Suboxone. Husband spent approximately one month in an inpatient facility in Florida and overcame his addictions. Wife made the decision to leave the business in or around June 2023 as no restoration work was getting done in Husband's absence. Wife also found a "secret bank account" which she believed Husband was using to hide business assets from her. Upon his release from inpatient treatment, Husband attempted to revive the business using a $200,000 loan from his mother. Husband hired a secretary to cover some of Wife's former responsibilities but had no-one to handle the books and records. Husband ultimately decided to close the business in or around January 2024. Husband claims that when the business closed it was over $600,000 in debt. However, no evidence of such debt was offered at trial.

Wife credibly testified that she was never "paid" in a traditional sense when she worked for Harborview but that she received a fictious 20% distribution for "tax purposes" (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 60). After she left Harborview, Wife obtained gainful employment as a "large claims loss adjuster" for The American Family Insurance Company. Wife began working for American Family in March 2025. Wife currently works full time in a salaried position and earns a base salary of $112,000. In addition to her income from employment, Wife collects approximately $7,235 a month in rent from the 36th Street property.

By Court Order dated October 3, 2023, both parties were directed to pay 50% of the mortgage, insurance and property taxes related to *** Lighthouse Avenue. However, in addition to supporting her own household, Wife credibly testified that she has been paying 100% of the Lighthouse Avenue carrying charges since January 2025 when Husband stopped contributing. Wife currently resides in Brooklyn with her mother and the parties' minor daughter N.H.. Wife is currently 50 years old and claims to be in good health although she has high blood pressure. Wife has a college education having obtained a Bachelor of Science degree from Hofstra University. In addition to her degree, Wife is a licensed claims insurance adjuster.

Husband offered no testimony as to his income while Harborview was operational. However, Wife credibility testified that he also did not receive a "traditional salary." Rather, both parties utilized the LLC's bank account as a personal asset, transferring money back and forth between accounts as needed to fund their lifestyle (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 62). Husband's current employment is even less clear. After he closed Harborview, Husband became self-employed and offers freelance consulting services to "15 to 20" different disaster restoration companies. Husband uses the extensive contacts that he made as the principal of Harborview to find clients. Husband testified that he gets paid a percentage of any estimate that he prepares, generally between three and five percent. As he is self-employed, Husband testified that his pay and taxes are recorded on an IRS form 1099 and he admitted that he possessed those tax documents (Tr. 9/5/25, pg. 184). However, Husband failed to offer any pay-stubs, 1099s or tax returns into evidence. At the time of trial, Husband had not filed his 2024 tax return and admitted that he did not file a tax return in 2023. Husband did not even attempt to approximate his annual income on the record.

Husband is currently 46 years old. Husband has offered no evidence or testimony regarding his health other than having a prior back injury which resulted in his substance abuse issues. Husband has not offered any evidence of his level of education. However, the record supports a finding that Husband is a highly skilled contractor with over 20 years of experience. Husband currently resides within the former marital home with the parties' adult son F.L.

Equitable Distribution

When determining the equitable distribution of marital property, the Court must consider the factors set forth in DRL § 236(B)(5)(d). Before making the determinations herein, the Court has reviewed all the enumerated statutory factors. This Court has included for discussion herein of only those factors that specifically apply to the facts of this proceeding. Accordingly, some factors were omitted while others were afforded minimal weight, if any, by this Court. Regarding tax implications, no evidence was offered by either party as to the likely tax impact of any potential award.

Specifically, in this case, the Court has considered the following factors: (a) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of commencement; (b) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (c) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (d) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; (e) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business; and (f) acts of domestic violence committed by either party and the impact of said acts. See Santamaria v. Santamaria, 177 AD3d 802 (2d Dept. 2019). The enumerated factors also include a "catch all" provision which allows the Court to consider any other specific factor it identifies. Here, the Court has specifically considered Husband's pervasive non-compliance with Court Orders as a factor it considered when determining equitable distribution.

Notably, in this case, equitable distribution is complicated by Husband's failure to comply with Court Orders to provide basic financial documentation and the limited evidence he offered at trial. Moreover, Husband's failure to upload pre-trial documents, including an Updated Statement of Net Worth has limited Wife's ability to prove his income, identify his assets and/or address his monthly expenditures. Similarly, Husband's failure to file a Statement of Proposed Disposition has forced this Court to speculate as to the relief he is requesting. These, and other failures on Husband's part, led to the issuance of an Order in Limine which drew several adverse inferences against him and granted Wife "issue resolution" on her financial claims (See Order dated December 17, 2025). Husband's refusal to participate has also made it exponentially more difficult for Wife to satisfy her burdens of proof.

Equitable distribution law is premised upon the theory that marriage is not only an emotional and physical union between spouses, but also an economic partnership. See Burke v. Burke, 175 AD3d 458 (2d Dept. 2019). "As such, during the life of a marriage spouses share in both its profits and losses." Ospina-Cherner v. Cherner, 178 AD3d 1059 (2d Dept. 2019). When considering issues of equitable distribution, the term "marital property" is to be construed broadly, while the concept of "separate property" is to be construed narrowly. See Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8 (1986). "Were courts to engage in . . . precise financial tracing, they would be paralyzed by divorcing parties seeking review of every debit and credit incurred during their marriage." Klauer v. Abeliovich, 149 AD3d 617 (1st Dept. 2017). Thus, the specific economic decisions made by the parties during the course of their marriage are not subject to review, rather, the Court must effectuate an equitable distribution of marital assets that exist when the action is commenced, taking into account all relevant factors. See Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415 (2009). When a marriage is one of significant duration, where both parties have equally contributed to it, the distribution of assets should be effectuated as equally as possible. See Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017); see also Miller v. Miller, 128 AD2d 844 (2d Dept. 1987).

Factors Considered

(a) Income and Property of Each Party; Standard of Living.

The first factor considered by this Court in determining an appropriate distribution of marital assets is the relative incomes of each party. A more comprehensive discussion of the parties' comparative incomes can be found in relation to the issue of child support below. However, for the purposes of equitable distribution, the Court finds that both parties earn or have the potential to earn an equivalent income. At trial, Husband failed to offer any evidence or testimony regarding his income and sparse testimony regarding their standard of living. Wife, on the other hand, described a "rags to riches" story of sudden success. Wife credibly testified that when they started disaster restoration work, they had nothing, but that during their best years they would spend a weekend in the Bahamas on a whim, and would give each other $20,000 gifts (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 63). Wife testified extensively to the standard of living that the parties enjoyed when Harborview was thriving. Wife claimed to own "65 pairs of Christian Louboutin shoes" and several "Herve Leger" dresses. She testified that the parties primarily shopped in high end stores such as "Neiman Marcus." Throughout their marriage the parties purchased several luxury vehicles including a Ferrari, a Range Rover, a Mercedes, a BMW and a Bentley. The parties would travel often and would typically have a "babysitter" accompany them, so that they could go out alone. The parties employed household help, including a housekeeper and a landscaper. When asked how they could afford this affluent lifestyle, Wife credibly testified that in "good years" they would withdraw $15,000 to $20,000 a month from the business accounts for their personal use (Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 58).

When the parties' business and personal relationships soured, they were both forced to seek separate employment. Wife secured employment as an insurance claims adjuster. Husband continued his restoration work but as an independent contractor working for his former competitors. Wife testified at length as to how her standard of living decreased significantly after the business closed (Tr. 12/15/25, pg 71). While Wife remains gainfully employed, she has had to ask her mother for financial assistance on more than one occasion to make ends meet and has explored side employment to supplement her income.

Husband failed to contradict Wife's testimony regarding the standard of living that they enjoyed during the marriage. However, he did add context, credibly testifying that the company had "good years" and "bad years." Husband's testimony was elusive as to his current employment, only indicating that he works as an independent consultant to firms that work in the same field that Harborview once did. Husband failed to offer even approximation of his income and failed to offer any financial documentation into evidence.

In the absence of any credible evidence as to Husband's income, it is difficult for this Court to determine who has the greater income potential for equitable distribution purposes. However, Wife has established that Husband has proven his ability to establish and manage a successful business. Husband, on the other hand, credibly testified as to how reliant he was upon Wife to run the office and handle the books and records. As the success of Harborview was equally attributable to both parties, this factor does not weigh greatly in either party's favor. However, when determining which party has more "property" the factor favors Husband. Wife owns commercial real estate in Brooklyn, which is her separate property, and from which she receives substantial rent. In contrast, this Court is aware of no separate property owned by Husband other than debt.

(b) Duration of the Marriage, Age and Health of the Parties, Drug Use

The parties were married twenty years before the commencement of the present action. Accordingly, the Court finds that this is a marriage of significant duration. Wife is 50 years old. Husband is 46 years old. Neither party has testified as to any significant health problems which would affect their earning capacity or that would require a larger distributive award than they otherwise would have been entitled to. However, at trial, Husband admitted that he is in recovery from substance abuse issues that plagued him during the marriage. Husband claims that his addiction to opioids began after he misused medication prescribed to him for a back injury.

Wife credibility testified that throughout their marriage she "found" evidence of Husband's drug use, including "empty pill bottles" hidden in the car and "bag's of residue" in in the laundry (Tr. 10/16/25, pgs. 53-54). Wife further claimed that Husband not only used opioids, but that early in their marriage he also sold them. However, Wife also admitted to her own illicit drug use with Husband when they were "younger and in love." Wife admitted to sporadic opioid, marijuana and cocaine usage during their marriage.

While there is evidence in the trial record that both parties used illegal drugs, and misused prescription drugs, Husband has not established to what extent, if any, Wife's substance abuse affected their finances. In contrast, Husband admitted that his own substance abuse issues resulted in a psychotic breakdown, treatment in more than one mental health facility, and more than a month of inpatient treatment in Florida at a time when the marital business was already struggling because of the parties' separation. This Court credits Wife's position that Husband's drug use directly contributed to the demise of Harborview and caused a reduction in his income. Accordingly, this factor weighs in Wife's favor.

(c) The Probable Future Financial Circumstances of the Parties

As indicated above, both parties have equivalent earning capacities although an accurate assessment of Husband's income has been frustrated due to his failure to provide financial documentation. In terms of future earning capacity, Wife arguably has more employment options as a college graduate. However, Husband has significant trade skills and has established his abilities as an entrepreneur. The Court is not concerned that either party will be unable to support themselves in the future. Accordingly, the Court finds this factor to be balanced between the parties as both have established their ability to sustain gainful employment.

(d) The impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business.

The primary source of the assets accumulated by the parties during their marriage and the debts they currently owe was the marital business, Harborview Restoration LLC. Both parties credibly testified that they started their marriage with "nothing," but accumulated considerable wealth through this once prosperous business venture. As has been discussed at length herein, the parties were both directed to share the expense of having Harborview analyzed by Empire Appraisers to determine its value on the date of commencement.

Each party paid approximately $11,000 during the course of this litigation for Empire to conduct its analysis. However, when it came time for the report to be issued, Husband failed to pay his share of the outstanding balance, to wit $4,195, despite repeated promises that he would do so imminently. In contrast, Wife established that she was ready willing and able to pay her share. Wife argues that Husband's failure to pay was willful and deliberate to avoid having to pay Wife a distributive award for her contributions to the business. This Court finds that Husband's failure to comply with the Court Ordered appraisal not only frustrated Wife's ability to prove the value of the business, but also further obfuscated the issue of Husband's ability to earn income. This factor has been given significant weight in Wife's favor.

(e) Wasteful Dissipation of Assets by Either Party

A wasteful dissipation occurs when a party wrongfully reduces or extinguishes marital assets without a reasonable explanation, or with the intention of depriving the other spouse of that asset. See e.g. Wilner v. Wilner, 192 AD2d 524 (2d Dept. 1993); see also Mage v. Mage, 174 AD3d 884 (2d Dept. 2019). The party alleging the wasteful dissipation bears the burden of proving such waste by a preponderance of the evidence. See Marino v. Marino, 2020 NY Slip Op 02922 (2d Dept. 2020). While there is considerable discretion in what amounts to waste, a wasteful dissipation of assets generally does not occur when marital funds are utilized to pay legitimate expenses or used to fund failed investments, absent evidence of wrongdoing. See Eschemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 AD3d 983 (2d Dept. 2018); see also Kohl v. Kohl, 24 AD3d 219 (1st Dept. 2005).

Both parties testified that they started their marriage with next to nothing. However, through their joint efforts of entrepreneurship the parties managed to create a successful business. In the company's best years, the parties were never in need of money, as they freely used the business' bank accounts to support their lifestyle. The money withdrawn from Harborview enabled the parties to enjoy an affluent life including luxury cars, a $1.4 million dollar home, expensive clothing, jewelry, watches, and vacations. Wife argues that they managed to maintain the business, even after the divorce commenced, with both parties working separately. Wife testified that she did not think the business was at risk of closing. Wife claims that the business only failed due to Husband's illicit drug use, which ultimately resulted in a mental health hospitalization followed by a month of in-patient rehab. Wife claims that Husband's opioid addiction caused him to abandon the business at a precarious time and ultimately resulted in its failure. Finally, Wife claims that she attempted to save the business by requesting the appointment of a business receiver, but that the application was denied by the Motion Court. Wife claims that Husband decided to close the business unilaterally, without consulting her, and without her consent. Wife does not believe the business was in such financial peril that it had to close.

Husband offers a different explanation as to the demise of Harborview. Husband claims that Wife looted the corporate bank accounts and then left the business. However, Husband offered no proof to establish his claim than his own conclusory testimony. Husband claims that he took steps to replace Wife when she left, but that it was impossible to replicate her contributions to the business. Husband testified that he borrowed $200,000 from his mother in a final attempt to save the business, but that it was too late. No proof of a $200,000 loan was offered at trial.

This Court credits both parties' testimony regarding the demise of Harborview and concludes that it failed for all the stated reasons. Both parties testified as to how the other was necessary for the business to thrive. Husband's disappearance left Wife unable to fulfill his responsibilities. Wife's departure made it impossible for the business to survive upon Husband's return. However, on balance, this Court finds that this factor weighs in Wife's favor as she established the efforts she made to save the business through admissible evidence. Husband only offered unsupported conclusory statements.

(f) Acts of Domestic Violence

Husband failed to offer any evidence or testimony regarding domestic violence during the parties' marriage. However, Wife credibly testified that both parties called the police "several times" during their post commencement cohabitation, but no arrests were ever made. Wife credibly testified that Husband "screamed in her face, pointed fingers in her face" and on one occasion "slammed her hand down on a desk" (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 49). Wife further testified that Husband sent her nasty and threatening text messages during the course of this proceeding (Tr. 1/5/26, pg. 33). However, Wife admitted to using derogatory terms herself including calling Husband a "lowlife" and "deadbeat" (Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 20). Wife acknowledged that she was verbally abusive and admitted that those were "not [her] finest moments" (Tr. 1/5/26, pg. 20).

Wife further testified that at least two times during her marriage she filed a Family Offense Petition and received an Order of Protection enjoining Husband.³ However, Wife admitted that Husband also filed two Family Offense Petitions  ⁴ and received at least one Order of Protection enjoining her. Wife testified that she did not want to elaborate on the topic of domestic violence as she did not want the subject to "rent space in [her] brain anymore" (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 51). Wife testified that both parties decided to mutually withdraw their cross Orders of Protection "amicably" before factual findings could be made (Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 90).

In addition to incidents between the parties, Wife testified as to a physical altercation that took place between Husband and F. L. A video of the incident was watched during trial (Def. Ex. F). The event took place on July 3, 2023, shortly after Husband returned from his in-patient treatment in Florida. On that date Husband sought assistance from the Police Department to tow a motor vehicle that he owned. At the time Husband knew that the vehicle was being used by his son. It is unclear from the record why Husband requested that the police tow the vehicle. F.L.took offense to Husband's actions, and a verbal argument ensued. That verbal argument quickly turned into a physical altercation between father and son in the middle of the street. As a result of the fight with his son Husband was arrested but the "charges were dropped." A Temporary Order of Protection was issued against Husband in favor of F.L. (JN #7). Despite his unfortunate event, F.L.has elected to reside with this Father throughout the course of this litigation.

Neither party specifically connected the issue of domestic violence, or domestic strife, to the economic issues in this proceeding or testified as to what "effect" it had on their lives. Accordingly, this Court has considered this factor but finds that it fails to offer significant weight in either party's favor regarding the financial issues in this divorce.

(g) Husband's Non-Compliance With Court Orders

As will be discussed at greater length in relation to the adjudication of Wife's contempt motion (see below), Wife's ability to fairly litigate this case has been severely frustrated by Husband's pervasive failure to comply with Court Orders. Husband's non-compliance has not only resulted in Wife being unable to value certain assets (i.e. Harborview Restoration LLC), it has also resulted in Wife having to liquidate several marital bank accounts and assets to pay for pendente lite obligations attributed to Husband. For example, all of the parties' marital bank accounts were liquidated during the pendency of the action to pay down a money judgment associated with Husband (See "Cummings Judgment" below). Husband's non-compliance with Court Orders has resulted in this Court drawing a blanket adverse inference against him in regard to financial matters (See In Limine Order dated 12/17/25). This factor weighs greatly in Wife's favor and supports an unequal distribution of the remaining assets.

Distribution of Assets and Debts

Having considered the above factors, the Court will distribute the parties' marital assets as indicated below. In making its determination, the Court notes that this is a marriage of significant duration and starts with the presumption that the assets should be distributed as equally as possible. See Kamm v. Kamm, 2020 NY Slip Op 02465 (2d Dept. 2020); See Achuthan v. Achuthan, 117 N.Y.S. 3d 667 (2d Dept. 2020). However, equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution. See Arrigo v. Arrigo, 38 AD3d 807 (2d Dept. 2007). As discussed below, this Court finds that an unequal distribution in favor of Wife is supported by the factors above and the overall circumstances of this case. See Ropiecki v. Ropiecki, 94 AD3d 734 (2d Dept. 2012).

1. Harborview Restoration LLC.

The history and operations of Harborview Restoration LLC. has been discussed at length above. Suffice it to say the business was created in 2004 or 2005, during the marriage, making it marital property. Typically, marital businesses are "owned and managed" by one spouse, with the non-titled spouse asserting a claim in equitable distribution based upon, inter alia, their direct contributions to the business or indirect contributions to the marriage that support the business. See e.g. Kamm v. Kamm, 182 AD3d 590 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Culman v. Boesky, 2022 NY Slip Op 03440 (2d Dept. 2022). However, the evidence offered at trial in the present action established that both parties were equal business partners from the company's inception. Under these circumstances a more substantial award to the non-titled spouse is warranted. See Keren v. Keren, 201 AD3d 906 (2d Dept. 2022).

The trial record is unclear as to whether the parties attributed any ownership interest in the business to Wife when it was formed. While the business tax returns attributed a 20% ownership interest to Wife, Husband testified that the parties fabricated her ownership interest for tax purposes. Wife did not contest Husband's claim and merely indicted that she was "unsure." In any event, any ownership interest attributed to Wife would not be binding on this Court as it is authorized to consider the equitable distribution of marital assets, regardless of title. See Nedd v. Nedd, 246 AD3d 822 (2d Dept. 2026); see also Sperling v. Sperling, 165 AD2d 338 (2d Dept. 1991). In this regard, both parties credibly testified that they operated the business as equal partners. Wife managed all the back office and bookkeeping work related to the business, and Husband managed the construction work "in the street." The parties conferred with one another frequently and made all major decisions together.

When the parties separated, they continued to manage the business with Wife working remotely, although their ability to communicate was strained. However, Harborview suffered a major setback in or around June 2023 when Husband sought inpatient treatment for his opioid addiction. Wife credibly testified that she took whatever steps she reasonably could to save the business, including requesting the appointment of a business receiver in July 2023 (See Mot. Seq. No 008). However, Wife's request for the appointment of a receiver was denied by Order dated December 26, 2023 (Marrone, J.) Therein, the Court directed Husband to provide an accounting for the business and granted leave for Wife to renew her application after the accounting was considered. However, Husband failed to comply with the court ordered accounting and a receiver was never appointed.

Ultimately Wife stopped her involvement with the business after she discovered what she believed to be a "secret account" that Husband was depositing business income into to hide it from her (Tr. 12/15/26 pg., 85). Husband claimed that the money in that account was being held by the business "in escrow" for jobs that were pre-paid by the insurance companies they worked with (Tr. 12/15/26 pgs. 94-95). Wife testified that as the business' bookkeeper she was aware of its accounts, and the account that she found was unknown to her. Wife testified that she could no longer fulfill her bookkeeping responsibilities if business funds were being hidden.

When Husband completed his inpatient treatment, he continued to operate the business after Wife's departure. While the business was in debt, he took a $200,000 loan from his Mother to keep it afloat. Husband also attempted to hire office staff to fulfill some of Wife's prior responsibilities, but with little success. Ultimately, Husband made the unilateral decision to "close" Harborview and end its operations in or around January 2024. Husband testified that he made this choice because the business was burdened with significant debt, and he found it difficult to operate without Wife's contribution. Moreover, shortly after Wife's departure, Husband also lost the services of his primary salesperson, Michael Donato. Mr. Donato worked as an independent contractor finding potential clients. Wife testified that Mr. Donato was loyal to the business but left because he was not being paid on a regular basis.

By Order dated January 31, 2023 (Marrone, J.), Empire Valuation Consultants was appointed to determine the fair market value of Harborview as of the commencement date of this action. Each party was directed to pay 50% of any costs associated with the appraisal and expert testimony at trial. In furtherance of this Order, each party paid approximately $11,000 during the pendency of the action for the business to be valued. The parties were further authorized to use "joint marital savings" held in a specific Citibank account to pay their respective shares.

On or about August 13, 2025, this Court was advised that Empire Valuation Consultants had not issued its valuation report. By Pre-Trial Conference Order dated August 13, 2025, this Court specifically permitted the appraisal to be completed after the Note of Issue was filed. On or about September 3, 2025, Wife filed an Order to Show Cause in Limine (Seq. No. 16) seeking to preclude Husband from offering evidence at trial for, inter alia, failing to pay his proportionate share of Empire's Fees. On or about October 27, 2025, mid-trial, Husband testified that he was "in the process" of gathering funds to pay Empire. By Short Form Order dated October 27, 2025, Husband was granted a final opportunity to pay his portion of the remaining evaluation fees in the sum of $4,195 by November 15, 2025. He failed to do so despite several on the record assurances that he would.

Wife's Order to Show Cause in Limine was granted by Order of this Court dated December 17, 2025. Therein, this Court found it appropriate to draw an adverse inference against Husband in relation to the value of the business and ruled that the question of value would be resolved in Wife's favor, subject to her burden of proof. Finally, this Court found that as Wife's ability to offer a value for the business was frustrated by Husband's non-compliance, the prejudice caused by Husband's actions would be "specifically considered" in relation to the distribution of the remaining marital assets.

A party seeking the equitable distribution of an asset has the burden of establishing a value for that asset. See Seckler-Roode v. Roode, 36 AD3d 889 (2d Dept. 2007); see also Spera v. Spera, 71 AD3d 661 (2d Dept. 2010). Absent persuasive evidence of value, it is improper for the Court to speculate as to the distribution of an asset. See Gredel v. Gredel, 128 AD2d 834 (2d Dept. 1987). When dealing with actively managed assets, such as a business, the proper valuation date is generally the date of commencement. See Cotton v. Roedelbronn, 170 AD3d 595 (1st Dept. 2019); See also Daniel v. Friedman, 22 AD3d 707 (2d Dept. 2005). Accordingly, this Court is tasked with establishing a commencement date value for Harborview, before equitably distributing that value between the parties. See Cotton v. Roedelbronn, 170 AD3d 595 (1st Dept. 2019). In so doing, the Court is required to consider each party's direct and indirect contributions made to the acquisition, management and growth of the company at issue See Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017).

Here, Wife failed to offer any evidence of the value of Harborview at or around the date of commencement of this action in May 2022. Wife offered the company's 2020 business tax return into evidence which established that the company received $2,408,194 in gross sales in 2019 (Def. Ex. M). However, this figure is before the cost of goods and business deductions. The cost of goods recorded on the tax return was $1,391,214, which resulted in a "gross business profit" of $1,016,980. When business related expenses were deducted from this number the resulting "net business income" was $163,173. This figure, while illustrative to the profits available to Husband and Wife as owners, is insufficient to attribute a value to the company. The determination of the value of a business is a function within the fact-finding power of the court, but it generally must rest on the credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques. See Rigas v. Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 (2d Dept. 2024); see also Sieger v. Sieger, 51 AD3d 1004 (2d Dept. 2008).

Despite the absence of a value, both parties credibility testified that they equally contributed to the creation, management and growth of the company. Accordingly, if a value was established at trial, This Court finds that it would have been distributed equally between the parties (50% each). See Silvers v. Silvers, 197 AD3d 1195 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Keil v. Keil, 85 AD3d 1233 (3rd Dept. 2011). This Court finds that Husband's failure to pay his $4,195 share for the business evaluator's report to be issued wrongfully negated Wife's right to an equal distribution of Harborview's date of commencement value. Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's in limine Order dated December 17, 2025, this Court will consider the frustration of Wife's rights in conjunction with the distribution of the remaining marital assets, particularly the distribution of the former marital home (See "Real Property" below). Moreover, Wife's request for reallocation of the business evaluator's fees is granted as Wife paid $11,000 to Empire and received no benefit. Wife shall be entitled to a reallocation credit in the amount of $11,000 to be paid out of Husband's share of the net proceeds from the sale of the former marital home.

2. Bank Accounts

During trial, both parties made passing references to various business and personal bank accounts that were created during the marriage. The bank accounts mentioned included accounts at Chase, Discover and Citibank. During the pendency of this action Wife prepared and e-filed three sworn Statements of Net Worth.⁵ However, only her second Statement of Net Worth dated November 15, 2023, was entered into evidence at trial (Def. Ex. G). Therein Wife identified eight marital bank accounts  ⁶ and indicated both their date of commencement values and their values as of October 7, 2023. The commencement date values of the identified accounts total $205,138. The same accounts decreased in value to $54,527 as of October 7, 2023. No values were offered into evidence by Wife beyond that date. Wife's Statement of Net Worth also identifies a retirement account in her name from her employment with State Farm, but she indicates that it was created post commencement.

During the pendency of the action Husband prepared and e-filed two sworn Statements of Net Worth, both of which were offered by Wife into evidence at trial. Husband's first Statement of Net Worth is dated March 8, 2023 (Def. Ex. I), his second is dated February 19, 2024 (Def. Ex. J). Defendant's initial Statement of Net Worth (3/8/23) is incomplete and devoid of any financial information. Most sections of the Statement, including the "bank account" section are completely blank. No financial statements, paystubs or tax documentation are annexed. Husband's second Statement of Net Worth (2/19/24) is still incomplete but identifies a single marital bank account (Chase #4279) with a claimed date of commencement value of $14,230 and a balance of $12,676 as of February 19, 2024

No banking records were offered into evidence at trial, by either party, to resolve the discrepancy between their respective Net Worth Statements. In fact, no banking records were offered into evidence at all. Likewise, no evidence was offered regarding any marital investment or retirement accounts. In her Statement of Proposed Disposition, Wife suggests that each party should keep the accounts presently held in their name. She further claims that all joint bank accounts were "exhausted" during the pendency of this action. Bank accounts are not specifically addressed in Wife's summation. Husband's "summation" claims that $400,000 of marital funds were withdrawn from marital accounts and spent by Wife during the action. He asserts a claim for $200,000 in equitable distribution representing a 50% share of $400,000.

A party seeking the equitable distribution of a marital asset has the burden of establishing the existence of that asset, and its value. See Rudish v. Rudish, 150 AD3d 1291 (2d Dept. 2017). Bank accounts are typically valued as of the date of commencement if they are utilized by the parties during the pendency of the proceeding. See Rywak v. Rywak, 100 AD2d 542 (2d Dept. 1984); see also Graziano v. Graziano, 285 AD2d 488 (2d Dept. 2001); Michaelessi v. Michaelessi, 59 AD3d 688 (2d Dept. 2009). If left untouched, the valuation date of a "passive" bank account would typically be the date of trial to capture any increase in value. See Halley v. Craven, 236 AD3d 512 (1st Dept. 2025).

During the pendency of this action the parties were each Ordered to pay 50% of the six installment payments due pursuant to the settlement of a lawsuit related to Husband's construction work (See "Cummings Judgment" below). In total the parties paid $455,000 of the $475,000 owed. Wife credibly testified that she liquidated the martial bank accounts identified in her Statement of Net Worth to satisfy the installment payments as they came due. At least one such liquidation was Court Ordered (See SFO dated 3/16/23). The parties also sold their Ferrari and used the proceeds towards the Judgment.

Husband claims that Wife's use of funds from marital bank accounts constituted marital waste and seeks a $200,000 distributive award. However, Husband has failed to meet his burden of proof for the distribution of marital bank accounts, as he has failed to offer any proof of their existence and value. See Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 (2d Dept. 2017); see also Vainchenker v. Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620 (2d Dept. 1997). Neither party has offered a single bank record into evidence to establish the balance of their marital accounts. Even if the Court were to consider Wife's Statement of Net Worth to be an admission as to value, she claimed the commencement date value to be $205,138, not $400,000. Moreover, Husband has not disputed Wife's claim that those funds have been spent on marital expenses, primarily marital debt. Wife credibly testified that all the parties marital accounts were liquidated during the pendency of this action to reduce the Cummings debt. The use of marital funds to pay down marital debts does not constitute marital waste. See Epstein v. Messner, 73 AD3d 843 (2d Dept. 2010); see also Corless v. Corless, 18 AD3d 493 (2d Dept. 2005); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 291 AD2d 373 (2d Dept. 2002).

Under these circumstances the Court declines to award either party a distributive award related to the marital bank accounts identified at trial. Rather, Husband shall be entitled to keep the contents of any bank accounts in his name, and Wife shall keep the contents of any accounts in her name. As for any existing joint accounts, their present date value is to be split evenly between the parties.

3. Jewelry

In his post-trial summation, Husband requests a distributive award in an unspecified sum representing a 50% share of marital jewelry allegedly "removed" from the marital residence by Wife when she relocated. Generally, the value of personalty must be proven at trial and a failure to do so precludes distribution. See Kiani v. Kiani, 197 AD3d 1168 (2d Dept. 2021). However, a party's admission as to value may sometimes be considered as evidence. See Ferina v. Ferina, 286 AD2d 472 (2d Dept. 2001). Here the trial record is devoid of any testimony or evidence identifying any specific piece of jewelry as a marital asset or offering a value for the same. Accordingly, Husband's application for the equitable distribution of jewelry is denied due to a failure of proof.

4. Real Property

Two parcels of real property were identified as potential assets at trial, *** 36th Street in Brooklyn, New York and *** Lighthouse Avenue in Staten Island, New York. *** 36th Street is a commercial building that was deeded in Wife's name before the marriage. It is currently being leased by a commercial tenant. *** Lighthouse Avenue is the former marital home. Lighthouse was purchased during the marriage and is deeded in Wife's name. Lighthouse is currently occupied by Husband and the parties' adult child F. L.

(a). *** Lighthouse Avenue, Staten Island, New York

On or about March 6, 2009, during their marriage, the parties jointly purchased a parcel of real property located at *** Lighthouse Avenue in Staten Island, New York. This property served as the parties' marital home until Wife moved out in March 2022. After the commencement of this action the parties continued to cohabitate, with Wife moving into the basement. However, Wife credibly testified that she was ultimately compelled to relocate with N.H. as the domestic strife between the parties increased. By Order dated October 3, 2023, the parties were directed to split (50% each) the cost of the mortgage, homeowners' insurance premiums and property taxes pendente lite.

It is undisputed that this property is marital in nature and is therefore subject to equitable distribution. By Order dated May 17, 2023, Neglia Appraisals Inc. was appointed as a neutral evaluator to value the property. Both parties were directed to equally share the cost of this evaluation. Wife promptly paid her share of the evaluation. Husband belatedly paid his share mid-trial after being compelled to do so by Wife's contempt motion (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 54).

By Order dated February 5, 2024, the parties were directed to update the appraisal as it had become stale. Wife promptly complied with the updated appraisal order and paid her 50% share. However, Neglia's representative at trial testified that Husband failed to pay his 50% share (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 28). Wife credibly testified that she paid Husband's share of the updated appraisal. Wife's claim for reimbursement is addressed below (see "Counsel Fees").

On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff called the President of Neglia Appraisals Inc., Richard J. Sheeler, to testify in support of the valuation findings in his reports (Def. Exs. W&R). Mr. Sheeler testified that the property's present-day value was $1,400,000. Husband stipulated on the record that he believed the Mr. Sheeler's value was "correct." By Order dated January 7, 2026, the parties agreed to sell Lighthouse with the assistance of a court appointed broker. Husband was first granted an opportunity to purchase Wife's share of the equity, which he elected not to do. By Order dated January 7, 2026, Mr. Adam Kalish Esq. was selected from the approved "Part 36" list of real estate brokers to sell Lighthouse Avenue. There has been considerable post-trial litigation regarding the sale. As of the writing of this Decision, the parties have been directed to accept an offer of $1,500,000 for the property (see Order dated 5/1/26). The property is in contract for sale and is awaiting a closing as of the last report to this Court. At closing, the net proceeds of the sale are to be held in escrow until such time as this Decision and the resulting Judgment of Divorce formally directs their distribution.

(a)(1). Origination Separate Property Credit

Husband alleges that he is entitled to a $750,000 origination separate property credit in relation to the purchase of *** Lighthouse Avenue. Husband claims that in or around 2007, during the marriage, he "inherited" a parcel of vacant land located at 8806 Glenwood Road in Brooklyn, New York. Although he utilized the word "inherit" Husband testified that he obtained the property from his Mother, who is still alive. Moreover, while Husband testified that "he" inherited the property, he admits it was deeded in Wife's name. (Tr. 9/4/25, pg. 99). Neither party offered the deed into evidence. Husband testified that all property associated with the parties was deeded solely in Wife's name in an attempt to make Husband "judgment proof."

Husband credibly testified that at the time when 8806 Glenwood was obtained, he was working with his Father, who owned a construction company. Husband and his father decided to improve the vacant land. Husband claims that over the course of a few months, he built a home on the vacant lot. The funds used to build the home were obtained through a construction loan taken in Wife's name (Tr. 9/4/25, pg. 100). Upon its completion, the Glenwood property was "immediately" sold for $750,000, which allegedly generated a $600,000 profit. Husband claims that the parties' used this money, which he claims to be separate property, to purchase *** Lighthouse Avenue.

Property obtained during the course of a marriage is presumed to be marital. See Cuomo v. Moss, 199 AD3d 635 (2d Dept. 2021). A party seeking to overcome this presumption has the burden of proving that the property at issue is separate property. See Massimi v. Massimi, 35 AD3d 400 (2d Dept. 2006). "Marital property is to be viewed broadly, while separate property is to be viewed narrowly." See Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 AD3d 702 (2d Dept. 2009). Husband admits that he obtained 8806 Glenwood Road while the parties were married (Tr. 9/4/25, pg. 86). While Husband claims that he "inherited" the property, he has not offered any proof as to the context in which he inherited it, other than to say that he received it from his Mother, who is still alive. See Parker v. Parker, 240 AD2d 554 (2d Dept. 1997); see also E.G. v. D.G., 43 N.Y.S. 3d 766 (Sup. Ct. West. Cty. 2014). Husband has failed to offer evidence sufficient to establish a valid inter vivos gift. See Juliano v. Juliano, 984 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. Kings. Cty. 2014). Moreover, any inter vivos gift would have arguably been transmuted into marital property when it was placed in Wife's name. See Sherman v. Sherman, 304 AD2d 744 (2d Dept. 2003).

Considering the facts above, this Court finds that Husband failed to overcome the presumption of marital property. See D'Angelo v. D'Angelo, 14 AD3d 476 (2d Dept. 2005). Moreover, even if the Court were to credit Husband's conclusory separate property claim, it remained his burden to trace that separate property contribution to the purchase of *** Lighthouse Avenue. See Shkreli v. Shkreli, 142 AD3d 546 (2d Dept. 2016).

A party seeking a separate property contribution credit has the burden of "tracing" the source of the funds with "sufficient particularity." See Masella v. Masella, 67 AD3d 749 (2d Dept. 2009). A party making a contribution claim cannot meet their burden of proof through their own testimony. See Ferrante v. Ferrante, 186 AD3d 566 (2d Dept. 2020). Tracing generally requires the submission of documentary evidence. See Marshall v. Marshall, 91 AD3d 610 (2d Dept. 2012). When asked how he planned to prove his alleged separate property contribution claim Husband testified "we can have my mother in here to testify and show the deeds . . . we can show the sale of the house . . . I can show lists, pictures, plans, permits." (Tr. 9/4/25 pg. 91). Husband also indicated that he may also be able to produce bank statements to establish the transfer of funds. Although this testimony acknowledges how one could establish a separate property contribution claim, Husband failed to call his mother as a witness and failed to offer any deeds, lists, pictures, plans, permits or bank records into evidence. Husband offered no proof beyond his own conclusory testimony. Accordingly, this Court finds that Husband failed to meet his burden to establish his entitlement to a separate property contribution credit in relation to the purchase of *** Lighthouse Avenue. See Iacono v. Iacono, 145 AD3d 972 (2d Dept. 2016); see also Belilos v. Rivera, 164 AD3d 1411 (2d Dept. 2018).

Equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution. See Taylor v. Taylor, 140 AD3d 944 (2d Dept. 2016). Rather, the distribution of marital assets must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Holternman v. Holterman, 3 NY3d 1 (2004). This Court finds that both parties contributed equally to the acquisition of Lighthouse Avenue and its maintenance and upkeep during the marriage. Accordingly, under traditional circumstances, both parties would be entitled to an equal share of the net proceeds from its sale. See e.g. Matter of Motta v. Motta, 145 AD3d 560 (1st Dept. 2016).

However, as indicated above, Husband's repeated willful failure to comply with Court Orders has negated Wife's ability to receive a distributive award from the business that she otherwise would have been entitled to. Moreover, Husband's failure to provide a completed Statement of Net Worth frustrated Wife's ability to identify and value other potential assets. By Order dated December 17, 2025, this Court indicated that the proper remedy for Husband's failure to comply with the business appraisal was an adverse inference to be considered in relation to the remaining marital assets. Accordingly, this Court finds it to be equitable under the circumstances to distribute the net proceeds from the sale of the former marital home 60% to Wife and 40% to Husband. See Dosher v. Dosher, 137 AD3d 962 (2d Dept. 2016); see also Hathaway v. Hathaway, 16 AD3d 458 (2d Dept. 2005); Balsamo v. Balsamo, 200 AD2d 649 (2d Dept. 1994). This distribution shall be after all mortgage associated debts are satisfied at closing.

(b). *** 36th Street, Brooklyn, New York

The parties met in February 2001 and were married on September 11, 2001. On October 21, 1999, before the marriage, Wife purchased a parcel of vacant land located at *** 36th Street, in Brooklyn New York. Wife credibly testified that when she purchased the land, she did not know Husband (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 88). Shortly after purchase, Wife began the construction of a commercial building, starting with its foundation. The property is deeded in Wife's maiden name (Pl. Ex. 10). Wife credibly testified that she purchased this property using a $60,000 inheritance from her father. Husband admits that he had "nothing to do" with the acquisition of the property (Tr. 9/5/25, pg. 144). However, Husband claims that during the marriage the parties improved the property from mostly vacant land to a rentable commercial building. Husband further claims that he did most of the renovation work himself. In his summation, Husband seeks a distributive award equal to 50% of the appreciation of the property during the marriage.

Marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the commencement of a matrimonial action." See DRL § 236 (B)(1)(c). Property obtained before the marriage is considered "separate property" that is not subject to equitable distribution. See Exchemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 AD3d 983 (2d Dept. 2018). Any increase in the value of separate property remains separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse. See Garcia v. Garcia, 200 AD3d 652 (200 AD3d 652 (2d Dept. 2021). Such contributions can include maintaining, renovating or improving the separate property. See Weidman v. Weidman, 162 AD3d 720 (2d Dept. 2018). However, it is the burden of the party seeking a contribution credit to separate property to distinguish any appreciation in value due to market forces from any appreciation in value due to their efforts. See Kattan v. Kattan, 202 AD3d 771 (2d Dept. 2022); see also Pauk v. Pauk, 232 AD2d 386 (2d Dept. 1996).

It is undisputed that as *** 36th Street was purchased before the marriage and therefore constitutes Wife's separate property. During the pendency of this action Neglia Appraisals Inc. was appointed by the Court as a neutral real estate expert to appraise the 36th Street Property. By Amended Appointment Order dated 2/5/24 (Marrone, J.) Neglia Appraisals Inc. was appointed to appraise the 36th Street property with two valuation dates, September 11, 2001 (the date of marriage) and the "current value" as of February 5, 2024. The Order did not request a date of commencement value, when the accumulation of marital assets arguably ended.⁷ The Appointment Order further directed Neglia Appraisals to "assume that the construction of the building on the property was completed as of this date." However, the Order preserved Husband's right to challenge that the construction was not completed at trial. The "building" at issue consists of a brick two-story warehouse with office space on the second floor and a one garage warehouse unit on the first floor. Since its construction, the building has been occupied by at least three commercial tenants. The building's current tenant is a company known as "Capri Architectural Windows" (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 91).

On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff called the President of Neglia Appraisals Inc., Richard J. Sheeler, to testify in support of the valuation findings in his reports (Def. Exs. W&R). Mr. Sheeler was qualified as a real estate expert over Husband's objection. Mr. Sheeler testified that he followed the Court's Order and assumed that a completed building was constructed on the property on the date of marriage although he had no personal knowledge if a building existed at that time. Mr. Sheeler testified that on September 11, 2001, *** 36th Street had a value of either $175,000 or $275,000 dependent upon whether the property was subject to an Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program (ICIP) tax exemption, as a potential buyer would pay more for tax-exempt property. Mr. Sheeler testified that his second valuation date was June 3, 2025, which he construed to be a "present day" value for the property. Mr. Sheeler opined that the property's value was $1,100,000 on June 3, 2025. Finally, Mr. Sheeler opined that in his opinion, given the assumption in the Order of Appointment, that the increase in value between September 2001 and June 2025 was due solely to market forces (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 21).

Mr. Sheeler's credible testimony established that the appreciation in value of the 36th Street Property between the date of marriage and June 3, 2025, was either $825,000 or $925,000 depending on the tax status of the property, a fact never conclusively established. Therefore, it became Husband's burden to distinguish or separate the appreciation due to market forces from appreciation due to his direct or indirect contributions to the property. See Keane v. Keane, 25 AD3d 729 (2d Dept. 2006); see also McCann v. McCann, 142 Misc 2d 1083 (Sup. Ct. Suff. Cty. 1989). In support of his contribution claim, Husband testified that he personally improved the property from a "foundation" that existed in 2001 to the warehouse that currently exists at the property. However, Husband failed to include any details regarding the nature of the work he did, the cost attributable to his renovations, or the time he contributed to the work. He further failed to offer any documentary evidence whatsoever to support his claim. Wife contests Husband's claims regarding his contributions to the 36th Street Property. Wife testified that she retained the services of several different contractors to construct the property on the land she purchased and that Husband did not contribute at all (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 91).

In the absence of a single invoice, receipt, work order or picture, this Court finds that Husband's conclusory, self-serving testimony is woefully insufficient to meet his burden. Accordingly, as Husband failed to prove that any definable portion of the increase in value was due to his direct or indirect contributions, as opposed to market forces, the property at *** 36th Street, Brooklyn New York shall remain Wife's separate property and is not subject to equitable distribution. See Alper v. Alper, 77 AD3d 694 (2d Dept. 2010); see also Carniol v. Carnoil, 306 AD2d 366 (2d Dept. 2003); Shahidi v. Shahidi, 129 AD2d 627 (2d Dept. 1987).

5. Personalty/ Motor Vehicles

Considerable testimony was offered by both parties at trial regarding high-end luxury vehicles that were purchased during the marriage, including a Ferrari, a Range Rover, a Mercedes, a BMW and a Bentley. Both parties' also made passing references to valuable personalty, including designer shoes, clothing, and high-end watches owned by Husband. However, neither party established that any of these assets remained in existence on the date of commencement. Moreover, neither party established the value of any vehicle or personalty at trial. It is the burden of a party seeking equitable distribution to establish the existence of a marital asset, and its value. See Massimi v. Massimi, 35 AD3d 400 (2d Dept. 2006). The failure to do so constitutes a failure of proof. See Seckler-Roode v. Roode, 36 AD3d 889 (2d Dept. 2007).

The Court finds that the parties' motor vehicles and personalty were not identified at trial with any specificity as to identity and value such that a distributive award to either party can be considered. See Fu Kuo Hsu v. Hsuan Huang, 149 AD2d 405 (2d Dept. 1989); see also Butler v. Butler, 256 AD2d 1041 (3rd Dept. 1998). Thus, each party shall be entitled to keep the personalty in their possession, and each party shall be granted exclusive use of the vehicle that they currently drive. The ownership of any additional vehicles shall be controlled by title.

6. Miscellaneous Assets

This Court has undertaken a thorough review of the parties' pre and post-trial submissions, the documentary evidence offered at trial and the trial record to make the distribution of the parties' property as complete and equitable as possible. However, the trial record admittedly makes passing references to other equitable distribution claims that are not specifically addressed herein. The Court finds that any claim for equitable distribution not specifically addressed herein is hereby denied due to a failure of proof. When determining equitable distribution, it is the burden of a party who seeks the distribution of an asset to specifically identify that asset and provide evidence as to its value. See Nacos v. Nacos, 168 AD3d 413 (1st Dept. 2019). The Court finds that after an exhaustive review, all other equitable distribution claims raised by the parties are hereby denied due to a failure to meet their respective burdens of proof. See Hand v. Hand, 196 AD3d 469 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Antonian v. Antonian, 215 AD2d 421 (2d Dept. 1995); Post v. Post, 68 AD3d 741 (2d Dept. 2009).

7. Marital Debt

Just as assets accumulated during a marriage are subject to equitable distribution so are marital debts. See Barra v. Barra, 191 AD3d 831 (2d Dept. 2021). The relevant time period for equitable distribution ends when the marital partnership ceases at the commencement of a divorce action. See Heyman v. Heyman, 102 AD3d 832 (2d Dept. 2013). Expenses incurred prior to the commencement of an action for divorce are marital debt to be shared by the parties upon an offer of proof that they represent marital expenses. See Bari v. Bari, 200 AD3d 835 (2d Dept. 2021). Expenses incurred after the commencement of a divorce action are the responsibility of the party who incurred them. See Prince v. Prince, 247 AD2d 457 (2d Dept. 1998.) In their post-trial summations, both parties seek the allocation of a debt owed to an individual known as "Patricia Cummings" and the allocation of a "Lightstream Loan."

(a). Patricia Cummings Judgment

In or around July 2007, during the course of the marriage, Husband undertook a project to construct a home for a customer named Patricia Cummings. To limit his liability for the project, Husband created a new limited liability company known as 8806 Glenwood Road, LLC,. This project resulted in a lawsuit  ⁸ being commenced by Ms. Cummings on July 10, 2013, against several entities related to the project including 8806 Glenwood Road, LLC, Harborview Construction, and Husband individually. In her suit, of which this Court takes judicial notice, Ms. Cummings asserted causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment, violations of the lien law, and an application to pierce the corporate veil to reach Husband individually. Wife is not individually named in the suit, although she admitted that she was tangentially involved with the project (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 86).

Ms. Cummings suit was resolved by "Settlement Agreement" dated March 18, 2022 (Pl. Ex. 3). Therein the Husband (individually) and the companies under his control agreed to settle the case for contingent sum of $1,000,000. The amount was "contingent" because the parties agreed that if the sum of $475,000 was paid in full pursuant to a schedule of payments, the remaining balance of $525,000 would be waived. However, if the payments were not fully and timely made, a money judgment for the full balance owed ($1,000,000), less any payments made, would be entered against Husband.

Wife credibly testified that the parties liquidated marital assets, including several bank accounts and a marital "Ferrari," to satisfy the first five installment payments. The Ferrari was sold for approximately $225,000. At least one of these installment payments was the subject of motion practice, which resulted in an Order directing both parties to liquidate the parties' remaining marital bank accounts  ⁹ to satisfy the $35,000 payment due on March 25, 2023 (See Order dated 3/16/23; Marrone, J.) This Order specifically indicated that "Wife may be credited for all or a portion of this amount . . . at trial." In total, Wife testified that $75,000 was liquidated from marital accounts during the course of the litigation to satisfy this marital debt (Tr. 12/15/25, pgs. 105-106).

The satisfaction of the first five installment payments left a single remaining installment payment of $40,000 to avoid the entry of Judgment in the amount of $1,000,000. The last installment payment was due on September 25, 2024. Wife credibly testified, and the evidence at trial establishes that Wife paid one half ($20,000)¹⁰ of the final installment payment on or about September 25, 2024. This information was communicated to Husband via a contemporaneous email from Ms. Cumming's attorney Louis Venezia Esq. (See Pl. Ex. 3, pg. 11). Despite being aware of the ramifications of non-payment, Husband failed to pay the remaining $20,000. This resulted in the filing and issuance of a Kings County Money Judgment in the amount of $1,000,000 against Husband, less amounts paid, resulting in a balance due of $545,000.

In her Statement of Proposed Disposition Wife asks this Court to attribute 100% of the outstanding balance of the money judgment to Husband as a separate debt. Debts accrued during a marriage are considered marital debts which are subject to equitable distribution. See Westreich v. Westereich, 169 AD3d 972 (2d Dept. 2019). Although Ms. Cummings did not sue Wife in her individual capacity, she sued Husband and the parties' companies during the marriage for causes of action that accrued during the marriage. Moreover, Wife admitted that she was involved in the underlying construction project. Accordingly, the money owed to Ms. Cummings constitutes a marital debt that is subject to equitable distribution. However, an equitable distribution of debt does not necessarily mean an equal distribution of that debt. See Minervini v. Minervini, 152 AD3d 666 (2d Dept. 2017).

This Court finds that Wife has paid her equitable share of the Cummings debt by liquidating several marital assets that she otherwise would have been entitled to a share of. These liquidations, which took place during the pendency of this matter, resolved all but $40,000 of the Cummings settlement. Wife then made a 50% contribution of $20,000 to the final $40,000 installment payment due. If Husband had done the same the debt would have been satisfied in its entirety. It is only due to Husband's failure to make his $20,000 payment that the outstanding debt ballooned to $545,000. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented, this Court finds that Wife's equitable obligation to contribute to the Cummings debt is satisfied. The remaining balance of $545,000, which has already been reduced to a Judgment, shall be 100% the responsibility of Husband to pay. See Corless v. Corless, 18 AD3d 493 (2d Dept. 2005); see also Kosovsky v. Zahl, 257 AD2d 522 (1st Dept.1999).

(b). Lightstream Loan

During trial Wife made several passing references to a "Lightstream Loan" taken by Husband during the course of the marriage after he ran into "trouble" with the New Jersey Attorney General. Wife testified that the initial amount of the loan was approximately $75,000(Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 82). The loan was primarily used to pay a settlement to the New Jersey Department of Consumer Affairs. In her contempt motion (Seq. No. 014) Wife argues that the so called "Automatic Orders" set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2)(b) and 22 NYCRR 202.16-a required Husband to continue making payments to satisfy the loan. However, no testimony was offered during trial as to the amount owed under this loan on the date of commencement, or the amount currently due and owing. Moreover, no documentary evidence was offered into evidence to prove the existence of the loan, its terms, or its balance.

Like a marital asset, a party seeking equitable distribution of a marital debt has the obligation to identify that debt, establish that it is a marital debt, and offer evidence of the amount of indebtedness. See Epstein v. Messner, 73 AD3d 843 (2d Dept. 2010). Here, Wife failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that the Lightstream Loan exists in an amount certain that can be allocated by this Court. See Dermigny v. Dermigny, 23 AD3d 429 (2d Dept. 2005); see also Cebeche v. Cebeche, 10 AD3d 441 (2d Dept 2004). Accordingly, the Lightstream Loan shall be controlled by title, and shall remain the debt of one or both parties depending upon who signed the contract to repay it.

Child Support

There are two adult "children" of the parties marriage. F. L. was born in August 2004, and N. H. was born in March 2008. F. L. turned twenty-one in August 2025, and N.H. is currently 18 years old. Throughout the course of these proceedings F.L. has resided with Husband and N.H. has resided with Wife. A custodial Order was never issued for F. L., but it is undisputed that he continues to reside with his father. As F.L. is currently beyond the child support jurisdiction of this Court, any award to Husband would be for retroactive support only. Wife was granted sole custody of N.H. by consent Order dated April 7, 2025, and she continues to reside with Wife although she is now a young adult.

Both parties seek an award of child support for the "child" that resides with them. In "split custody" situations, where the subject children are separated between two households, the Court must determine the basic child support obligation on a per household basis with the controlling percentage for each home determined according to how many children reside there. See Scomello v. Scomello, 260 AD2d 483 (2d Dept. 1999); see also Matter of Ross v. Manley, 135 A.D. 1104 (3rd Dept. 2016); Burns v. Burns, 70 AD3d 1501 (4th Dept. 2010).

The Child Support Standards Act sets forth the method by which the "presumptively correct" amount of child support can be calculated. See Domestic Relations Law § 240; Family Court Act § 413. A three-step process is required by the relevant statutes. The first step requires a calculation of the "combined parental income" up to a statutory cap, currently $193,000. See NY Soc. Serv. Law § 111-i(2)(b). The second step requires the Court to multiply the combined parental income by a specified percentage based upon the number of children. The third step is only triggered when the combined parental income exceeds the statutory cap. Once the statutory percentage is applied to the parties' combined income, and each party's pro rata contribution to that amount is determined, the resulting sum is presumptively the correct amount of child support.

As child support must be determined in both directions given the split custodial arrangement, two sets of calculations are required. As indicated above, Husband has de facto retroactive custody of F.L. and Wife has awarded sole custody of N.H. The correct statutory percentage to be applied to the parties' combined parental income for each child is 17%. See Matter of Hipp v. Ryan, 188 AD3d 1206 (2d Dept. 2020). Application of this percentage to the combined parental income will provide the appropriate level of support to meet the basic needs of each child. The income of the parties was a point of contention at trial.

During the marriage, Wife was employed as the office manager for Harborview. During her time at Harborview, she did not receive a traditional salary. Instead, the parties both withdrew money from the business accounts as needed to support their marital lifestyle. After leaving Harborview, Wife obtained employment as a claims adjuster for State Farm Insurance, a position she maintained until an unspecified date in 2024. Wife is presently employed as a "large claims loss adjuster" for The American Family Insurance Company. Wife works in this position full time as a salaried employee. Wife credibly testified at trial that she earns a base salary of $112,000 a year from her employment (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 40). However, Wife has not provided a W-2, paystub or tax return into evidence to substantiate her income. While Wife submitted her 2023 sworn Statement of Net Worth into evidence (Def. Ex. G) that document contains historical income information from 2019 to 2022 and does not reflect her current income. In addition to her base salary, Wife testified that she receives $7,235 a month ($86,820 a year) in rent from a commercial tenant that occupies *** 36th Street (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 41.) Wife offered no documentary evidence to support the amount of rent she receives. Wife has further failed to establish any expenses related to the building that would serve to offset the rental income. See e.g. Matter of Kristy Helen T. v. Richard F.G., 24 AD3d 788 (2d Dept. 2005). Finally, Wife testified that to "make ends meet" she has occasionally written private estimates as an insurance consultant. However, she credibility testified that her current employer does not condone this activity, so it is not a reliable source of ongoing income. Considering the limited income information offered by Wife at trial, this Court finds that Wife earns $198,820 a year for the purposes of calculating child support.

As indicated above, Husband's child support application is only limited to "retroactive" support running from May 2022 to August 2025. During that time Wife has worked for three companies, Harborview, State Farm Insurance, and her current employer American Family Insurance. In their post-trial summations, neither party makes a compelling argument as to how the Court should address the issue of retroactivity considering Wife's fluctuating income. However, Wife has not provided sufficient evidence of her historical finances for this Court to determine what her income was during each year of the relevant time period. The only tax return offered into evidence by Wife was from 2023, representing her 2022 income. Under these circumstances the Court finds that Wife's current income is the best indicator of her earning capacity.

The issue of Husband's income is much more complicated. Throughout the course of the marriage, Husband was the principal owner of Harborview. Husband and Wife jointly grew their startup company into a highly successful business venture. Both parties testified that the business had good years and bad years, but during the good years, they were flush with money. Like Wife, Husband was never paid a traditional salary. Rather, the parties withdrew funds from their business "as needed" to support their lifestyle. The closure of Harborview is discussed elsewhere in this Decision but generally resulted from conflict between the parties related to this divorce, and Husband's entry into inpatient substance abuse treatment. After Harborview closed, Husband continued in the disaster restoration field as an independent consultant. Husband testified that he used the business connections that he made through Harborview to find clients. Husband gets paid via 1099, but no 1099s or other tax documentation were offered into evidence at trial. Husband testified that he has not filed personal taxes in 2023 or 2024. Husband failed to offer even an approximation of his current income at trial. Given this shocking absence of financial information, an accurate calculation of Husband's income is an impossible task.

In her Statement of Proposed Disposition Wife suggests that the Court impute an income of $223,808 to Husband. This figure was allegedly derived from the "New York State Department of Labor Wage Guidelines" for an experienced contractor in Husband's field. However, no vocational testimony was elicited regarding these guidelines at trial, nor were the guidelines entered into evidence. The only financial evidence available to this Court regarding Husband's income are two Statements of Net Worth that he prepared during the pendency of this action (Def. Exs. I&J). Husband's first Statement of Net Worth, dated March 8, 2023, is not useful in determining his income, as the relevant sections of the document are completely blank. Husband's second Statement of Net Worth, dated February 19, 2024, indicates that he still worked at Harborview. Although no tax documentation is annexed to the statement, Husband self-reports an income of $130,000. However, this self-reported income is belied by the "expenses" section of the document. The instructions for the expenses section directed Husband to "list your current expenses on a monthly basis." In total, Husband calculated that he paid $13,532 a month in February 2024 to maintain his household. When annualized, this amounts to $162,384 of household expenses per year, a figure approximately $32,000 more than his claimed income. It is axiomatic that household expenses are paid with "post-tax" net income. Accordingly, a gross pre-tax income significantly greater than $162,384 a year would be needed. While this Court is unable to speculate as to what that income would be, it would arguably be more than the $223,808 claimed by Wife.

When determining a party's income for the calculation of child support, a court need not rely on that party's own account of his or her finances, but may, in the exercise of its discretion, impute income to a party based upon what he or she is capable of earning. See Kessler v. Kessler, 118 AD3d 946 (2d Dept. 2014). Here, the failure of proof regarding Husband's income is not attributable to Wife. As set forth in the "in limine" Order dated December 17, 2025, Husband's failure to pay the business evaluator, and failure to prepare an updated statement of net worth with the necessary supporting documentation removed the tools necessary for Wife to meet her burden. Accordingly, Wife was granted an adverse inference that the business evaluator's testimony and the updated statement of net worth would support her position, not Husband's, if they were offered at trial. Wife was also granted "issue resolution" so long as she could provide some evidence to support her claim. Given these rulings, the $223,808 figure suggested by Wife becomes plausible as it would tend to support Husband's claimed expenses. Therefore, given the limited financial information available, and in light December 17th Order, this Court finds it appropriate to impute the sum of $223,808 to Husband for the purposes of child support calculations. This imputed income adequately supports Husband's established standard of living and represents his earning capacity as established throughout the parties' marriage. See Saks v. Saks, 199 AD3d 950 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Haagen-Islami v. Islami, 96 AD3d 1004 (2d Dept. 2012).

For the reasons set forth above, this Court has determined that Husband's annual income is $223,808 at a minimum and that Wife's annual income is $198,820. From these amounts, the Court is directed to deduct certain statutory taxes (FICA and local NYC taxes) that were "actually paid." See Khaira v. Khaira, 93 AD3d 194 (1st Dept. 2012); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 172 AD3d 1654 (3rd Dept. 2019). Here, neither party has provided sufficient tax documentation from which this Court would be able to determine the amount of taxes they "actually paid." Accordingly, this Court is constrained to use their entire income for its child support calculations.

When calculating CSSA child support, there is a statutory cap limiting the parties combined income. See DRL § 240(1-b); see also Koutsouras v. Mitsos-Koutsouras, 198 AD3d 630 (2d Dept. 2021). The statutory cap is presently $193,000. When determining how to address income above the statutory cap the Court is directed to consider a number of statutory factors See DRL § 240 (1-b)(f); see also Park v. Park, 193 AD3d 1065 (2d Dept. 2021); Matter of Peddycoart v. MacKay, 145 AD3d 1081 (2d Dept. 2016). Notably, neither party has specifically addressed the issue of the statutory cap and whether it should be imposed. In fact, both parties summations after trial are silent on the issue of child support other than to request the same.

In determining whether to utilize income above the cap the Court has considered the enumerated statutory factors and makes the following findings. Both "children" at issue are not "minor children." F.L. is over the age of 21 and is therefore only entitled to a retroactive award. N.H. is 18 years old. Both parties have sufficient financial resources to support the child in their care. Regarding the standard of living enjoyed by the subject children, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the children lived anything beyond a middle-class lifestyle. While Wife testified at length as to her own standard of living during the marriage, she failed to connect the parties' prosperity to the children's standard of living. There is no evidence to show that the children were taken on vacations other than to Florida, were engaged in expensive extracurricular activities other than N.H.'s competitive dance, or that their parent's wealth was used to substantially increase their lifestyle. Moreover, the Court notes that both parties incomes are to some degree inflated as Husband's income has been imputed, and Wife's income failed to include expenses or tax deductions. Accordingly, after specific consideration of these factors, and a general consideration of the other factors set forth in DRL § 240, the Court finds that an application of the statutory cap of $193,000 without utilization of income above that cap is appropriate. See Marino v. Marino, 183 AD3d 813 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Hepheastou v. Spaliaras, 201 AD3d 793 (2d Dept. 2022).

As there is one child (F. L.) who has resided with Husband, the applicable child support percentage is 17%. The capped combined parental income is $193,000. Seventeen percent of the combined parental income is $32,810. This figure represents the parties' combined child support obligation for F. L., Husband's pro rata share of this combined child support amount is 53% and Wife's share is 47%. Forty-seven percent of $32,810 is $15,421 which represents Wife's retroactive annual child support obligation for F. L. Her retroactive monthly obligation was $1,285.

The other child of this marriage, N.H., resides with Wife. The applicable child support percentage is 17%. The capped combined parental income is $193,000. Seventeen percent of the parties' combined income is $32,810. This figure represents the parties' combined child support obligation for N.H.. Husband's pro rata share of this combined child support amount is 53% and Wife's share is 47%. Fifty-three percent of $32,810 is $17,389, which is Husband's annual child support obligation. His monthly obligation is $1,449. Husband is hereby Ordered to pay the sum of $1,449 directly to Wife on or before the 15th of each month. However, given the issue date of this Decision, the first payment shall be due on or before June 30, 2026.

Husband's ongoing child support obligation may be revisited by a Court of competent jurisdiction upon a showing of "(i) a substantial change in circumstances; or (ii) that three years have passed since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted; or (iii) there has been a change in either party's gross income by fifteen percent or more since the order was entered, last modified or adjusted." See Mejia v. Mejia, 106 AD3d 786, 964 N.Y.S.2d 607 (2d Dept. 2013). His obligation will end on its own terms when N.H. reaches the age of twenty-one.

Retroactivity

Child support awards are generally retroactive to the first time that they were affirmatively requested. See Crane v. Crane, 264 AD2d 749 (2d Dept. 1999). A review of the official court file reveals that that Husband made his first application for child support in his Summons with Notice which was filed on May 2, 2022. Child support ends on its own terms when the child at issue reaches the age of twenty-one. F.L. reached the age of twenty-one on August 2, 2025. Accordingly, Husband is entitled to a retroactive award of child support for a set period of thirty-nine months from May 2022 to August 2025.

Accordingly, Wife owes thirty-nine months of child support for F.L. at a rate of $1,285 a month for a total retroactive award of $50,111. When calculating arrears, the Court is directed to credit payments of pendente lite child support ordered by the Court but not amounts voluntarily paid for the benefit of the children. See LiGreci v. LiGreci, 87 AD3d 722 (2d. Dept. 2011). Husband never filed a motion for pendente lite child support. However, Wife is also entitled to a credit for payments made to third parties for the subject child's benefit. See Yunis v. Yunis, 94 NY2d 787 (1999); see also McKay v. Groesbeck, 117 AD3d 810 (2d Dept. 2014).

By Order dated October 3, 2023, both parties were directed to pay 50% of the "mortgage, homeowner's insurance, insurance premiums, and property taxes" for the marital home, which was occupied by Husband and F. L. Wife must be credited for payments made towards the mortgage where F.L. resides to avoid a "double shelter" violation. See Davidman v. Davidman, 97 AD3d 627 (2d Dept. 2012). At trial, Wife credibly testified that she has consistently paid her 50% share of these expenses since being ordered to do so. Wife further credibly testified that Husband initially paid his 50% share but then stopped complying with his obligation in January 2024 when he only made a partial payment of $1,000. Husband failed to make any additional payments in calendar year 2025 (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 43). When Husband stopped paying his 50% share, Wife began paying the entire mortgage to protect her credit score. Wife offered a comprehensive chart of the payments that she made into evidence (Def. Ex. Y). Wife is entitled to a $20,493 credit against her retroactive child support arrears equaling 50% of the payment of the mortgage and related expenses from October 2023 to November 2024.¹¹ She is entitled to a credit in the amount of $1,952 for the amount she paid towards the mortgage in December 2024.¹² Finally, she is entitled to a credit of $26,007 equaling 100% of the payments made from January 2025 to July 2025.¹³ While there are additional payments indicated on Wife's chart, they were not adequately explained at trial for this Court to determine that they constitute a credit that Wife would be entitled to. Notably, the parties' mortgage payments increased by approximately $1,000 a month when Husband's failure to pay his share of the homeowner's insurance caused the policy to lapse. M&T bank, which holds the parties' mortgage, instituted a "forced policy" and added the cost to the parties' monthly mortgage payment (Tr. 10/27/25, pgs. 30-36). Wife's established credits for the payment of the mortgage total to $48,452. When these credits are deducted from Wife's retroactive child support arrears of $50,111 a balance of $1,659 remains due from Wife to Husband. However, Wife also seeks an award of retroactive child support arrears.

Wife's application for child support for N.H. is retroactive to the first time that she affirmatively requested it. A review of the official court file reveals that Wife made her first application for child support in her Pendente Lite Motion (Seq. No. 008) filed on July 30, 2023. Accordingly, Wife is entitled to a retroactive award of child support in the amount of $1,449 a month for a period of thirty-four months from July 2023 to May 2026. This calculates to a total retroactive child support award of $49,266. When calculating arrears the Court must consider pendente lite child support payments made. By Order dated December 26, 2023 (Marrone, J.), Husband was directed to pay $1,293 a month in pendente lite child support.

Throughout her testimony at trial, Wife repeatedly claimed that Husband failed to make any child support payments in compliance with the December 26th Order. However, on cross examination she admitted that Husband may have made two or three payments after the Order was issued (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 84). Accordingly, this Court will credit Husband with three payments totaling $3,879. Husband did not contradict Wife's testimony and offered no proof whatsoever of even a single child support payment made. Rather, Husband testified that he failed to follow the December 26th Order because he "came to an agreement" with Wife that he would pay for all of F. L.'s expenses and she would pay for N.H.'s (Tr. 10/27/25, pgs. 107-108). Wife denies, and this Court does not credit, Husband's claim of a "side deal" between the parties. In any event, an informal agreement between the parties cannot serve to supplant an Order of the Court mandating the payment of child support. In addition, while Husband testified that on at least twenty occasions he gave N.H. money directly, usually $500, he offered no proof of the same. Even if the Court were to credit his testimony, direct cash payments to the subject child do not constitute a viable child support credit when Husband was Ordered to pay child support directly to Wife. See Matter of English v. Smith, 173 AD3d 1022 (2d Dept. 2019). Husband has not offered any credible testimony or evidence of payments that would entitle him to a child support credit. Accordingly, after crediting Husband with the payment of $3,879, this Court finds that Husband owes retroactive child support arrears in the sum of $45,387. When the $1,659 of child support arrears owed by Wife to Husband is deducted from this amount, Husband's arrears decrease to $43,728. These arrears will be paid out of Husband's share of the proceeds from the sale of the Lighthouse Avenue property.

Child Support Add-On's / Tuition Arrears

Neither party has made a specific application for this Court to allocate statutory or discretionary "add on" expenses relating to the subject children. Wife's statement of proposed disposition and summation after trial are both silent on the issue of "add on" expenses other than to request the payment of an unspecific amount of arrears accrued by Husband for his non-compliance with Pendente Lite Orders addressing N.H.'s tuition. Similarly, Husband's Summation requests the sum of $27,982 in arrears related to F. L.'s past educational expenses that he claims Wife failed to pay.

Child support add-on expenses are generally attributed to the parties on a pro-rata basis pursuant to the CSSA guidelines. See DRL § 240(1-b)(c); Vasileva v. Christy, 195 AD3d 980 (2d Dept. 2021). Some of the expenses enumerated in the statute are mandatory, while others are discretionary. See Michael J.D. v. Carolina E.P., 138 AD3d 151 (1st Dept. 2016). The Court shall determine the allocation of each parent's share of "reasonable health care expenses not reimbursed or paid by insurance." See DRL § 240(1-b)(c)(5)(v). The Court may allocate educational expenses and direct a non-custodial parent to pay their proportionate share. See DRL § 240(1-b)(c)(7). As for the mandatory allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses, this Court finds that Husband shall be responsible for paying 53% of N.H.'s reasonable medical and dental expenses not covered by health insurance until she reaches the age of twenty-one. Wife shall be obligated to pay the remaining 47%. Neither party has offered any evidence regarding retroactive unreimbursed medical expenses, nor was a claim made for the same in summation.

In addition to unreimbursed medical expenses, Wife raised the issue of N.H.'s educational expenses at trial. Unlike the obligation to provide for a child's healthcare expenses, funding a child's college education is discretionary. See Matter of Grubler v. Grubler, 108 AD3d 535 (2d Dept. 2013). During the pendency of his action N.H. attended Xaverian High School, a prestigious college preparatory school located in Brooklyn, New York. As of the time of trial N.H. was in her Junior year looking at potential colleges. Wife did not offer any evidence as to the potential cost of N.H.'s college education, nor did she address any of the factors typically considered by courts when determining whether the payment of college tuition should be compelled. See Matter of Holliday v. Holliday, 35 AD3d 468 (2d Dept. 2006); see also Michael J.D. v. Carolina, E.P., 138 AD3d 151 (1st Dept. 2016); Messinger v. Messinger, 121 N.Y.S.3d 778 (Sup. Ct. Mon. Cty. 2019). Moreover, Wife did not specifically request that this Court compel Huband to contribute to N.H.'s future educational expenses when she attends college. Under these circumstances, the Court declines to compel Husband to contribute to N.H.'s future educational expenses beyond the balance of her high school education.

However, both parties also seek to enforce the prior Orders of this Court directing the payment of educational expenses, pendente lite. Like an award of basic child support, an application for the payment of add-on expenses is typically retroactive to when it was first requested. See Sinnott v. Sinnott, 194 AD3d 868 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Manocchio v. Manocchio, 16 AD3d 1126 (4th Dept. 2005). Husband's request for add-on expenses for F.L. is retroactive to his Summons with Notice dated May 2, 2022. Wife's request for add-on expenses for N.H. is retroactive to her filing of motion sequence number 002 on November 14, 2022, wherein she requested an Order directing Husband to contribute towards "the children's add-on expenses, including tuition."¹⁴

By Order dated October 3, 2023 (Marrone, J.) Husband and Wife were both Ordered to pay 50% of the subject children's "college and tuition expenses" incurred during the pendency of this action. This allocation was subsequently superseded by Order dated December 26, 2023 (Marrone, J.) which changed the percentages to 56% to Husband and 44% to Wife. However, it is this Court's final pro rata allocation of add-on expenses of 53% to Husband and 47% to Wife which is to be applied to the parties' respective retroactive dates. When contribution was first requested N.H. attended Xaverian High School at a cost of approximately $17,000 a year. Wife offered a payment ledger from the "Blackbaud Tuition Management Center" into evidence to establish the cost of N.H.'s tuition from July 2022 to August 2025 (Def. Ex. DD). F.L. attended New York City College of Technology ("City Tech") at an approximate cost of $3,400 to $3,600 a semester depending on the number of course credits he selected. Wife approximated that the total cost of City Tech for a year would be "about $7,200" (Tr. 10/16/25, pg. 104). Husband failed to offer any documentation into evidence which would substantiate the actual amount of F. L.'s tuition or substantiate any payments made towards that tuition by either party.

Wife credibly testified that despite the terms of the October 3rd and December 26th Orders Husband failed to make any payments towards N.H.'s tuition or educational expenses. The only payment that could be indirectly credited to Husband was the parties' stipulated use of a $8,000 tax refund check issued to Harborview towards N.H.'s tuition (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 86). However, Wife correctly argues that half of this refund check was technically hers, so Husband shall only be credited for the payment of $4,000. As per the "Blackbaud" schedule of tuition payments offered into evidence, Wife established that between the retroactive date of November 14, 2022, and the date of her testimony she paid $48,990  ¹⁵ At the close of the trial record the parties owed Xaverian High School a remaining balance of $14,960 to be paid by June 15, 2026. As Wife has credibility testified that Husband has failed to make any payments towards N.H.'s tuition pendente lite he is not entitled to any credits other than the $4,000 discussed above. Husband's 53% share of $48,990 is $25,965 and his 53% share of $14,960 is $7,929. After giving him credit for a $4,000 indirect contribution, Husband remains obligated to pay $29,894.¹⁶ This payment shall be made to Wife out of Husband's share of the proceeds from the sale of the Lighthouse Avenue property. Husband shall also be obligated to pay 53% of any tuition fees owed to Xaverian High School for N.H.'s education until she graduates. Any such payment shall be made directly to Wife upon the presentation of a tuition bill.

In his written summation after trial, Husband requests that Wife be Ordered to pay him $27,982, representing a 50% share of F. L.'s "college related expenses." However, Husband fails to explain how he calculated this number, and this Court finds that it is not supported by the trial record, which is devoid of any tuition bills for City Tech. Husband also testified that his calculations included an unspecified amount for additional expenses, such as transportation to and from school. As a defense to Wife's claim for contribution, and in support of his own, Husband testified that the parties came to an unofficial "agreement" that he would be wholly responsible for F. L.'s college expenses and that Wife would be wholly responsible for N.H.'s (Tr. 10/27/25, pgs. 107-109). Wife denies that they had any such agreement and this Court credits Wife's testimony. However, even if they did have an agreement, it would not serve to negate the Order directing them to split the children's educational expenses pro rata.

Although Wife denies that the parties had a "secret agreement" absolving her obligation to F. L., she does admit that there came a time when she found herself unable to contribute to his educational expenses. Wife credibly testified that she complied with her obligation to contribute to his college tuition payments for approximately two years before she stopped (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 50). Wife established these payments via the submission of a series of consecutive checks to the parties' joint checking account into evidence (Def. Ex. EE). Wife testified that she was "forced" to stop contributing due to Husband's failure to comply with Court Orders for child support and add-on expenses. Husband's failure to pay placed all the parties' marital obligations on Wife. Wife credibly testified that she paid Husband's share of the mortgage, carrying charges, marital loans, and all of N.H.'s day-to-day expenses and tuition without any contribution. This regrettably left her with insufficient funds to pay for F.L. (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 82).

As the party seeking an award of retroactive tuition payments, Husband bore the burden of proof of establishing his claim at trial. Husband was required to offer admissible evidence establishing the amount of tuition that F.L. was required to pay and whether those payments were made. This is typically satisfied through the submission of tuition billing statements. Husband was further required to establish that he paid Wife's share of the tuition expense to support a claim for "reimbursement" or that the tuition payments remained due and owing for to support a claim for "enforcement." Here, Husband failed to provide any documentation whatsoever to establish either of his burdens. Husband failed to establish the semesters that F.L. attended college, the number of credits he carried, the tuition he was charged, and whether that tuition was paid, or remained unpaid. In the absence of documentary evidence, this Court is unable to award him retroactive arrears without resorting to speculation. See Shanon v. Patterson, 38 AD3d 519 (2d Dept. 2007); see also Schackler v. Shackler, 43 AD3d 1029 (2d Dept. 2007); Aleksandr V. v. Juliya V., 191 N.Y.S.3d 920 (Sup. Ct. Kings. Cty. 2023).

Civil Contempt

By Notice of Motion dated March 31, 2026 (Seq. No. 014), Wife seeks an Order adjudicating Husband to be in civil contempt for his failure to comply with various Court Orders issued during the pendency of this action. Specifically, Wife alleges that Husband violated the "automatic orders" set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2)(b) and 22 NYCRR 202.16-a. Wife further alleges that Husband violated Court Orders dated January 31, 2023, October 3, 2023, November 2, 2023, December 26, 2023, February 5, 2024, and January 28, 2025. The Court has taken judicial notice of all the Orders identified by Wife. These Orders obligated Husband to pay: (1) child support and child support add on expenses including tuition; (b) a share of the real estate and business appraisers; (3) one half of the mortgage and insurance for the marital home; (4) a share of attorney for the child's ("AFC") fees; and (5) the marital "Lightstream Loan".

As Wife's motion identifies incarceration as a possible remedy, this Court appointed Michele Sileo Esq. to represent Husband in relation to issues of contempt by Order dated April 21, 2025. Husband filed opposition to the contempt motion on July 17, 2025. Therein, he provided proof of compliance with the real estate appraiser and the AFC's fees. In addition, he raised several factual and legal defenses. In addition to filing opposition, Husband also filed an Order to Show Cause "in limine" (Seq. No. 015) seeking to preclude Wife from offering evidence of Husband's contempt at trial. While framed as a motion in limine, Motion 015 is effectively a cross-motion that raises the same legal arguments raised in Husband's opposition. Wife filed reply papers on July 31, 2025.

Unless all the material facts are undisputed, a motion seeking a finding of civil contempt requires an evidentiary hearing. See Bergman v. Bergman, 84 AD3d 537 (1st Dept. 2011). Where, as here, the motion is filed around the start of trial, the issues of contempt are best raised at that trial. Accordingly, Motions 014 and 015 were referred to the trial court. See Mage v. Mage, 174 AD3d 884 (2d Dept. 2019). Given the availably of Ms. Sileo, the fourth day of trial, October 27, 2025, was reserved for the issue of contempt. However, given the pervasive nature of Husband's failure to comply with Court Orders, the issue of non-compliance was raised throughout the trial. Moreover, as Husband's non-compliance has affected almost every aspect of this Decision, most of the requests for relief sought by Wife have already been adjudicated herein.

To prevail on a motion for civil contempt, the moving party must prove: (1) the existence of a clear and lawful mandate of the court; (2) that the party alleged to have disobeyed the Order was aware of its terms, and (3) that the moving party's rights were prejudiced as a result of the non-compliance. See Coyle v. Coyle, 63 AD3d 657 (2d Dept. 2009); See also Keller v. Keller, 126 AD3d 940 (2d Dept. 2015). These elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 (1983); See also Matter of Hughes v. Kameneva, 96 AD3d 845 (2d Dept. 2012). While "willfulness" is an essential element for a finding of "criminal contempt," the mere act of disobedience, regardless of motive, is sufficient to establish "civil contempt" if such disobedience "defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices the rights or remedies of a party." Therefore, a showing of willfulness is unnecessary for a finding of civil contempt. El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d 4 (2d Dept. 2013); See also Yalkowsky v. Yalkowsky, 93 AD2d 834 (2d Dept. 1983)

Throughout trial, Wife credibly testified as to Husband's non-compliance with Court Orders, specifically Orders that required the payment of money for any purpose. As has been addressed throughout this Decision, Husband failed to pay the business appraiser, failed to pay basic child support, failed to pay his pro-rata share of child support add on expenses, failed to pay his share of N.H.'s tuition, failed to pay the Cummings Judgment, and failed to pay half of the mortgage and related expenses for the former marital home which he occupied with F.L. Wife further established that Husband was aware of these lawful mandates of the Court and that the Orders were never vacated or reversed on appeal. While Husband's opposition establishes that he belatedly complied with certain Orders, such as by paying the AFC and the real estate appraiser, he remained non-compliant with several other Orders.¹⁷

Finally, Wife has testified, at length, to the degree of prejudice that she has suffered. This Court credits Wife's testimony and finds that she has established by clear and convincing evidence that Husband was aware of the Orders at issue, that he disobeyed those Orders, and that she has been prejudiced as a result. See Mohen v. Mohen, 2026 NY Slip Op 01195 (2d Dept. 2026); see also Breskin v. Moronto, 172 AD3d 1298 (2d Dept. 2019). Once contempt has been established, the burden shifts to Husband to offer evidence sufficient to establish a viable defense. See Shemtov v Shemtov, 153 AD3d 1295 (2d Dept. 2017).

In opposition, Husband does not allege that he was unaware of the Court's Orders. Husband also fails to raise a viable "inability to pay" defense as his opposition, and the trial record, are devoid of evidence regarding his finances and income. A bare conclusory claim of an "inability to pay" unsupported by financial documentation is insufficient to raise a defense. See Matter of Fitzgerald, 144 AD3d 906 (2d Dept. 2016); see also Farkas v. Farkas, 209 AD2d 316 (1st Dept. 1994). Husband's opposition further relies upon a misunderstanding of the law that his non-compliance has to be deemed "willful" for a contempt finding to be made. A showing of willfulness is unnecessary for a finding of civil contempt. See Breskin v. Moronto, 172 AD3d 1298 (2d Dept. 2019). A finding of willfulness is only relevant to the issue of counsel fees. See DRL § 237(c).

Finally, Husband's opposition attempts to raise a res judicata, or law of the case, defense relying upon an Order dated July 25, 2024 (Marrone, J.) Husband claims that this Order, which denied a prior "enforcement" motion (Seq. No. 012) filed by Wife, precludes her from raising the issue of arrears at trial. Husband is correct that Wife's current contempt motion is to some degree duplicative of Motion 012, however the July 25th Order specifically denied Wife's motion without prejudice. Motion 012 was denied because the motion Court found that it was inadequately supported by "evidence quantifying the amount owed." Accordingly, the enforcement motion was denied with leave to refile with appropriate supporting documentation. The present contempt motion (Seq No. 014) represents Wife's refiling, and the trial record provides the evidence necessary to find Husband in civil contempt.

Accordingly, as Wife has met her burden and Husband has failed to raise a viable defense, this Court adjudicates Husband to be in civil contempt of the various Orders identified in Motion 014. See Goldsmith v. Cavuoti, 2026 NY Slip Op 01494 (2d Dept. 2026); see also Chen v. Chen, 245 AD3d 412 (1st Dept. 2026). However, as this Court has already considered Husband's non-compliance as a factor supporting an inequal distribution of the marital estate and has addressed the payment of arrears as distributive awards herein, the Court need not craft an additional contempt remedy at this time. However, this finding of contempt has been specifically considered in relation to the issue of counsel fees, as discussed below. See Tankleff v. Tankleff, 239 AD3d 685 (2d Dept. 2025); see also Brandford v. Brandford, 237 AD3d 792 (2d Dept. 2025); Matter of Tender Touch Health Care Servs. Inc. v. Tnuzeg LLC., 246 AD3d 548 (1st Dept. 2026).

Counsel Fees

In her summation after trial, Wife requests a "full" counsel fee award in the amount of $239,261, representing the totality of the fees that she incurred during this protracted divorce proceeding. Wife's primary argument in support of her counsel fee application is that Husband's frivolous conduct throughout the proceeding warrants a counsel fee award. Wife alleges that the meritless positions advanced by Husband and the actions he has intentionally taken to delay the case have resulted in the accrual of unnecessary counsel fees. Wife further alleges that Husband's persistent failure to comply with Court Orders and failure to provide basic financial discovery increased her legal fees substantially.

Husband's summation after trial is silent on the issue of counsel fees. Wife credibly testified as to what she deemed to be frivolous behavior on the part of Husband throughout this proceeding. Many of the incidents addressed by Wife occurred before this action was transferred to this Part for trial. However, this Court was able to assess Husband's positions by considering Wife's credible testimony, the evidence she offered at trial, and by taking judicial notice of the sixteen motions and resulting Orders contained in the official court file.

In support of her counsel fee application, Wife has offered her retainer agreement with the "Dow Divorce Law Firm" into evidence (Def. Ex. G). Wife retained the Dow Divorce Law Firm on October 4, 2022. Throughout the course of this proceeding, Wife has been represented by two attorneys from that firm, Adelola Sheralynn Dow Esq. and her associate, Loui-Ann MacKnight Esq. Ms. MacKnight served as lead counsel at trial. Wife initially agreed to pay Ms. Dow the sum of $425 an hour and Ms. MacKnight $300 an hour in 2022. However, during this protracted proceeding their billing rates increased. By the time of trial, Ms. Dow's fee increased to $550 an hour and Ms. MacKnight's to $425 an hour. Given their experience in the matrimonial field, and the complexity of the issues in this case, this Court finds that these rates are both reasonable and appropriate. See In re Ury, 180 AD2d 816 (2d Dept. 1985); see also E.J.L v. K.L.L., 950 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. Mon. Cty. 2012). Ms. Dow and Ms. MacKnight were assisted by a paralegal ($225 an hour) and a client care specialist ($100 an hour). This Court finds that the fees charged by the Dow Divorce Law Firm in this proceeding are reasonable, and commensurate with fees charged for similar services in this community. See DRL § 237(a); see also In re Baby Girl, 189 AD2d 763 (2d Dept. 1993).

In addition to her testimony, Wife has submitted documentary evidence in support of her counsel fee application. Wife offered detailed billing records that she received from her attorneys into evidence (Pl. Ex. JJ). Husband did not object to the billing records being entered into evidence, did not call a witness to address the billing, and did not challenge the itemized entries. A review of the billing documentation establishes that counsel substantially complied with the matrimonial billing requirements of 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3. See Reisz v. Reisz, 238 AD3d 1080 (2d Dept. 2025). Moreover, while several of the entries were "redacted" there was sufficient information provided in the unredacted sections for this Court to determine that the charges were appropriate. See Goodman v. Lempa, 168 AD3d 914 (2d Dept. 2019).

Wife's counsel requests an award representing fees incurred from the commencement of this action through the end of trial, not including summations. However, the billing documentation offered in support of the application is limited to a period from December 12, 2022, to October 3, 2025. Notably this includes the first two days of trial September 4, 2025, and September 5, 2025, but excludes the last four days of trial, October 16, 2025, October 27, 2025, December 15, 2025, and January 5, 2026.

An award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Gilliam v. Gilliam, 109 AD3d 871 (2d Dept. 2013). The issue of counsel fees is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each case. See Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 98 AD3d 605 (2d Dept. 2012). While DRL § 237 permits consideration of many factors, paramount among these factors is financial need. See O'Halloran v. O'Halloran, 58 AD3d 704 (2d Dept. 2009); see also Silverman v. Silverman, 304 AD2d 41 (1st Dept. 2003)."An award of an attorney's fee will generally be warranted where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties". Cohen v. Cohen, 73 AD3d 832 (2d Dept. 2010). The main purpose of a counsel fee award is to "redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse. See O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 (1999). Other factors to be considered include the relative merits of the parties' positions, and if either party engaged in conduct that resulted in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation. See Vitale v. Vitale, 112 AD3d 614 (2d Dept. 2013). While all relevant factors must be considered, there is a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees should be awarded to the less monied spouse. See Marchese v. Marchese, 185 AD3d 571 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Boltz v. Boltz, 178 AD3d 656 (2d Dept. 2019).

The primary consideration when determining a counsel fee application is financial need. See Rennock v. Rennock, 203 AD3d 675 (2d Dept. 2022). Accordingly, when considering an application for counsel fees, the Court must determine which party represents the "more monied spouse." As set forth above, this Court's ability to determine Husband's income was hindered by his failure to comply with Court Orders requiring him to provide financial documentation, including a complete statement of net worth supported by paystubs and tax returns. In the absence of financial documentation, this Court has imputed the income requested by Wife, to wit $223,808, as that figure is representative of Husband's earning capacity.

Wife credibly testified that her income has fluctuated throughout the course of this proceeding. However, Wife testified that her income at the time of trial was $198,820, which includes both income from her employment, and rental income received from her separate property ownership of *** 36th Street. Comparing the parties' respective incomes this Court finds that Wife's actual gross income is approximately $24,988 less than Husband's imputed income. However, pursuant to the present Decision, Wife is receiving an increased share of the parties only significant asset, the former marital home. Wife has also been awarded several distributive awards herein, which are to be paid from Husband's share of the marital home's equity. The Court is authorized to consider each party's respective assets when determining which party is in the superior position to bear the expenses of litigation. See Marchese v. Marchese, 185 AD3d 571 (2d Dept. 2020).

Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether either party should be considered the "monied" spouse as they have similar incomes. Moreover, after equitable distribution is considered, Wife is arguably in the superior financial position. Accordingly, after considering the amount and nature of the parties' respective incomes, and the effect of equitable distribution, this Court finds that neither party presents as the "more monied spouse" such that fees should be presumptively awarded. However, this does not end the Court's counsel fee analysis. The Court must also consider several non-monetary factors, such as the relative merit of the parties' positions, and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation. See Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Nehlsen v. Nehlsen, 241 AD3d 562 (2d Dept. 2025).

As has been established above, Husband's conduct, and the positions that he has taken throughout this case, have frustrated Wife's ability to meet her burdens of proof at trial. Most notable was Wife's inability to obtain a distributive award related to the parties' marital business. As discussed above, Wife was successful in establishing her right to a 50% distribution of the value of that company at the time of commencement. However, she was rendered unable to offer a value for the business due to Husband's failure to comply with Court Orders directing him to pay Empire Evaluators for the preparation of a valuation report. As a result, a report was never issued, resulting in Wife's inability to meet her burden of proof.

In support of her contempt motion, Wife argues that Husband's failure to pay Empire Evaluators should result in the imposition of a counsel fee award pursuant to DRL § 237(c) which "mandates such an award upon a finding of willfulness." Yaeger v. Yaeger, 38 AD2d 534 (2d Dept. 2007). After considering the trial record, this Court finds that Husband's failure to pay was willful, as he repeatedly indicated to this Court that he was ready, willing and able to pay Empire, but failed to do so. Husband's false promises of compliance continued up to the fifth day of trial when he falsely testified that the business evaluator was being paid "at that very moment, while he was in Court" (Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 128). Despite his repeated promises under oath, and several Court Orders, Husband failed to pay the evaluator to release his report. This Court finds that Husband's willful failure to pay the evaluator's fee mandates an award of counsel fees. See Schnee v. Schnee, 110 AD3d 427 (1st Dept. 2013); Lamassa v. Lamassa, 106 AD3d 957 (2d Dept. 2013). As to the extent of that award, this Court has attributed every entry in Wife's billing documentation which reasonably relates to Empire's evaluation as fees rendered "unnecessary" by Husband's conduct. See Hayes v. Hayes, 127 AD3d 1021 (2d Dept. 2015); see also Gooden v. Gooden, 117 AD3d 902 (2d Dept. 2014). The Court has also awarded every entry reasonably related to the preparation and litigation of the contempt motion, which would not have been necessary but for Husband's refusal to comply with Court Orders. See Matter of Gonnard v. Guido, 141 AD3d 649 (2d Dept. 2016); see also Hamilton v. Murphy, 100 AD3d 1235 (3rd Dept. 2012).

A similar circumstance occurred in relation to the payment of fees for the appraisal of the parties' real property interests. By Order dated May 17, 2023, "Neglia Appraisals" was appointed to value the former marital home located at *** Lighthouse Avenue. By subsequent Order dated November 1, 2023, "Neglia Appraisals" was appointed to appraise Wife's separate property located at *** 36th Street. The cost of both evaluations was to be shared equally between the parties. By Order dated June 18, 2025, this Court ordered Neglia to update their initial appraisal for *** Lighthouse Avenue. The cost of the updated appraisal was also to be shared equally.

On September 3, 2025, the day before trial, Wife filed a motion in limine (Seq. No. 016) seeking preclusion for Husband's failure to pay, inter alia, his share of the Neglia Appraisal fees. At that time, Wife established that Husband had failed to pay his share of either the initial evaluation or the updated evaluation. In response to Wife's preclusion and contempt motions, Husband belatedly paid his share of the original appraisals in the amount of $2,250. However, he failed to pay for the updated appraisal despite assurances that he would. Wife credibly testified that the updated appraisal was only issued after she paid for the entire cost of the update, including Husband's $750 share (Tr. 10/27/25, pg. 63). As Wife was forced to paid a sum that Husband was ordered to pay, she is hereby awarded a distributive award in the amount of $750 as reimbursement. This award shall be paid out of Husband's share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home.

Throughout Wife's billing documentation there are numerous itemized entries regarding the Neglia appraisal, Husband's failure to pay, and Wife's decision to pay for him. These entries include email and telephonic communications with Neglia, emails to Husband's prior counsel, and correspondence with Husband as a self-represented litigant. The billing records also include entries for motion practice related to the appraisal and resulting appearances before this Court, including oral argument of the preclusion motion. Accordingly, when determining a proper counsel fee award, this Court has included all billing entries reasonably related to Husband's non-compliance with Court Orders. See Silberman v. Silberman, 216 AD2d 41 (1st Dept. 1995).

When reviewing the official court file, the trial record, and Wife's billing documentation, this Court has found numerous additional instances of baseless positions taken by Husband that resulted in superfluous legal work and unnecessarily delayed the case. For example, Wife credibly testified that during the pre-trial phase of this proceeding Husband repeatedly threatened to file for bankruptcy (Tr. 10/27/25, pgs. 11-12.) The billing documentation submitted by Wife's counsel establishes that these threats triggered a considerable amount of legal analysis to determine what effect a bankruptcy filing would have on the parties' assets and financial obligations. In addition to conferences with Wife, and legal research, the billing entries identify several conversations held with Husband's former counsel, and at least one appearance before the Court to address how bankruptcy would affect the case. However, despite his threats, and the legal work that they caused, Husband never filed for bankruptcy. In determining an appropriate counsel fee award, this Court has included billing entries reasonably related to Husband's false bankruptcy claims which only served to delay and complicate this proceeding. See Bloom v. Hilpert, 222 AD3d 574 (1st Dept. 2023).

Another instance which supports a counsel fee award to Wife was Husband's last-minute notification that he would not be appearing for his deposition. The billing documentation submitted by Wife establishes that significant counsel fees were incurred in preparation for Husband's deposition, which was never conducted. Husband's last-minute cancellation also resulted in a $415 "cancellation charge" being issued by the stenographer (Tr. 12/15/25, pgs. 35-36). Wife paid this charge although it was caused by Husband. The reimbursement of this charge has been included in Wife's counsel fee award.

Finally, the Court notes that Husband was often disruptive during trial, which unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and complicated the record. On at least three instances this Court had to warn Husband that continued inappropriate behavior would result in a finding of "summary contempt" (Tr. 12/15/25, pg. 81; Tr. 1/5/26, pgs. 3,10). See Gomes v. Roux, 2026 NY Slip Op 02331 (1st Dept. 2026).

After considering Wife's arguments, and after reviewing the billing documentation in evidence, this Court finds that a "full" counsel fee award equal to Wife's entire legal bill is unwarranted. Not all of Husband's positions lacked merit, and the parties had some genuine issues that required a trial. Rather, this Court finds that a counsel fee award of $31,990 to Wife's counsel is appropriate to partially reimburse Wife for unnecessary fees created by Husband's baseless positions, non-compliance with court orders, and obstructionist tactics throughout the proceeding. See Johnson v. Chapin, 12 NY3d 461 (2009); see also Voorham v. Hicks-Voorham, 242 AD3d 435 (1st Dept. 2025); Odermatt v. Odermatt, 119 AD3d 754 (2d Dept. 2014); Silvers v. Silvers, 197 AD3d 1195 (2d Dept. 2021); Patete v. Rodriquez, 109 AD3d 595 (2d Dept. 2013). This award of $31,990 shall be paid out of Husband's share of the proceeds from the sale of the former marital home. This sum shall be paid directly to Wife's counsel to be credited against any outstanding legal fees owed by Wife. If Wife does not currently owe any fees, or the award exceeds her current bill, any balance will be returned to Wife as a reimbursement for fees unnecessarily expended during this proceeding.

Conclusion

For the detailed reasons set forth above, and in accordance with the testimony of both parties, and the terms of the Preliminary Conference Order, Plaintiff Husband is hereby granted a Judgment of Divorce on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably for a period of six months. See DRL § 170(7). The parties have resolved all issues of custody and parental access on consent. The parties have agreed to mutually waive any spousal maintenance claims.

The Court has made various monetary awards herein, all of which are payable from Husband to Wife. After calculating the total of the various awards herein, the Court finds that Wife is entitled to awards from Husband totaling $117,362. This combined award will be paid to Wife (in accordance with the terms of this Decision) out of Husband's 40% share of the net proceeds from the sale of the former marital home. In the unlikely event that there are insufficient funds to compensate Wife, she shall be entitled to a money judgment in the amount of any balance owed. Any such judgment shall run with 9% interest from the date it is issued.

Husband's prospective child support obligation for N.H. has been determined to be $17,389 a year, or $1,449 a month. Husband shall be obligated to pay the sum of $1,449 a month to Wife until N.H. turns 21 years of age or is otherwise emancipated. These payments shall be made through the child support enforcement unit. Either party shall have the right to seek modification of the child support awards herein upon a showing of a change in circumstances, an increase or decrease in either party's income by at least 15% or the passage of three years-time. Husband shall be responsible for paying 53% of N.H.'s reasonable medical and dental expenses not covered by health insurance until she reaches the age of twenty-one. Wife shall be obligated to pay the remaining 47%. Husband shall also be responsible for the payment of 53% of N.H.'s high school tuition until she graduates. The first payment of prospective child support due shall be paid by Husband to Wife in the amount of $1,449 on or before June 30, 2026. The Judgment of Divorce shall indicate this date as the start date of payments, nunc pro tunc.

All motions that have been referred to trial have either been resolved herein or mooted by the issuance of this Decision. To the extent that this Decision does not resolve a specific application raised at trial, or in a motion referred to trial, that application is hereby denied.

As the party granted the divorce it would typically be Husband's obligation to file a Judgment of Divorce and other required filings. However, as Husband is self-represented, Defendant Wife is hereby directed to serve and file a Judgment of Divorce in accordance with the terms of this Decision, together with Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and all additional supporting documentation. The Judgment, Findings of Fact, and supporting documentation are to be filed within thirty days of the issuance of this Decision.

This constitutes the Decision of the Court after trial, any issue raised during trial that was not specifically addressed herein is hereby denied.

Dated: June 8, 2026

Hon. Catherine M. DiDomenico

FOOTNOTES

1.   September 4, 2025, September 5, 2025, October 16, 2025, October 27, 2025, December 17, 2025, and January 5, 2026.

2.   Ms. Sileo's Summation filed for Husband on the issue of Contempt contains substantive argument and includes proper citation.

3.   Richmond County Family Court Dockets O-02217-21 and O-04262-22.

4.   Richmond County Family Court Dockets O-2452-21 and O-02740-23.

5.   SNW #1 Dated 11/9/22; SNW #2 Dated 11/15/23; SNW #3 8/27/25.

6.   Chase #6405; Chase #4279; Citibank #1876; Citibank #1945; Chase #0261; Chase #7103; Chase #6576; Discover #4600.

7.   Typically, the date of valuation for a claim of active contribution to separate property begins on the date of marriage and ends on the date of commencement. See e.g. Marcus v. Marcus, 135 AD2d 216 (2d Dept. 1988).

8.   Supreme Court Kings County Index Number 12427/2013.

9.   Chase savings accounts ending in 6576 or 7103 and/or any savings account held by Citibank.

10.   Paid via three checks issued in Wife's name for $10,126.14, $3,185.82 and $6,748.04.

11.   Wife's 50% share of each monthly payment of $2,913 for nine months was $1,457(X 9 = $13,113); Wife's 50% share of each monthly payment of $2,952 for five months was $1,476 (X5= $7,380). $13,113 + $7,380= $20,493.

12.   Husband was obligated to pay $1,476 in December 2024, he only paid $1,000, Wife paid his $476 shortfall in addition to her $1,476 obligation.

13.   Wife Paid $2,952 for two months, $4,032 for four months, and $3,975 for one month.

14.   Notably, Wife's motion did not seek the payment of basic child support. That application was not made until the filing of motion sequence number 008 on July 30, 2023.

15.   Wife paid $7,825 from 11/15/22 to 6/15/23, $18,805 from 7/15/23 to 6/15/24, $18,570 from 7/15/24 to 6/15/25 and $4,150 from 7/15/25 to 8/15/25, with a balance remaining due of $14,960 to be paid by 6/15/26.

16.    $25,965 + $7,929= $33,894 - $4,000 = $29,894.

17.   Certain aspects of Wife's Contempt Motion were resolved on the record of October 27, 2025 (Tr. 10/27/25, Pg. 54).

Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.