IN RE: GIANT USED CARS A/S (1998)

This motion for an order vacating an arbitration award and petition is dismissed.   The alternate arbitration mechanism set forth in section 198-b of the General Business Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 13 NYCRR part 300, establish a compulsory arbitration process for Lemon Law disputes.   These regulations contain procedural safeguards, and therefore comport with due process.  (See, Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 2nd Cir., 929 F.2d 891).   The governing regulations provide that the administrator, appointed by the Attorney General, assign an arbitrator, and inform the arbitrator and the parties of the assignment by mail;  notify the dealer of the consumers request for arbitration;  and notify the parties of the date, time and place of the hearing at least eight days prior to its scheduled date.  (13 NYCRR 300.6, 300.7).   The administrator, unlike an arbitrator under CPLR 7506(b), is not required to notify the parties “personally or by registered or certified mail”.   The notice provisions set forth in the governing regulations are calculated to give the parties notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, and thus comport with due process.  (See, Smith v. Brooklyn Car Connection, 158 Misc.2d 601, 605 N.Y.S.2d 620).   Contrary to petitioners assertions, neither due process nor General Business Law § 198-b require that the administrator adopt the methods of service set forth in CPLR 7506(b).   The evidence presented herein establishes that the administrator followed the notice provisions set forth in the governing regulations, and therefore afforded petitioner due process.  (See, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State of New York, 75 N.Y.2d 175, 551 N.Y.S.2d 470, 550 N.E.2d 919;  cf., Eagle Insurance Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 202 A.D.2d 273, 608 N.Y.S.2d 655).

ARTHUR W. LONSCHEIN, Justice.