COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CARE OF NEW YORK v. HAUSKNECHT (2008)

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated January 12, 2007, as denied that branch of his motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel is granted.

 The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue that was clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295, 303, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914, cert. denied 535 U.S. 1096, 122 S.Ct. 2293, 152 L.Ed.2d 1051;  Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 349, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647;  Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487).   In order to invoke the doctrine, the identical issue must necessarily have been decided in the prior action or proceeding and be decisive of the present action or proceeding, and the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination (see Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d at 303-304, 740 N.Y.S.2d 252, 766 N.E.2d 914;  Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d at 349, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 712 N.E.2d 647;  D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659, 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d 24, 564 N.E.2d 634).

 The defendant met his burden of establishing that the issue raised herein was necessarily decided in a prior arbitration and related proceedings (see Martin v. Geico Direct Ins., 31 A.D.3d 505, 506, 818 N.Y.S.2d 265;  Lobel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 A.D.2d 502, 502, 704 N.Y.S.2d 488), while the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of demonstrating that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in those proceedings (see Martin v. Geico Direct Ins., 31 A.D.3d at 506, 818 N.Y.S.2d 265;  Lobel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 A.D.2d at 502, 704 N.Y.S.2d 488;  cf. Hughes v. Gibson Courier Servs. Corp., 218 A.D.2d 684, 685, 630 N.Y.S.2d 552).   Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the instant action was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Lobel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 269 A.D.2d at 502, 704 N.Y.S.2d 488;  see also Hibbert v. Avwontom, 35 A.D.3d 813, 814, 826 N.Y.S.2d 441;  Lanzisera v. Miller, 289 A.D.2d 1015, 1015, 735 N.Y.S.2d 282).

In view of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.