PLATOVSKY v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2008)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., and a related proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration, the petitioners Gerald Platt and Kelner & Kelner, Esqs., and Vicki-Jo Platovsky, a nonparty, appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), dated April 23, 2007, as, in effect, denied that branch of the petitioners' motion which was for summary judgment declaring that Robert Herbst, Esq., and Beldock Levine & Hoffman, LLP, are not entitled to an attorney's fee in connection with the action, denied the petition, and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.

ORDERED that the appeal by Vicki-Jo Platovsky is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as she is not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511);  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

 When determining whether a particular dispute is arbitrable, a court must determine whether the dispute “falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement” (Maross Constr. v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth., 66 N.Y.2d 341, 345, 497 N.Y.S.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 67), and whether the dispute “is one that may be submitted to arbitration without violation of any law or public policy” (id. at 346, 497 N.Y.S.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 67).   Since the dispute over the entitlement of the respondents Robert Herbst, Esq., and Beldock Levine & Hoffman, LLP, to an attorney's fee in connection with the underlying personal injury action, falls within the scope of the broad arbitration clause contained in the contract at issue (see Matter of Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 37 N.Y.2d 91, 96, 371 N.Y.S.2d 463, 332 N.E.2d 333), and since no law or public policy precludes arbitration of that dispute (see Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg ], 46 N.Y.2d 623, 630, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456), the Supreme Court properly concluded that the dispute was arbitrable.

The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.