IN RE: Steven GAROFOLO (2008)

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Sackett, J.), entered October 22, 2007 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.

In October 1975, while charges of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree and burglary in the second degree stemming from an unrelated incident were pending against him, petitioner bludgeoned his girlfriend with a nightstick, causing her death.   Petitioner was ultimately convicted in May 1977 of the three charges arising from the earlier incident and convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree in September 1979 based upon the death of his girlfriend.   Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life for the murder convictions.   In August 2006, he appeared for the fourth time before the Board of Parole for parole release.   His request was denied and he was ordered held for an additional 24 months.   After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.   Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.

 We affirm.   The record demonstrates that the Board considered the appropriate statutory factors (see Executive Law § 259-i[2][c] ), including the violent nature of his criminal conduct, his positive institutional record, his educational achievements, and his planned residence and employment upon release (see Matter of Cruz v. New York State Div. of Parole, 39 A.D.3d 1060, 1061-1062, 833 N.Y.S.2d 311 [2007];  Matter of Mojica v. Travis, 34 A.D.3d 1155, 1156, 824 N.Y.S.2d 497 [2006];  Matter of Wilcher v. Dennison, 30 A.D.3d 958, 959, 817 N.Y.S.2d 449 [2006] ).   Furthermore, inasmuch as the Board appeared to have placed greater weight on the violence and brutality of defendant's conduct than on the other statutory factors, we note that it was not required to weigh each factor equally, nor was it required to explicitly articulate the weight it accorded to each factor (see Matter of Gardiner v. New York State Div. of Parole, 48 A.D.3d 871, 872, 850 N.Y.S.2d 722 [2008];  Matter of Serrano v. Dennison, 46 A.D.3d 1002, 1003, 846 N.Y.S.2d 808 [2007];  Matter of Wilcher v. Dennison, 30 A.D.3d at 959, 817 N.Y.S.2d 449;  Matter of Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 [2006], lv. denied 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750, 849 N.E.2d 973 [2006];  Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d 827, 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96 [2003], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 511, 760 N.Y.S.2d 102, 790 N.E.2d 276 [2003];  Matter of Trobiano v. State of N.Y. Div. of Parole, 285 A.D.2d 812, 813, 728 N.Y.S.2d 269 [2001], lv. denied 97 N.Y.2d 607, 738 N.Y.S.2d 290, 764 N.E.2d 394 [2001] ).

 Additionally, we are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the Board's decision was the product of an executive policy to deny parole release to all violent felons (see Matter of Motti v. Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1030, 1031, 831 N.Y.S.2d 298 [2007];  Matter of Mojica v. Travis, 34 A.D.3d at 1156, 824 N.Y.S.2d 497;  Matter of Wilcher v. Dennison, 30 A.D.3d at 959, 817 N.Y.S.2d 449;  Matter of Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d at 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296;  Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d at 828, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96).   Nor do we find merit in petitioner's assertion that Supreme Court applied an incorrect standard of review in reaching its conclusion (see Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000];  Matter of Tatta v. Dennison, 26 A.D.3d at 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296).   Accordingly, inasmuch as the Board's decision does not demonstrate “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501, quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] ), and despite petitioner's excellent institutional record and numerous achievements (see Matter of Cruz v. New York State Div. of Parole, 39 A.D.3d at 1061-1062, 833 N.Y.S.2d 311;  Matter of Trobiano v. State of N.Y. Div. of Parole, 285 A.D.2d at 813, 728 N.Y.S.2d 269), affirmance is mandated.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

CARPINELLO, J.

CARDONA, P.J., PETERS, ROSE and MALONE JR., JJ., concur.