IN RE: GABRIEL G. (Anonymous) (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Gabriel G. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Alan Beckoff, J.), dated August 13, 2024.  The order of disposition, upon an order of fact-finding of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Craig S. Walker, J.), dated June 28, 2024, made upon the admission of Gabriel G., finding that he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of robbery in the third degree, after a dispositional hearing, adjudicated him a juvenile delinquent and conditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months.  The appeal brings up for review the denial of Gabriel G.'s motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by an unreasonable delay in prosecution and his statutory right to a speedy trial.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as conditionally discharged Gabriel G. for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as conditionally discharged Gabriel G. for a period of 12 months must be dismissed as academic, as the period of conditional discharge has expired (see Matter of Adonis J.W., 238 A.D.3d 775, 776, 234 N.Y.S.3d 227;  Matter of Marlon C., 139 A.D.3d 941, 941, 30 N.Y.S.3d 711).  However, because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, that portion of the appeal which brings up for review the denial of Gabriel G.'s motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by an unreasonable delay in prosecution and his statutory right to a speedy trial is not academic (see Matter of Adonis J.W., 238 A.D.3d at 776, 234 N.Y.S.3d 227;  see Matter of Marlon C., 139 A.D.3d at 941, 30 N.Y.S.3d 711).

This matter arises from Gabriel G.'s theft of a cell phone on September 16, 2022, when he was 14 years old.  Three days after the theft, on September 19, 2022, the victim identified Gabriel G. in a photo array.  Gabriel G. was arrested five months later, on February 18, 2023.  On February 20, 2023, Gabriel G. was arraigned in the Supreme Court on crimes arising out of the theft and was thereafter indicted on charges of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree, and assault in the third degree, among others.  On July 26, 2023, the People served and filed a certificate of compliance with discovery, announcing readiness for trial (hereinafter the initial COC).  On September 1, 2023, the People filed a supplemental certificate of compliance indicating that they had additionally disclosed previously undisclosed photographs and again announcing readiness for trial (hereinafter the supplemental COC).

By notice of motion dated October 24, 2023, Gabriel G. moved in the Supreme Court to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by the five-month delay between his commission of the underlying offense on September 16, 2022, and his arrest on February 18, 2023, and his statutory right to a speedy trial.  In an order dated February 21, 2024, the Supreme Court denied Gabriel G.'s motion.  Subsequently, Gabriel G. made an admission to robbery in the third degree (Penal Law § 160.05), and the matter was removed to the Family Court for disposition.  In an order of disposition dated August 13, 2024, the Family Court adjudicated Gabriel G. a juvenile delinquent and conditionally discharged him for a period of 12 months.  Gabriel G. appeals.

“ ‘By statute and constitutional law, New York guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial and prompt prosecution’ ” (People v. Grant, ––– A.D.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 00910, *3, quoting People v. Regan, 39 N.Y.3d 459, 464, 191 N.Y.S.3d 265, 212 N.E.3d 282;  see N.Y. Const, art I, § 6;  CPL 30.20, 30.30).  “This right necessarily prohibits unreasonable pre-indictment delay” (People v. Tyson, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01446, *1).  “[A] deprivation of the defendant's right to a prompt prosecution may require dismissal of an indictment ‘even though, in the interim, [the] defendant was not formally accused, restrained or incarcerated for the offense’ ” (People v. Grant, ––– A.D.3d at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op., *3 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Regan, 39 N.Y.3d at 464–465, 191 N.Y.S.3d 265, 212 N.E.3d 282).  “ ‘The due process right to a speedy trial extends to respondents in juvenile delinquency proceedings’ ” (Matter of Adonis J.W., 238 A.D.3d at 776, 234 N.Y.S.3d 227, quoting Matter of Isaiah L., 169 A.D.3d 907, 908, 94 N.Y.S.3d 331;  see Matter of Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d 660, 667, 685 N.Y.S.2d 400, 708 N.E.2d 156).  Due process claims predicated on a pre-indictment delay in both criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings are analyzed by weighing the five factors set forth in People v. Taranovich:  “ ‘(1) the extent of the delay;  (2) the reason for the delay;  (3) the nature of the underlying charge;  (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration;  and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay’ ” (People v. Tyson, ––– N.Y.3d at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op., *1, quoting People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303;  see Matter of Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d at 668–669, 685 N.Y.S.2d 400, 708 N.E.2d 156).  “When applying this balancing test [to juvenile proceedings], ‘courts must remain acutely cognizant of the goals, character and unique nature of juvenile proceedings’ ” (Matter of Isaiah L., 169 A.D.3d at 908, 94 N.Y.S.3d 331, quoting Matter of Benjamin L., 92 N.Y.2d at 668, 685 N.Y.S.2d 400, 708 N.E.2d 156;  see Matter of Adonis J.W., 238 A.D.3d at 777, 234 N.Y.S.3d 227).

Here, weighing the relevant factors, Gabriel G. was not denied due process by the five-month delay between his commission of the underlying offense on September 16, 2022, and his arrest on February 18, 2023 (see People v. Jones, 187 A.D.3d 934, 130 N.Y.S.3d 736;  Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 A.D.3d 748, 995 N.Y.S.2d 614;  People v. Chance, 105 A.D.3d 758, 962 N.Y.S.2d 620;  see also Matter of Daquan W., 233 A.D.3d 526, 221 N.Y.S.3d 532;  cf.  Matter of Adonis J.W., 238 A.D.3d at 776, 234 N.Y.S.3d 227;  Matter of Isaiah L., 169 A.D.3d at 907, 94 N.Y.S.3d 331).

CPL 30.30(1)(a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action in felony cases (see People v. Gonzalez, 244 A.D.3d 1229, 1229, 247 N.Y.S.3d 717).  Here, contrary to Gabriel G.'s contention, the initial COC was valid.  The record demonstrates that the People exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquires prior to filing the initial COC despite the belated or missing disclosures, as extensive documents and disclosures were provided to Gabriel G. with the initial COC, and the additional disclosures accompanying the supplemental COC were minimal and made in good faith and were voluntarily provided to Gabriel G. once the People were made aware that certain materials had not been previously disclosed (see id. at 1230, 247 N.Y.S.3d 717;  People v. Macaluso, 230 A.D.3d 1158, 1160, 218 N.Y.S.3d 105).  Furthermore, contrary to Gabriel G.'s contention, the period of time between the filing of the subject motion on October 24, 2023, and the Supreme Court's order on February 21, 2024, is properly excludable for statutory speedy trial purposes (see CPL 30.30[4][a];  People v. Sheard, 236 A.D.3d 826, 827, 229 N.Y.S.3d 210).

Accordingly, Gabriel G.'s motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by the five-month delay between his commission of the underlying offense on September 16, 2022, and his arrest on February 18, 2023, and his statutory right to a speedy trial was properly denied.

Gabriel G.'s remaining contention is without merit.

DILLON, J.P., DOWLING, LANDICINO and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.