IN RE: Devorah KRAUSZ (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the appeal is from an order of protection of the Family Court, Kings County (Sharon N. Clarke, J.), dated December 16, 2024.  The order of protection, upon a finding, in effect, that the appellant committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and stalking in the fourth degree, made after a fact-finding hearing, directed her, inter alia, to stay away from the subject child until December 15, 2026, except pursuant to a court order of visitation.

ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In 2024, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, against the appellant, on behalf of her adopted child.  The appellant, who is the child's biological mother, surrendered her parental rights to the child in 2016 and agreed to the adoption.

After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found, in effect, that the appellant committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and stalking in the fourth degree.  The court then issued an order of protection in which it directed the appellant, inter alia, to stay away from the child, except pursuant to a court order of visitation.  This appeal ensued.

The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, upon a determination that the allegations were supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence;  that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if supported by the record (see Matter of Jeudy v. Duroc, 237 A.D.3d 708, 708–709, 230 N.Y.S.3d 697;  Matter of Renz v. Little, 137 A.D.3d 920, 921, 26 N.Y.S.3d 777).

Here, a fair preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing established that the appellant committed the family offenses of harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26[2];  Family Ct Act § 812[1];  Matter of Preston v. Hormadaly, 246 A.D.3d 923, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 00900) and stalking in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 120.45[2];  Matter of Golian v. Golyan, 242 A.D.3d 745, 746–747, 241 N.Y.S.3d 784).

The appellant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.