R.C.F., Plaintiff, v. L.Y.F., Defendant. (2026)

The following documents were considered in connection with the order to show cause of the Plaintiff's counsel, dated March 19, 2026, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Relieving the law firm [Redacted], as attorneys for R.C.F. upon a breakdown of communication between attorney and client;

2. For a stay of proceedings for 30 days from the date of the granting of this motion; and

3. For such other and further relief as to this Court may deem just and proper.

PAPERS DOC. NO.

Order to Show Cause/Affirmation  ¹ /Exhibit A 1-3

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

On February 12, 2025, this matrimonial action was commenced with the filing of a summons with notice, notice of automatic orders, notice concerning continuation of health care coverage and maintenance guidelines worksheet (hereinafter collectively "Summons"),² which seeks the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7) based upon the alleged irretrievable breakdown of the parties' relationship and ancillary relief.

While no proof of service of the Summons has been filed to date, a notice of appearance  ³ was filed by Defendant's counsel on March 31, 2025.

On February 18, 2026, Defendant's counsel filed a request for judicial intervention  ⁴ seeking the scheduling of a preliminary conference.

On February 19, 2026, a court notice (hereinafter "Court Notice"),⁵ was issued advising that the undersigned had been assigned to preside over this action and directing a preliminary conference to be held on March 5, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., and requested that counsel and/or self-represented parties, "***Please contact the Part Clerk if an interpreter is required for either party***." Thereafter, the court staff received no requests for a court interpreter to be present.

On February 20, 2026, Defendant's counsel filed a letter  ⁶ requesting an adjournment of the preliminary conference which was granted by order  ⁷ entered that day to an adjourned date of March 6, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.

On February 27, 2026, seven days following the entry of the aforementioned order rescheduling the preliminary conference, Plaintiff's counsel filed a letter  ⁸ requesting an adjournment due to asserted unavailability, and an order was entered granting the request scheduling a new date for the preliminary conference to be held on March 12, 2026, at 2:00 p.m.

On March 11, 2026, Defendant's counsel filed a retainer agreement, dated March 28, 2025, (hereinafter "Defendant's Retainer Agreement"),⁹ along with Defendant's statement of net worth (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW"), which was incomplete for the following reasons: (1) while it referenced ten assets, each listed failed to include significant information, and no total value of the assets was provided; (2) the section pertaining to legal and expert fees was left blank; and (3) while the document was signed by Defendant, she did so in the portion pertaining to attorney certification, while the attorney did not certify the document.

On March 12, 2026, at 1:00 p.m., being one hour before the scheduled preliminary conference, Plaintiff's counsel filed Plaintiff's statement of net worth (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW"),¹⁰ which was also defective. Initially, the first page below the caption fails to provide the date when Plaintiff indicates that the information set forth in the document is correct, or a proper jurat as the county where the party's execution of the document is not included, as it includes the following:

"STATE OF NEW YORK)

)ss.:

COUNTY OF)

R.C.F., the Plaintiff/Defendant herein, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that, subject to the penalties of perjury, the following is an accurate statement as of ______________, 2018, as my net worth (assets of whatsoever kind and nature wherever situated minus liabilities), statement of income from all sources and statement of assets transferred of whatsoever kind and nature and wherever situated and statement of expenses:"

Turning to the each of the seven assets listed, each are missing requested information and the total assets was left blank. Similarly, each of the six liabilities listed are missing requested information with the total liabilities left blank. Thereafter, without explanation, two blank rider pages are included. Next, on the signature page no information is provided regarding legal and expert fees despite the document including the following instruction, "[p]lease state the amount you have paid to all lawyers and experts retained in connection with your marital dissolution, including name of professional, amounts and dates paid, and source of funds." The required statement of the party completing the form confirming that the statements contained therein and in any annexed riders is incomplete as it fails to indicate the number of pages of any annexed riders (or indicating "0" to remove ambiguity if no rider is annexed). Finally, while the document prominently includes a section below the party signature for the party's attorney to certify the document, this was also left blank.

Simultaneous with the filing of Plaintiff's SNW, Plaintiff's counsel filed a retainer agreement (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement"),¹¹ which provides the following provisions pertaining to the nature, scope and payment of services to be rendered by Plaintiff's counsel to Plaintiff including the following:

"PAYMENT OF FEES FOR A UNCONTESTED AGREEMENT

The client agrees to pay the Law Firm on the basis for the following flat fee arrangement: $1,500.00 (inclusive of court fees) to proceed with an uncontested divorce Client paid $1,500.00.

* * *

The above flat fee arrangement applies ONLY if the defendant signs an affidavit waiving rights to interpose an answer or defaults by not responding to this action. In the event that this divorce matter becomes contested, the client will receive a credit for the retainer paid and a new retainer will be issued.

* * *

THE NATURE OF SERVICES TO BE RENDERED

The retainer fee does not include any services rendered in Appellate Courts or any actions or proceedings other than the action for which this office has been retained, or any court appearances. The Complaint must be served on the Defendant and returned to our office within three months in order to comply with the Court's time requirements. In the event the complaint is not returned to our office within three months then the client will incur additional fees to start the Divorce process anew."

Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement includes as part of the document a portion entitled "Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities" (hereinafter "Subject Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities"), which this Court has compared with the form statement of clients' rights and responsibilities included in 22 New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (hereinafter "NYCRR") § 1400.2 for domestic relations matters wherein the subject counsel is being retained with payment being made by the client (hereinafter "Required Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities") and the following represents a recital of the entirety of the Required Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities with sections in bold and italic which are not included in the Subject Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities reflecting that 19 of the 30 provisions required to be included are either partially or totally omitted:

"STATEMENT OF CLIENT'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

An attorney is providing you with this document to inform you of what you, as a client, are entitled to by law or by custom. To help prevent any misunderstanding between you and the attorney, please read this document carefully.

If you ever have any questions about these rights, or about the way your case is being handled once you retain the attorney, you are responsible to ask your attorney. Your attorney should be readily available to represent your best interests and to keep you informed about your case.

An attorney may not refuse to represent you on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, age, national origin or disability.

You are entitled to an attorney who will be capable of handling your case; show you courtesy and consideration at all times; represent you zealously; and preserve your confidences and secrets that you reveal in the course of the relationship, to the extent permitted by law. You are responsible to communicate honestly, civilly and respectfully with your attorney.

If you are hiring an attorney you and your attorney are required to sign a written retainer agreement which must set forth, in plain language, the nature of the relationship and the details of the fee arrangement. Before you sign the retainer agreement, you are responsible to read it and ask the attorney any questions you have before you sign it. At your request, and before you sign the agreement, you are entitled to have your attorney clarify in writing any of its terms, or include additional provisions.

You are entitled to fully understand the proposed rates and retainer fee before you sign a retainer agreement, as in any other contract. The retainer fee you pay to your attorney, as is written in the retainer agreement, may not be enough money to pay for all the time that the attorney works on your case.

You may refuse to enter into any fee arrangement that you find unsatisfactory.

An attorney may not request a fee that is contingent on the securing of a divorce or on the amount of money or property that may be obtained.

An attorney may not request a retainer fee that is non-refundable. That is, should you discharge the attorney, or should the attorney withdraw from the case with court permission, before the retainer has been used up, the attorney is entitled to be paid commensurate with the work performed on your case and any expenses. The attorney must return to you any balance of the retainer that has not been used. However, the attorney may enter into a minimum fee arrangement with you that provides for the payment of a specific amount below which the fee will not fall based upon the attorney's handling of the case to its conclusion.

You are entitled to know the approximate number of attorneys and other legal staff members who will be working on your case at any given time and what you will be charged for the services of each.

You are entitled to know in advance how you will be asked to pay legal fees and expenses, and how the retainer, if any, will be spent.

You may be responsible at the beginning of the case or before or after the trial to contribute to or pay the other party's attorney's fees and other costs if the court has ordered you to do so.

The other party may be responsible to contribute to or to pay your attorney's fees, if the court orders the other party to do so. However, if the other party fails to pay the court ordered fee, you are still responsible for the fees owed to your attorney and experts in your case.

You are required to pay for court filing fees, process servers as well as fees for expert reports, testimony, depositions and/or trial testimony and you may seek reimbursement from the other party.

If you engage in conduct which is found to be frivolous or meant to intentionally delay the case you could be fined or sanctioned and/or responsible for additional fees.

At your request, and after your attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate your case, you are entitled to be given an estimate of approximate future costs of your case. That estimate shall be made in good faith but may be subject to change due to facts and circumstances that develop during your case. There are no guarantees that the cost of your case will be as originally estimated.

You are entitled to receive a written, itemized bill on a regular basis, at least every 60 days.

You are expected to review the itemized bills sent to you by your attorney, and to raise any objections or errors in a timely manner in writing. Time spent in discussion or explanation of bills will not be charged to you.

You are responsible to be honest and truthful in all discussions with your attorney, and to provide all relevant information and documentation to enable her or him to competently prepare your case. Attorneys and clients must make reasonable efforts to maintain open communication during business hours throughout the representation. An attorney may seek to be relieved as your attorney if you are not honest and truthful with her or him.

You are entitled to be kept informed of the status of your case, and to be provided with copies of correspondence and documents prepared on your behalf or received from the court or your adversary.

Your attorney is required to discuss the following with you: a) the automatic orders that are in effect once either party files a summons with notice; b) the law that provides for the financial support of the children, the Child Support Standards Act, if you and the other party have children under the age of twenty-one; and c) the law that provides for the financial support of the parties, the Maintenance Guidelines Statute.

You are responsible to be present and on time in court at the time that conferences, oral arguments, hearings and trials are conducted unless excused by the Judge or the part rules of the assigned Judge.

You are entitled to make the ultimate decision on the objectives to be pursued in your case, and to make the final decision regarding the settlement of your case. Your attorney has the right to send you written communications if your attorney disagrees with how you want your case handled.

Your attorney's written retainer agreement must specify under what circumstances he or she might seek to withdraw as your attorney for nonpayment of legal fees. If an action or proceeding is pending, the court may give your attorney a "charging lien," which entitles your attorney to payment for services already rendered at the end of the case out of the proceeds of the final order or judgment. In some cases your attorney may exercise a "retaining lien" which, subject to court proceedings, may allow them to keep your file as security.

You are under no legal obligation to sign a confession of judgment or promissory note, or to agree to a lien or mortgage on your home to pay for legal fees. Your attorney's written retainer agreement must specify whether, and under what circumstances, such security may be requested. In no event may such security interest be obtained by your attorney without prior court approval and notice to your adversary. An attorney's security interest in the marital residence cannot be foreclosed against you.

You are entitled to have your attorney's best efforts exerted on your behalf, but no particular results can be guaranteed.

If you entrust money with an attorney for an escrow deposit in your case, the attorney must safeguard the escrow in a special bank account. You are entitled to a written escrow agreement, a written receipt, and a complete record concerning the escrow. When the terms of the escrow agreement have been performed, the attorney must promptly make payment of the escrow to all persons who are entitled to it.

Once your Judgment of Divorce is signed, if you are re-retaining an attorney you must sign a new retainer agreement.

If you are expecting your attorney to prepare and file documents related to the transfer of a house, co-op or lease, that must be specified in the retainer agreement. The signing of an agreement or court order that transfers title does not transfer a co-op apartment or a house. A separate document must be prepared and filed.

In the event of a fee dispute, you may have the right to seek arbitration pursuant to Part 137 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge where the dispute involves a sum of more than $1,000.00 or less than $50,000.00 unless you agree otherwise. Your attorney will provide you with the necessary information regarding arbitration in the event of a fee dispute, or upon your request.

Receipt Acknowledged:

__________ Attorney's signature

__________ Client's signature"

On March 12, 2026, a preliminary conference was held wherein all parties and counsel appeared, after which a so-ordered transcript was filed (hereinafter "3/12/2026 Transcript"),¹² which reflects that at the onset of the conference this Court addressed concerns regarding Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement including that the scope of representation appeared to exclude contested litigations and despite this action proceeding in that manner without the filing of an amendment to the retainer agreement, new retainer agreement or a notice of limited scope representation:

"THE COURT: *** With respect to Plaintiff's counsel, I have a couple of questions.

MR. [REDACTED]: Sure.

THE COURT: Your retainer was filed today as NYSCEF Document Number 19. Do you have a copy of that with you?

MR. [REDACTED]: I don't. Everything happened through my office, but I wasn't there to participate, meaning my paralegal uploaded it a few hours ago.

THE COURT: So I just want to note, I'm looking at it here and I have a copy, you can take a look at it, it says here, "This agreement is entered into between [Redacted], referred to in this agreement as the law firm or as we or us and R.C.F.is referred to in this agreement as client or as you," and then it says here, "Payment of fees for an uncontested agreement. The client agrees to pay the law firm on the basis of the following flat fee arrangement, $1,500 inclusive of Court fees to proceed with an uncontested divorce. Client paid $1,500.00." I read through the entirety of the agreement and my concern is that at the very best, this could be considered a limited scope representation and that would require under the CPLR provisions dealing with attorneys and their representation of clients and the Court the filing of a notice of limited scope representation with a retainer agreement with the client that specifically says there is a limited scope. Unless you folks are going to give me a settlement agreement today and you're going to give me all the uncontested divorce documents, it is not uncontested. Usually, those are commenced without even a judge being involved. We get a package. It goes upstairs to a couple of court referees. They review them and proceed in that manner. So I need clarification, A, do you believe that this is uncontested. If so, I happily will receive a settlement agreement and we'll proceed in that way. If it's not, then I need you to tell me that you're here as an officer of the Court and you're going to be filing an amended engagement appearance with a regular Notice of Appearance indicating that you're here for the duration of this litigation and I'm going to go through all of that in a minute.

MR. [REDACTED]: We're going to be filing an amended retainer agreement. He paid me an additional — he paid the firm an additional $3,500, so there is $5,000 in retainer. My understanding was that he had already signed that retainer, but I'll check back with my office. If it hasn't been done, we will make sure it gets done today and uploaded by the end of the day, but if it was done, I could have it uploaded within minutes.

THE COURT: Well, this was signed on February 7, 2025, unless it's misdated and I can see here that you have been involved in this case because you filed as a NYSCEF registered user on this case on February 12, 2025 is that correct?

MR. [REDACTED]: Yes.

THE COURT: So you need to file Notices of Appearance here in accordance with the rules and law of our profession. The ethical responsibilities of lawyers, by the way, is to file a retainer agreement and a statement of client's rights and responsibilities."¹³

Almost half-way through the conference, this Court was first notified of the need for a Court interpreter and promptly obtained same prior to proceeding with the conference, reminding all in attendance of the importance of each party having complete knowledge of what was transpiring in the courtroom as same impacted their rights:

"THE COURT: ***Moving along, I'm seeing on the preliminary conference order that there is a request for a Spanish language interpreter. That wasn't advised to me earlier today. Plaintiff's counsel, does your client need an interpreter?

MR. [REDACTED]: No.

MR. [REDACTED]: No, I just did that as a precautionary measure, but my client is fine with English.

THE COURT: If anybody needs an interpreter, you have the right to have-

MS. L.Y.F.: I understand a lot, everything what you're staying, I understand, but you know, professional words, I'm not fluent — my English is not fluent.

THE COURT: Well, you need to talk to your lawyer, but I'm happy that you told me that because what I'm going to do now is I'm going to pause the record and I'm going to ask for an interpreter to come up.

MS. L.Y.F.: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Even if somebody can communicate in English a little bit, you need to hear everything because your rights are being affected here and I would suggest, because you're going to order the transcript, that you read it with somebody that could read it to you in Spanish so that if you missed anything, you can understand it, because I can tell you, that there [are] certain legal words, for example, that not everyone who speaks English as a first language would know, and I can tell you that even in Spanish, there are dialects like there are in many languages where a word might mean something differently in one country versus another."

Following the completion of the conference, during which the Court also addressed the deficiencies in Plaintiff's SNW, a preliminary conference order  ¹⁴ was entered wherein the parties were directed to file amended statements of net worth with required annexed documents including retainer agreements by March 20, 2026.

On March 19, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 1  ¹⁵ was filed supported by only Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement and an affirmation of Plaintiff's counsel (hereinafter "Affirmation of Plaintiff's Counsel"), which includes the following assertions made in support of the application:

"Your affiant is the managing partner of the firm of the [Redacted], attorneys for the Plaintiff, R.C.F., in the above-entitled action. This affirmation is submitted in furtherance of the within motion, by order to show cause, seeking to relieve said law firm as counsel for R.C.F.. Mr. R.C.F. retained the services of [Redacted] to represent him on an uncontested divorce matter on February 7, 2025. In furtherance of said representation, Mr. R.C.F. signed a retainer agreement on February 7, 2025 — a copy is annexed as Exhibit A. However, the matter has since become contested, and though Mr. R.C.F. did pay our firm an additional $3,500.00 since retaining us, he is refusing to execute a new retainer agreement for representation on the uncontested divorce. R.C.F. has paid our firm a total of $5,000.00 to date; however, his outstanding balance is $1,651.00. Mr. R.C.F. does not respond to my outreach. I have tried emailing and texting him to no avail. He does not respond to my requests to speak. It is very challenging to represent a client who has become virtually impossible to communicate with and who refuses to execute a retainer agreement for our representation on his contested divorce case. I cannot go much further in depth without divulging confidential and/or sensitive client and/or case information. My associate, [Redacted], Esq., reached out to the part by email, as per Judge Hyer's Part Rules, to request permission to file the within motion on two occasions (March 17, 2026 and March 18, 2026), but never heard back. By reason of the foregoing, the relief herein requested should be granted in all respects. No prior application for the relief herein requested has been made."

On March 21, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed proof of service of Motion Sequence No. 1.¹⁶

On March 24, 2026, all parties and counsel appeared before the undersigned for a conference wherein oral argument was received pertaining to the instant application during which no objection was received pertaining to the requested relief by either Plaintiff or Defendant's counsel.

No further submissions were received pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 1.

Legal Analysis

A. Request For the Entry of Order Relieving Plaintiff's Counsel.

[1] Public Policy, Regulation & Procedure of Matrimonial Actions

The Court of Appeals has confirmed the manner in which practice and procedure in our courts may be regulated, noting the relationship between our State Constitution and legislation, with the adoption of court rules to compliment the former:

"Under the State Constitution the authority to regulate practice and procedure in the courts is delegated primarily to the Legislature (NY Const., art. VI, § 30). There are some matters which are not subject to legislative control because they deal with the inherent nature of the judicial function (see, e.g., Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App.Div. 101, 90 N.Y.S. 772, affd. 181 NY 531, 73 N.E. 1131). Generally, however, the Legislature has the power to *6 prescribe rules of practice governing court proceedings, and any rules the courts adopt must be consistent with existing legislation and may be subsequently abrogated by statute (Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 NY2d 237, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633, 250 N.E.2d 690). In addition, court rules must be adopted in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Constitution and statute (NY Const., art. VI, § 30; Judiciary Law § 211[1][b] )" (A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 NY2d 1 [1986]).

In a matter wherein an attorney sought to vacate an arbitration award in favor of a matrimonial client, and the attorney sought to vacate such award, in part, by asserting that the matrimonial rules of the courts were invalid, the Appellate Division, Third Department disagreed providing the following rationale:

"Respondent initially contends that the matrimonial rules (see 22 NYCRR part 1400; see also Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2—106[c] [2] [22 NYCRR 1200.11(c)(2) ] ) conflict with Judiciary Law § 474 and, thus, are invalid. The Court of Appeals, however, has held that, '[n]otwithstanding section 474 * * * few propositions are better established than that our courts do retain this power of supervision' over agreements between attorneys and clients (Gair v. Peck, 6 NY2d 97, 106, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43, appeal dismissed, cert. denied 361 U.S. 374, 80 S.Ct. 401, 4 L.Ed.2d 380; see Matter of First Natl. Bank of E. Islip v. Brower, 42 NY2d 471, 474, 398 N.Y.S.2d 875, 368 N.E.2d 1240 [recognizing 'the traditional authority of the courts to supervise the charging of fees for legal services under the courts' inherent and statutory power to regulate the practice of law']; Smitas v. Rickett, 102 AD2d 928, 930, 477 N.Y.S.2d 752 ['[I]t is the established rule that the courts of this State retain authority and implicit control over the supervision of fee arrangements between attorney and client under the court's inherent and statutory power to regulate the practice of law'] ). The Court further stated in Gair v. Peck, supra at 106, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43 that '[s]ection 474 confers upon the lawyer no inalienable right to impose on his [or her] client, and a retainer agreement becomes unenforceable in some situations where a contract would be enforceable if the parties to it were not attorney and client.'

*698 The language of the matrimonial rules reflects that they were designed, among other things, to provide basic boundaries for the attorney-client relationships in an area of practice that produced a disproportionate number of disputes between attorneys and clients. The reasons for promulgating the matrimonial rules included 'to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public' (Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122, 122, 666 N.Y.S.2d 147). The rules set forth parameters which provide safeguards to both parties to an agreement for legal services regarding this historically contentious area of law. We are unpersuaded that the matrimonial rules, both as written and as applied to the facts on appeal, strayed beyond the court's supervisory powers regarding attorneys or ran afoul of the statutory provisions of Judiciary Law § 474 (see generally People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 NY 465, 477, 162 N.E. 487 [Chief Judge Cardozo discussing the power of the courts to regulate attorney conduct] )" (In re Serazio-Plant, 299 AD2d 696 [3d Dept 2002]; see also, Regulating Attorney Conduct: Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, 1 Touro L. Rev. 609).

As noted in, In re Serazio-Plant, Id., litigants involved in matrimonial actions must be protected from abuse as it has been recognized that, "in the vast majority of cases divorce causes emotional trauma to spouses and their family" (Howard v. Lilliam S., 62 AD3d 187 [1st Dept 2009]), which requires our courts to be vigilant in their handling of such matters as noted by the Appellate Division, First Department:

"The courts of this state are regularly called upon to make decisions which affect the personal lives of people involved in divorce and remarriage. Where the divorce is acrimonious and the parties are enmeshed in the emotionalism that accompanies such trauma, judges must ferret out **969 the truth and make judgments which will not only be fair to the parties but will also most assuredly affect their future lives. Some of the most difficult and troublesome cases that a court is called upon to resolve involve custody and visitation issues, including the determination of what constitutes the best interests of the child" (Radford v. Propper, 190 AD2d 93 [1st Dept 1993]).

Matrimonial actions may also include conduct that amounts to litigation abuse, a form of domestic violence where parties utilize the courts, including prolonging the underlying matrimonial action and following post-judgment litigation, to engage in domestic violence against their spouse. As one author noted:

" 'Litigation abuse' is defined as a batterer's use of the court system as a tool of coercive control over the victim. Batterers often pursue litigation abuse as a tactic for several reasons: it is one of the few remaining ways that they can control a victim after separation, it can drain the victim's financial resources, and family courts allow for parties to demand many hearing.

* * *

Litigation provides many opportunities for batterers to abuse victims. 'such measures [have] included requests for emergency hearings, multiple charges of contempt, failing to supply appropriate documents, and accusations against the participants. The National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges notes that abusive parents frequently make multiple appearances 'seeking to undo orders that they perceive to be unfavorable to then, even in the absence of any change in circumstances between hearings.' Batterers may request continuances or otherwise seek to postpone final judgment.' Each time the batterer files a motion, he has another opportunity to continue his reach into the victim's life" (How Domestic Violence Batterers Use Custody Proceedings in Family Courts to Abuse Victims, and How Courts Can Put a Stop To It, 24 UCLA Women's L.J. 41 [internal citations omitted]; see also, The [E]X Factor: Addressing Trauma From Post-Separation Domestic Violence As Judicial Terrorism, 99 Wash. U.L. Rev. 339; Jessica T. v. Keith T., 67 Misc 3d 1229(A) [Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2020]).

Recognizing the necessity to protect litigants involved in matrimonial litigation in our State, safeguards have been established through legislative action and rules promulgated by the courts. These measures ensure that matrimonial actions proceed without undue delay while erecting guardrails to shield litigants from harm through ethical requirements of the attorneys who represent them. Initially, with respect to an attorney representing a matrimonial litigant they must first, before the presentation of a written retainer agreement, present their prospective client with a statement of client's rights and responsibilities, and obtain a written confirmation of receipt of same from the client:

"An attorney shall provide a prospective client with a statement of client's rights and responsibilities in a form prescribed by the Appellate Divisions, at the initial conference and prior to the signing of a written retainer agreement. If the attorney is not being paid a fee from the client for the work to be performed on the particular case, the attorney may delete from the statement those provisions dealing with fees. The attorney shall obtain a signed acknowledgement of receipt from the client. The statement shall contain the following:" (see 22 NYCRR § 1400.2 [emphasis added]; see also 2 Law and the Family New York § 26:36 [2025-2026 ed.]).

After the statement of client's rights and responsibilities is presented, signed and returned to the subject attorney, then they are required to obtain a written retainer agreement with the prospective client:

"An attorney who undertakes to represent a party and enters into an arrangement for, charges or collects any fee from a client shall execute a written agreement with the client setting forth in plain language the terms of compensation and the nature of services to be rendered. The agreement, and any amendment thereto, shall be signed by both client and attorney, and, in actions in Supreme Court, a copy of the signed agreement shall be filed with the court with the statement of net worth. Where substitution of counsel occurs after the filing of the net worth statement, a signed copy of the attorney's retainer agreement shall be filed with the court within 10 days of its execution. A copy of a signed amendment shall be filed within 15 days of signing. A duplicate copy of the filed agreement and any amendment shall be provided to the client. The agreement shall be subject to the provisions governing confidentiality contained in Domestic Relations Law, section 235(1). The agreement shall contain the following information:" (see 22 NYCRR § 1400.3; see also 2 New York Matrimonial Law and Practice § 12:16).

While the aforementioned requirements for the execution of a statement of client's rights and responsibilities, followed by a retainer agreement, may seem to some ministerial in nature, they are anything but. To the contrary, they represent the bedrock of the attorney-client relationship arising out of rules established over thirty-years ago, rooted in enduring public policy concerns pertaining to the vulnerability of litigants in matrimonial matters, initially hailed as "the country's most stringent set of rules over divorce lawyers" (New York Tackles Jury Standards, 80-Jan A.B.A. J. 22).

Providing historical context, one author noted that in 1993 then Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye "implemented these measures to counteract public criticism and cynicism about the legal profession and the courts," and provided an overview of the process within which the reforms were adopted specifically addressing the requirements pertaining to a statement of client's rights and responsibilities, and written engagement agreement:

"On July 16, 1992, the Administrative Board of the Courts ("the Administrative Board") formed the Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Actions ("the Committee") in order to examine the role of attorneys in matrimonial actions in the New York courts.14 This action was largely inspired by increased criticism of the substantive laws and legal procedures particular to matrimonial practice.

* * *

The reforms recommended by the Committee focus on three general areas. First, the reforms substantially increase clients' knowledge about their rights in the attorney-client relationship. Second, they limit the coercive aspects of the relationship that attorneys have used to exploit clients. Third, they prohibit specific behavior: attorney-client sexual relations during the pendency of domestic relations matters. The Administrative Board generally followed the Committee's recommendations in its official version of the rules, which took effect on November 30, 1993.24

The reforms enhance clients' knowledge about their rights in the attorney-client relationship by requiring that attorneys provide their clients with statements of clients' rights and responsibilities and written retainer agreements. The Committee notes that although a divorce will seriously affect the lives of the parties and their children, most divorce clients know little about their rights *255 and responsibilities as clients in the attorney-client relationship.25 When such ignorance is present at the inception of the attorney-client relationship, "the relationship begins with an inherent imbalance that may become exacerbated as the action progresses."26 The Committee concludes that a statement of rights will allow clients to become informed consumers who can "participate more knowledgeably and efficiently in the process and have more realistic expectations of counsel."

* * *

The requirement of written retainer agreements was also designed to further enhance clients' knowledge of their rights and responsibilities as parties to the attorney-client relationship. Many clients have voiced dissatisfaction with the high cost of fees, the way in which they were billed for legal services, and their lack of information about various aspects of their litigation including the duration and status of cases.29 The Committee notes that written retainers "will foster communication between counsel and client, *256 educate the client, and prepare him or her for the anticipated developments, delays, and costs of the action."30 Thus, the written retainer agreement required by the new rules provides additional assurances that domestic relations clients will have the knowledge necessary to protect them from unsavory attorneys." (Lawyers In Lust: Does New York's New Rule Addressing Attorney-Client Sexual Relations Do Enough?, 2 J.L. & Pol'y 249 [internal citations omitted]).

However, even when a written retainer agreement is obtained in compliance with 22 NYCRR § 1400.3, the Court of Appeals has held that the terms set forth therein must be clear as any ambiguity will be construed against the drafter due to the strong public policy noted above:

"The general rule that 'equivocal contracts will be construed against the drafters' is subject to particularly rigorous enforcement in the context of attorney-client retainer agreements (Shaw v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 68 NY2d 172, 176, 507 N.Y.S.2d 610, 499 N.E.2d 864 [1986]; see also Matter of Cooperman, 83 NY2d 465, 472, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 633 N.E.2d 1069 [1994] [noting that 'attorney-client fee agreements are a matter of special concern to the courts and are enforceable and affected by lofty principles different from those applicable to commonplace commercial contracts']). Indeed, '[t]he importance of an attorney's clear agreement with a client as to the essential terms of representation cannot be overstated. The client should be fully informed of all relevant facts and the basis of the fee charges, especially in contingent fee arrangement' (Shaw, 68 NY2d at 176, 507 N.Y.S.2d 610, 499 N.E.2d 864; accord King v. Fox, 7 NY3d 181, 191, 818 N.Y.S.2d 833, 851 N.E.2d 1184 [2006]; Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 NY2d 991, 993, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283 [1985] ). Accordingly, as a matter of public policy, courts 'cast[ ] the burden on attorneys who have drafted the retainer agreements to show that the contracts are fair, reasonable, and fully known and understood by their clients' (Shaw, 68 NY2d at 176, 507 N.Y.S.2d 610, 499 N.E.2d 864, citing, inter alia, Jacobson, 66 NY2d at 993, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283; Gair v. Peck, 6 NY2d 97, 106, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43 [1959], cert. denied 361 U.S. 374, 80 S.Ct. 401, 4 L.Ed.2d 380 [1960])" (Albunio v. City of New York, 23 NY3d 65 [2014]).

The Appellate Division, Second Department has noted that retainer agreements are subject to strict scrutiny, more so than retainers for other types of legal services, again due to public policy:

" '[A]ttorney-client fee agreements are a matter of special *644 concern to the courts and are enforceable and affected by lofty principles different from those applicable to commonplace commercial contracts' (Matter of Cooperman, 83 NY2d 465, 472, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 633 N.E.2d 1069). ' '[C]ourts as a matter of public policy give particular scrutiny to fee arrangements between attorneys and clients, casting the burden on attorneys who have drafted the retainer agreements to show that the contracts are fair, reasonable, and fully known and understood by their clients' ' (King v. Fox, 7 NY3d 181, 191, 818 N.Y.S.2d 833, 851 N.E.2d 1184, quoting Shaw v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 68 NY2d 172, 176, 507 N.Y.S.2d 610, 499 N.E.2d 864; see Seth Rubenstein, P.C. v. Ganea, 41 AD3d 54, 60, 833 N.Y.S.2d 566)" (Law Office of Howard M. File, Esq., P.C., v. Ostashko, 60 AD3d 643 [2d Dept 2009]).

In determining that a reader was entitled to a "fair and usual reading" of a matrimonial retainer agreement, one court noted, "[m]oreover, the Court finds that public policy also favors 'predictability and clarity' in regard to contracts, especially matrimonial retainers" (see S.M. v. M.R., 56 Misc 3d 1219(A) [Sup. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2017] quoting Moran v. Erk, 11 NY3d 452 [2008]).

Accordingly, matrimonial retainer agreements must substantially comply with the aforementioned rules as the failure to do so may preclude the attorney from recovery of any fee for services rendered (see Safir v. Safir, 237 AD3d 868 [2d Dept 2025]). Substantial compliance has been determined to include a clear articulation of the scope of services to be performed by the attorney for the subject client (Hyman & Gilbert v. Withers, 151 AD3d 945 [2d Dept 2014] [law firm not entitled to attorneys' fees for work performed on appeal of matrimonial action as retainer scope of services did not include appellate work]); and that the attorneys' fees charged the client rates comport with those set in the agreement (Rigas v. Rigas, 227 AD3d 1017 [2d Dept 2024] ["The papers submitted in support of the defendant's request for an award of attorney's fees revealed that her trial counsel charged rates that exceeded those set forth in the retainer agreement, with no evidence that the defendant had signed a written amendment to the retainer agreement setting for those higher rates"]). Notably, as both the retainer agreement, and statement of client's rights and responsibilities are often set forth in one document, they are to be read together (see Edelman v. Poster, 72 AD3d 182 [1st Dept 2010]).

It is important to note that an attorney is able to limit their scope of representation of a client in the event they comply with the applicable statutory and court rules:

"Rule 1.2(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) provides, in relevant part, that '[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances [and] the client gives informed consent.' 'An attorney may not be held liable for failing to act outside the scope of the retainer' (Genesis Merchant Partners, L.P. v. Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane, LLC, 157 AD3d 479, 482, 69 N.Y.S.3d 30; see AmBase Corp. v. Davis Polk & Wardwell, 8 NY3d 428, 834 N.Y.S.2d 705, 866 N.E.2d 1033)" (Kohler v. Polsky, 219 AD3d 821 [2d Dept 2023]).

To limit the scope of their representation, the attorney has the duty to ensure that the client understands the limits of their representation (see Genesis Merchant Partners, L.P. v. Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane, 157 AD3d 479 [1st Dept 2018]). Even when an attorney effectively limits the scope of their representation of a client, they may still face potential liability for offering negligent advice to the client pertaining to legal matters outside such limited scope (see Lam v. Weiss, 219 AD3d 713 [2d Dept 2023]).

The filing of a retainer agreement is not only a requirement of matrimonial attorneys, but also falls within the scope of responsibilities of the justice assigned to preside over the action as the rules require that "the court shall examine the agreement to assure that it conforms to Appellate Division attorney conduct and disciplinary rules" (see NYCRR § 202.16 [emphasis added]), thereby providing a proverbial belt and suspenders approach as it is inferred that the court is to address any deficiencies in such agreements at the preliminary conference as they are to be filed at least ten days prior thereto.

Beyond these rules pertaining to the initial formation of the attorney-client relationship and the documents necessary to complete that process, the applicable court rules require that matrimonial actions move forward without delay. Initially, 22 NYCRR § 202.16(d) directs that the request for judicial intervention be filed within a required timeframe:

"A request for judicial intervention shall be filed with the court by the plaintiff no later than 45 days from the date of service of the summons and complaint or summons with notice upon the defendant, unless both parties file a notice of no necessity with the court, in which event the request for judicial intervention may be filed no later than 120 days from the date of service of the summons and complaint or summons with notice upon the defendant [emphasis added]."

Notably, any party may file a request for judicial intervention (see 22 NYCRR § 202.6).

22 NYCRR § 202.16(f) then requires that a preliminary conference be held within 45 days of the request for judicial intervention being filed, with certain documents including parties' statements of net worth being exchanged at least 10 days prior, with a directive that "counsel shall consult with each other prior to the preliminary conference" to discuss outstanding issues so that they may be narrowed at the conference, with one of the issues to be addressed at the conference being "the establishment of a timetable for the completion of all disclosure proceedings, provided that all such procedures must be completed and the note of issue filed within six months from the commencement of such conference, unless otherwise shortened or extended by the court depending upon the circumstances of the case [emphasis added]." The importance of preparation for and effective completion of a preliminary conference cannot be overstated as reflected upon by one trial court, "[p]reliminary conferences further the object of facilitating and enhancing discovery" (Muller v. Brailofsky, 179 Misc 2d 634 [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1999]; see also 22 NYCRR § 202.12 ["The parties, with the court's assistance, are encouraged to consider as early as possible how best to achieve the most efficient, expeditious and cost-effective resolution of every case. A preliminary conference will frequently be a useful and even critical tool for furthering these goals."]; 22 NYCRR § 202.11). If these directives are followed, by bench and bar, most non-complex matrimonial actions should by trial-ready within one year of the request for judicial intervention having been filed.

In addition to this procedural timetable, all court users are entitled to the ability to understand what is being communicated in the courtroom contemporaneously with that communication, "[a]s a corollary to the right to counsel, non-English speaking individuals have the right to an interpreter to enable them to participate meaningfully in their trial and assist in their own defense" (In re Er-Mei Y., 29 AD3d 1013 [2d Dept 2006] [internal citations omitted]), with the court rules of this State requiring that:

"(a) In all civil and criminal cases, when a court determines that a party or witness, or an interested parent or guardian of a minor party in a Family Court proceeding, is unable to understand and communicate in English to the extent that he or she cannot meaningfully participate in the court proceedings, the clerk of the court or another designated administrative officer shall schedule an interpreter at no expense from an approved list maintained by the Office of Court Administration. The court may permit an interpreter to interpret by telephone or live audiovisual means. If no pre-approved interpreter is available, the clerk of the court or another designated administrative officer shall schedule an interpreter at no expense as justice requires. This rule shall not alter or diminish the court's authority and duty to assure justness in proceedings before it.

(b) A person with limited English proficiency, other than a person testifying as a witness, may waive a court-appointed interpreter, with the consent of the court, if the person provides his or her own interpreter at his or her own expense."

It is vital that a request for an interpreter be made timely by a self-represented litigant or counsel as the court is not required to sua sponte appoint an interpreter if there is no obvious manifestation that the litigant has limited English proficiency (see Catholic Guardian Soc. of Diocese of Brooklyn, Inc. (Ricardo V.) v. Elba V., 216 AD2d 558 [2d Dept 1995]; see also LAWFAMNY § 76:52), and in the absence of such request, later claims by a litigant that they failed to understand the proceedings may be unavailing in a challenge to orders or decisions entered.

In a writing directed to law students, Professor Kristen B. Gerdy, discusses the need for attorneys to adhere to the ethics of caring in their role as a counselor to their clients, in order to facilitate a strong attorney-client relationship and client-focused decision-making, noting:

"Professionals, including lawyers and doctors, must not only practice the science of their craft but must also incorporate caring if they *3 want to be successful. To professionally embrace '[t]he ethics of caring requires [the professional to] feel as well as reason. Our natural impulse to care comes from compassion and human love.'3 Caring is not merely an emotional response because it requires analysis and reasoning, but 'true caring . . . cannot be reduced to problem solving. It emphasizes as much the motivation as the consequences of an action. . . . Moreover, an orientation to caring incorporates the attributes of attentiveness, honesty, patience, respect, compassion, trustworthiness, and sensitivity into all aspects of moral behavior.'

* * *

Despite some lawyers' contentions that developing empathy for the client is at best uncomfortable and inefficient and at worst inappropriate and manipulative, empathy does play an important role in law practice.102 Every interaction a lawyer has with a client involves an emotional component, and facilitating the client's discussion of her emotions through expressions of empathy is not only appropriate but beneficial to the lawyer-client relationship and ultimately to the legal case itself.

* * *

Thus, every lawyer must develop the capacity to empathize with others and, in so doing, increase her effectiveness. Specifically, empathy can aid the lawyer in building rapport with her client and thus *20 foster a more beneficial relationship; foster open and complete communication; lead to more thorough legal analysis; improve the image of the legal profession; and satisfy client expectations.

* * *

Relationships with clients are central, even critical, to the 'helping professions,' which include counseling, teaching, social work, ministry, and law.108 Positive relationships between the professional and the client are conditioned upon 'empathy, respect and genuineness,' which are primarily in the control of the professional rather than the client.109 Additionally, '[r]apport, or mutual trust, is . . . central to a good client-professional relationship.'110 Empathy is the key ingredient in the development of rapport.111 In therapeutic contexts, research shows that a therapist's empathy is the 'key behavioural element in professional-patient interactions which builds the therapeutic alliance, increases patient motivation to participate actively in treatment and is a predictor of successful outcomes.'112 The same is true with the attorney-client relationship. When clients feel understood and believe that the lawyer is truly interested in a successful solution to their problems and concerns, the client becomes less anxious and more at ease.113 And when a lawyer truly empathizes with what a client is feeling and experiencing, 'decisions might be made differently and the process of arriving at decisions might be made with more consideration for the client's actual needs.'114" (Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the "Heart" of Lawyering, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 1).

The sage guidance offered by Professor Gerdy should be heeded by the matrimonial bench and bar, approaching the requirements set forth in 22 NYCRR § 1400.2 and 22 NYCRR § 1400.3 not merely as an obligation, but rather a sense of opportunity with the awareness that such compliance is not only the required thing to do, but is the right thing to do, and must be done with a sense of empathy, caring and diligence that each client deserves.

[2] Legal Authority Application to Attorney Withdrawal

CPLR § 321(b) permits withdrawal of an attorney on consent of their client with the filing of a consent to change attorney. CPLR § 321(B)(2) sets forth the manner within which an attorney may file a motion to withdraw, "[a]n attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending, upon motion on such notice to the client of the withdrawing attorney, to the attorneys of all other parties in the action or, if a person appears without an attorney, to the party, and to another other person, as the court may direct." In review of such an application, the Appellate Division, Second Department has noted that:

" ' 'The decision to grant or deny permission for counsel to withdraw lies within the discretion of the trial court, and the court's decision should not be overturned absent a showing of an improvident exercise of discretion' ' (Musachio v. Musachio, 80 AD3d 738, 738, 915 N.Y.S.2d 497, quoting Cashdan v. Cashdan, 243 AD2d 598, 598, 663 N.Y.S.2d 271). 'An attorney may be permitted to withdraw from employment where a client refuses to pay reasonable legal fees' (Weiss v. Spitzer, 46 AD3d 675, 675, 848 N.Y.S.2d 237; see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.16[c][5]). 'Additionally, an attorney may withdraw from **527 representing a client if the client 'fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively' ' (Aragona v. Shaibani, 138 AD3d 649, 650, 29 N.Y.S.3d 68, quoting Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.16[c][7] )" (Appelbaum v. Einstein, 161 AD3d 905 [2d Dept 2018]).

When an attorney appears with limited scope pursuant to CPLR § 321(d), no such motion is required as the statute provides, "[u]nless otherwise directed by the court upon a finding of extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown, upon completion of the purposes for which the attorney has filed a limited scope appearance, the attorney shall file a notice of completion of limited scope appearance which shall constitute the attorney's withdrawal from the action or proceeding."

[3] Legal Authority Pertaining to Stay Upon Attorney Withdrawal

Pursuant to CPLR § 321(c), upon the death, removal or disability of an attorney as counsel for a litigant, an automatic statutory stay is imposed as, "no further proceeding shall be taken in the action against the party for whom he appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party either personally or in such manner as the court directs." Such a stay will customarily be granted in the event an application to withdraw is made by counsel pursuant to CPLR § 321(B)(2) and the client objects with counsel being removed by court order (see Albert v. Albert, 309 AD2d 884 [2d Dept 2003]). However, where it is determined that the attorney withdrawal was necessitated by the client's conduct and/or is not objected to by the client, the court then has discretion to grant a stay (see Sarlo-Pinzur v. Pinzur, 59 AD3d 607 [2d Dept 2009]). When determining if discretion will be exercised to grant a stay, "the court must engage in a balanced consideration of numerous relevant factors, including the merit or lack of merit of the action, the extent of the delay, the number of adjournments granted, the lack of intent to deliberately default or abandon the action, and the length of the pendency of the proceeding (see Hawes v. Lewis, 127 AD3d 921 [2d Dept 2015] citing Diamond v. Diamante, 57 AD3d 827 [2d Dept 2008]).

[4] Application to Instant Motion

Unfortunately, this case provides an illustration of a matrimonial litigation wherein the parties were not afforded all of the safeguards established for their own protection, which has resulted in significant delay of this action and likely is the root cause of the instant application. While this case was commenced with the filing of the Summons in February 2025 and Defendant's counsel appeared (without limitation and/or reservation of rights) with the filing of a notice of appearance in March 2025, it is reasonable to assume that service was effectuated at that time triggering the responsibility for filing a request for judicial intervention within forty-five days required by 22 NYCRR § 202.16(d), which either party could have done pursuant to NYCRR § 202.6. Nonetheless, the procedural history of this action reflects that no request for judicial intervention was filed until approximately one year later, in February 2026.

The Court Notice issued on February 19, 2026, scheduled the preliminary conference to be held on March 5, 2026, which was later adjourned to March 12, 2026, requiring counsel to file their clients' respective statements of net worth at least ten days prior thereto (being March 2, 2026) pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 202.16(f). Nonetheless, the record reflects that Defendant's counsel filed Defendant's SNW one day prior, while Plaintiff's counsel filed Defendant's SNW one hour prior; and, both documents fell short of the stated intent in the rules as both were significantly deficient, failing to provide the information needed to have an effective conference to further the needs of the parties. Moreover, during the course of the preliminary conference, this Court saw no evidence that counsel had meaningfully consulted with each other prior to the preliminary conference as required by the court rules, again preventing the parties from obtaining the assistance such a conference is intended to afford litigants at the beginning stages of matrimonial litigation.

This lack of preparation not only violated the court rules, but placed both parties at a disadvantage by ensuring that this Court would be unable to narrow issues, unable to prevent undue delay and expense, and unable to grant interim financial relief (see Molner v. Molner, 243 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2025]). Finally, despite the Court Notice directing that the court be notified in advance of the scheduled conference of the need for court interpreters, no such notification was received with the court only receiving such request approximately halfway through completion of the conference by Defendant, herself, who indicated that she was not fully proficient in the English language. This resulted in further delay as the parties and counsel were required to wait for a second call while a court interpreter was located,¹⁷ while placing Defendant in a disadvantaged position, as she may have not fully understood what transpired in the first half of the conference.

With respect to Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement, this Court reviewed same as it is required to do pursuant to NYCRR § 202.16, and as noted above raised several concerns during the preliminary conference as it failed to substantially comply with 22 NYCRR § 1400.3. Foremost the Court inquired as to the scope of representation of Plaintiff's counsel for Plaintiff in this action as Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement indicated that the scope was limited to only an uncontested divorce, further indicating that if the matter became contested a new retainer agreement would be needed and this Court had not been provided with any additional retainer. As reflected by the transcript entries noted above, Plaintiff's counsel himself was unable to respond to this Court's inquiries and indicated that if a new retainer agreement had not been signed it would be. Accordingly, the representation of Plaintiff's counsel at the conference appeared to exceed the scope of representation set forth in Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement.

Plaintiff's counsel then advised this Court that, "[h]e paid me an additional — he paid the firm an additional $3,500, so there is $5,000 in retainer," which appeared to be an admission that he had accepted payment of funds from a matrimonial client beyond the fees set forth in Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement. Plaintiff's counsel made a similar statement in his affirmation filed in support of the instant application wherein he asserts, "Mr. R.C.F. has paid our firm a total of $5,000.00 to date; however his outstanding balance is $1,651.00," while further informing this Court that Plaintiff refused to execute a new retainer agreement, again calling into question if funds were received from Plaintiff by Plaintiff's counsel in excess of the fee schedule set forth in Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement. Equally as concerning, is the Subject Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities as compared to the Required Statement of Client's Rights and Responsibilities which was included within Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement. As many of the provisions required by the court rules are not included in what was presented to Plaintiff, he was preventing from having had the benefit of all of the intended information prescribed by the rules prior to executing any matrimonial retainer agreement, thereby failing to comply with NYCRR § 1400.2 and arguably preventing any retainer agreement signed by Plaintiff to be appropriate with the prospective client not having first been presented with a proper statement of client's rights and responsibilities.

Accordingly, to varying extents, both parties to this litigation were not afforded all of the protections afforded by statute and court rules crafted to protect matrimonial litigants who are understandably involved in a highly emotional situation where they are faced with litigation involving highly sensitive issues that are unmistakable life-changing. At the very least such conduct resulted in delay and increased expense to the parties, and as set forth above, while domestic violence is not yet alleged in this case, certain cases involving domestic violence, may increase exposure to harm for litigants and their families.

This Court is now presented with a request for the withdrawal of Plaintiff's counsel which has gone unopposed by Plaintiff and Defendant's counsel. In reviewing this request, it is unclear if Plaintiff's counsel ever had the authority to appear for Plaintiff in this contested matrimonial action as doing so exceeded the narrow scope of authority conveyed to counsel by Plaintiff in Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement. However, to the extent such authority existed and as Plaintiff's counsel is now the attorney of record for Plaintiff in this action, this Court determines that the oral argument received by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel support the finding that the attorney-client relationship has broken down between them to the extent where withdrawal is required.

Based upon the foregoing, the application of Plaintiff's counsel is granted to the extent that other than as set forth herein, [Redacted], shall have no further obligations to Plaintiff arising out of this litigation.

By April 3, 2026, [Redacted], shall serve upon Plaintiff, via e-mail and certified mail, an out-going attorney letter enumerating the contents of their file on this matter annexing copies of same, including, but not limited to: (1) retainer agreements, (2) statements of client's rights and responsibilities, (3) billing statements, (4) pleadings, (5) decisions and orders, (6) discovery demands and responses, (7) correspondence, and (8) any other contents; and, by April 3, 2026, file (without a copy of the letter and/or attachments) proof of service with a copy of the tracking slip.

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 202.16-c, [Redacted], shall remove their consent from NYSCEF in this action.

B. Request For the Entry of Order Granting Thirty Day Stay.

While Plaintiff's counsel is withdrawing pursuant to a manner other than as set forth in CPLR § 321(c), and recognizing that no statutory right to a stay exists, in an exercise of its discretion this Court hereby grants the request for a thirty-day stay directing that this action be stayed until April 30, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., wherein a status conference shall be held with all parties and counsel required to appear in person so that this court may address any open issues. In making this determination, this Court determined that while Plaintiff consented to the withdrawal of Plaintiff's counsel, neither Plaintiff's actions and/or inactions caused the withdrawal of his counsel, and the remaining equities required the stay to be granted.

C. Other Relief.

To the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that [Redacted], is hereby relieved as counsel for Plaintiff in this action, and upon completion of the directives set forth herein, shall have no further duties or obligations to Plaintiff arising out of this action; and it is further

ORDERED that by April 3, 2026, [Redacted], shall serve upon Plaintiff, via e-mail and certified mail, an out-going attorney letter enumerating the contents of their file on this matter annexing copies of same, including, but not limited to: (1) retainer agreements, (2) statements of client's rights and responsibilities, (3) billing statements, (4) pleadings, (5) decisions and orders, (6) discovery demands and responses, (7) correspondence, and (8) any other contents; and, by April 3, 2026, file (without a copy of the letter and/or attachments) proof of service with a copy of the tracking slip; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 202.16-c, [Redacted], shall remove their consent and representation in NYSCEF due to their withdrawal as counsel for Plaintiff in this action; and it is further

ORDERED that by April 1, 2026, Defendant's counsel shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on [Redacted], and Plaintiff by NYSCEF filing and e-mail; and by April 1, 2026 shall file a copy of the Notice of Entry and Affidavit of Service; and it is further

ORDERED that this action is hereby stayed until April 30, 2026; and it is further

ORDERED that on April 30, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., a status conference shall be held, wherein all parties and counsel shall appear in person, to discuss all outstanding issues in this action, including, but not limited to, the entry of an order setting extended discovery deadlines; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief was requested and not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: March 31, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

HON. JAMES L. HYER, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Note: While no answering submissions were received, the order to show cause for the instant application was conformed wherein the parties were directed to appear on the scheduled return date for oral argument, and all parties and counsel appeared on the return date wherein oral argument was received after which this Court advised a written decision would be entered.

2.    See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-4.

3.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 5.

4.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 6.

5.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 8.

6.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 9.

7.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 10.

8.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 11.

9.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 15.

10.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 17.

11.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 19.

12.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26.

13.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, 3/12/2026 Transcript, Pg. 2:7-25-Pg. 5:1-20.

14.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 20; see also, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26, 3/12/2026 Transcript, Pg. 30:22-25.

15.    See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 21-23.

16.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 25.

17.   Note: Requests for advance application for court interpreters is made by this Court as interpreters must be sought by this Court to the Office of Court Administration several days in advance of such need, to afford the administration the opportunity to locate an interpreter with the required language and dialect, as only limited resources exist within each courthouse for interpreting services on a daily basis.

James L. Hyer, J.