Enrico Caruso, Plaintiff v. Dee Dial, Defendant (2026)

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers NYSCEF Document(s)

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability (#2), with supporting documents (filed June 18, 2025) 45 — 58

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Threshold (#3) and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion (#2), with supporting documents (filed July 31, 2025) 62 — 72

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion (#3), with supporting documents (filed November 12, 2025) 75 — 88

Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition (#3) (filed December 16, 2025) 92

Upon the foregoing papers, the plaintiff, Enrico Caruso ("Plaintiff"), moves (Motion # 2) for summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to CPLR 3212, and for an order setting this matter down for a trial on damages. The defendant, Dee Dial ("Defendant"), opposes the motion and cross-moves (Motion #3), also pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff did not sustain a "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action commenced by the filing of a summons and verified complaint on November 1, 2023. Defendant interposed a verified answer on or about December 20, 2023. A preliminary conference order was entered on March 29, 2024. On April 23, 2025, this Court issued a decision and order granting, to the extent indicated therein, Plaintiff's motion to preclude non-party witness JO, the front seat passenger in Defendant's vehicle, from testifying at trial or in support of any dispositive motion due to her failure to comply with subpoenas. A certification order was entered on May 21, 2025, and Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness on June 9, 2025.

Plaintiff moved (Motion #2) for summary judgment on liability on June 18, 2025, and Defendant cross moved (Motion #3) for summary judgment on July 31, 2025. The return date on the motion and cross-motion was adjourned several times on consent, including to allow Plaintiff additional time to obtain medical reports and to be examined by his expert orthopedist. Oral argument was heard on December 18, 2025, with both parties represented by counsel, after which the motion and cross-motion were marked fully submitted. The Court's decisions were reserved.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 1, 2021, on Narrows Road North at or near Neckar Avenue in Staten Island, New York. At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he brought his vehicle to a complete stop in the right lane and remained stopped for approximately 30 seconds when the rear of his vehicle was struck by the front of Defendant's vehicle. He further testified that he heard no horn or screeching of brakes before the collision.

At her deposition, Defendant testified that, when the incident occurred, she was operating her vehicle on Narrows Road North with non-party JXXXXX OXXXXX ("JO") in the front passenger seat. Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff's vehicle and her vehicle were the only vehicles involved, and that the front of her vehicle was impacted. However, Defendant testified that she did not see Plaintiff's vehicle at any point prior to the collision, does not know how the accident happened, and only recalls her vehicle striking the median. Defendant further testified that she lost consciousness as a result of the collision, stating that her last memory was hearing a direction from her global positioning system ("GPS") and then waking up to an emergency medical technician pulling her out of her vehicle. Defendant declined transport to the hospital.

Defendant did not testify to any sudden or improper stop by Plaintiff, any maneuver by a third vehicle, any mechanical failure, or any other emergency that would have prevented her from avoiding the collision. She did state that she believes Plaintiff may have "cut [her] off," but admitted she has no recollection of what happened.

Plaintiff claims that the accident exacerbated a pre-existing injury to his left knee, ultimately resulting in surgery to that knee in February 2024 and a diagnosis of "end-stage left knee osteoarthrosis with retained femoral and tibial hardware." Plaintiff also claims to have suffered injuries to his right knee, lumbar spine, cervical spine, and pelvic region. According to Plaintiff, he has been confined primarily to his bed and home since November 22, 2023 due to injuries sustained in this motor vehicle collision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when the movant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). If the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opponent to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (see id.; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court's function is issue finding rather than issue determination (see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]; see also Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18 [2d Dept 2011], citing Pearson v Dix McBride, LLC, 63 AD3d 895 [2d Dept 2009]). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be employed only when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues (Chiara v Town of New Castle, 126 AD3d 111, 125 [2d Dept 2015] citing Millerton Agway Co-op, Inc. v Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17 NY2d 57 [1966]).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability because his stopped vehicle was struck in the rear by Defendant's vehicle, and Defendant has not offered a non-negligent explanation for the collision. Plaintiff relies on his testimony that he was completely stopped for approximately 30 seconds when his vehicle was struck, that he heard no horn or screeching of brakes, and that Defendant's vehicle then hit the median when Defendant attempted to maneuver after the collision. Plaintiff also points to Defendant's testimony that she never saw his vehicle before the collision, has no recollection of the events immediately preceding the impact, and does not know what happened.

Defendant opposes the motion, arguing in general terms that issues of fact exist as to how the accident occurred, but she does not point to any admissible evidence contradicting Plaintiff's account of the collision. Defendant does not contend that Plaintiff made a sudden or improper stop, that a third vehicle cut in front of her, or that any mechanical defect or emergency impaired her ability to avoid the collision. While she stated a belief that Plaintiff may have "cut [her] off," she admitted during her deposition that she has no actual recollection of the events immediately preceding the impact. Her account is that she was driving, heard her GPS, and then realized an accident had occurred.

A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 AD3d 672 [2d Dept 2010]). It is well settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]). To rebut the presumption of negligence, the operator of the rear vehicle must provide a nonnegligent explanation for the collision, such as, but not limited to, sudden or unavoidable circumstances (see Munoz v Agenus, Inc., 207 AD3d 643 [2d Dept 2022]; see also D'Agostino v YRC, Inc., 120 AD3d 1291 [2d Dept 2014]).

A non-negligent explanation may include evidence of a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause (see DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp., 75 AD3d 489, 490 [2010]). A claimed sudden stop, standing alone, is generally insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence (see Volpe v Limoncelli, 74 AD3d 795, 796 [2d Dept 2010]).

Here, Defendant does not proffer any evidence that Plaintiff stopped short, that any vehicle cut in front of her, or that any mechanical problem or sudden emergency prevented her from avoiding the collision. Rather, her testimony is simply that she did not see Plaintiff's vehicle and does not know how the accident occurred, which is insufficient to rebut the rear-end presumption (see Munoz-Rosario v Padilla, 237 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2025], citing Thompson v Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 AD3d 588 [1st Dept 2019]; see also Nsiah-Ababio, 78 AD3d 672; Plummer v Nourddine, 82 AD3d 1069 [2d Dept 2011]).

On this record, Plaintiff has demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, and Defendant has failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.

The Court notes that Plaintiff did not move to strike Defendant's affirmative defenses in his notice of motion.

A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the absence of his or her own comparative negligence to be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, as such negligence is relevant to the mitigation of damages and is not a defense to the elements of the cause of action (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312, 321 [2018]; CPLR 1411). Because Plaintiff did not move to strike the affirmative defenses, the issue of any comparative negligence on the part of Plaintiff remains for determination at trial (see Karim v Proline Rental, LLC, 222 AD3d 851, 852 [2d Dept 2023]).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

II. Defendant's Cross-Motion on Threshold

Defendant cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff did not sustain a "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Plaintiff opposes, relying on his own affirmation, medical records, and the affirmed report of his orthopedic expert, Dr. Jerry Lubliner.

The Insurance Law defines "serious injury" as:

"[A] personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment (Insurance Law § 5102 [d])."

On a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal on "serious injury" grounds, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, through competent medical evidence, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as a result of the accident, or that any such injury is not causally related to the accident (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956—957 [1992]; Celiz v Careride Paratransit, LLC, 185 AD3d 645 [2d Dept 2020]). With respect to the 90/180-day category, a defendant must submit admissible evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was not prevented, for at least 90 of the first 180 days following the accident, from performing substantially all of the material acts constituting the plaintiff's usual and customary daily activities (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969 [2d Dept 2011]; Reynolds v Wai Sang Leung, 78 AD3d 919, 920 [2d Dept 2010]). Only if the defendant meets this prima facie burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324; see also Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 345, 352 [2002]).

The "significant limitation of use of a body function or system" category requires more than a minor, mild, or slight limitation, and the 90/180-day category requires proof that the plaintiff's usual activities were curtailed "to a great extent rather than some slight curtailment" (Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 236—237 [1982]).

To defeat a properly supported motion, a plaintiff must submit objective medical evidence of the extent or degree of the alleged physical limitations and their duration, either through quantified range-of-motion testing or a qualitative assessment with an objective basis, together with a causation opinion (see Toure, 98 NY2d at 350—351; Lopez v Senatore, 65 NY2d 1017, 1019—1020 [1985]). Whether objectively measured limitations are "significant" is generally a question of fact (see Lopez, 65 NY2d at 1019-1020; Bates v Peeples, 171 AD2d 635 [2d Dept 1991]).

Cervical and lumbar spine

As to the cervical and lumbar spine, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's injuries were minor and have fully resolved. In support of this contention, Defendant points to the October 2, 2021 emergency room records, which reflect that while Plaintiff complained of lower back, neck, and left shoulder pain, his physical examination showed a range of motion within normal limits and noted that he was able to walk without difficulty. Defendant further relies on the emergency room x-rays, which the record describes as showing no acute abnormality but revealing mild, multilevel degenerative changes. Defendant also submits the affirmed report of Dr. Alexandra Carrer, who examined Plaintiff in July 2024 and diagnosed his neck and back injuries as resolved sprains. While Dr. Carrer recorded reduced range of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine during her examination, she characterized those findings as "subjective" and dependent on Plaintiff's volition. Based on her review of the medical history and her physical examination, Dr. Carrer concluded that Plaintiff sustained only sprain-type injuries on top of pre-existing degenerative changes, and found no objective medical evidence of radiculopathy or a lasting disability to the cervical and lumbar spine related to the accident.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the medical evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to the cervical and lumbar spine. Plaintiff points to the magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") report from June 2022, which describes disc herniations in the lower back along with degenerative changes, and the affirmed report of Dr. Jerry Lubliner, who examined Plaintiff in October 2025. On examination, Dr. Lubliner found that Plaintiff's neck and lower back did not move through a full normal range relative to accepted normal values. He concluded that Plaintiff "has and will continue to have permanent recurrent pain in his neck and back," and that the accident of October 1, 2021 is a competent cause of those spine injuries and the need for treatment. Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Lubliner's causation opinion is grounded in his review of Plaintiff's emergency room records, the June 2022 lumbar MRI report, which indicates degenerative changes, the course of chiropractic treatment from October 2021 through October 2022, and subsequent orthopedic care, as well as the range-of-motion limitations measured at his 2025 examination.

Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant's submissions, which include the emergency room records and Dr. Carrer's report describing sprain-type injuries on a degenerative spine with no objective nerve damage, are sufficient to satisfy her initial burden on the spinal claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to his cervical and lumbar spine under the "significant limitation" and "permanent consequential limitation" categories. Plaintiff's proof includes a lumbar MRI report showing disc herniations and a course of post accident treatment for neck and back complaints.

Plaintiff also submits an orthopedist's affirmed report documenting reduced neck and back movement and opining that those limitations are related to the subject accident. This is the kind of objective medical showing, imaging plus measured range-of-motion limitations, that courts have held sufficient to create a question of fact on the serious injury threshold (see Toure, 98 NY2d at 350 351; Lopez, 65 NY2d at 1019-1020; Bates, 171 AD2d 635). While the medical records here also reflect underlying degenerative changes, Plaintiff's expert acknowledges those findings and nonetheless opines that the present neck and back limitations are causally related to the accident. On this record, whether the limitations stem from degeneration, trauma, or a combination of both is an issue for the trier of fact (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566 [2005]). Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spine claims.

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's proof is deficient because Dr. Lubliner's report failed to rule out or sufficiently address the degenerative findings noted in the emergency room records. In the Pommells case, as cited by Defendant, the Court of Appeals upheld dismissal because the plaintiff's own expert found that the plaintiff's pain and limitations were "entirely consistent" with the degenerative condition identified in an MRI, effectively failing to provide a medical basis to attribute the limitations to the accident rather than to those pre-existing conditions (see Pommells, 4 NY3d at 579-580).

Here, while Dr. Lubliner's report expressly notes the multilevel degenerative findings described in the 2021 records and 2022 lumbar MRI, he does not find the current pathology to be merely a byproduct of those pre-existing conditions. Instead, the Court finds that Dr. Lubliner sufficiently addressed these findings by opining, based on Plaintiff's medical history, a physical examination, and a review of the medical records, that the October 1, 2021 accident is the competent cause for the current need for treatment and the resulting permanent conditions related to Plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spine. By expressly attributing the clinical findings to the accident rather than to the pre existing degenerative changes seen on imaging, and by explaining that opinion with reference to objective medical evidence, Dr. Lubliner's report raises a triable issue of fact. This conflict between the competing medical opinions and evidence cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has clarified that the lack of a contemporaneous numerical quantification of range-of-motion limitations is not a prerequisite to proving a serious injury, and that objective clinical evidence shortly after the accident, such as the emergency room records and subsequent MRI, is sufficient to bridge the chain of causation to a later examination (see id. at 217-219). Consequently, the absence of specific range of motion deficits in the initial emergency room records here does not negate the medical opinion of Plaintiff's expert where the expert has provided a medical basis to attribute the limitations to the subject accident.

The Court notes that Dr. Lubliner's report reflects his review of the uncertified records and treatment notes of chiropractor Dr. James Louro. The report also reflects his review of certified emergency room and MRI records, and his own examination and quantified range-of-motion testing, and the Court does not rely on the uncertified chiropractic records as independent proof of injury or causation.

Finally, the Court notes that even where a defendant's examining physician attributes reduced range of motion to subjective effort or lack of volition, measurable limitations may still preclude summary judgment and require resolution by the trier of fact (see Mercado v Mendoza, 133 AD3d 833 [2d Dept 2015]; Manton v Lape, 173 AD3d 731 [2d Dept 2019]; Miller v Bratsilova, 118 AD3d 761 [2d Dept 2014]).

Right and left knees

With respect to Plaintiff's right and left knees, Defendant argues that the accident did not cause Plaintiff's knee conditions, including the 2024 left total knee replacement and subsequent manipulation under anesthesia, and relies on the report of her expert Dr. Alexandra Carrer.

Defendant points out that the emergency room records do not indicate any knee complaints or findings. Dr. Carrer notes that the first documented complaint of left knee pain was not until approximately one year after the accident, when Plaintiff was seen by a "Dr. Buxbaum" in September 2022, and that the first documented complaint of right knee pain was not until October 2022, when he was seen by a physical therapist. She further notes that Plaintiff then underwent total left knee replacement surgery in February 2024.

On examination, Dr. Carrer found range-of-motion limitations in both knees but characterized those findings as subjective because the movements were performed volitionally by Plaintiff. Dr. Carrer finds no objective evidence of internal structural damage in either knee and characterizes the right knee MRI findings as showing pre existing degenerative changes. In Dr. Carrer's opinion, the absence of contemporaneous knee complaints, the approximately one year delay before knee related treatment, and the lack of left knee imaging for review prevented her, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, from concluding that the 2024 left total knee replacement was performed as a result of the accident. She added that the treatment gap caused her to question causality for both knees and that she found no objective evidence of disability or permanency related to this accident.

Plaintiff testifies that both knees struck the steering wheel in the collision, that he immediately felt knee pain, and that he communicated that to the emergency room staff even though the knees were not documented. He further concedes that his chiropractor did not treat his knees, but claims that his knee pain persisted and worsened until he sought orthopedic care. Plaintiff claims that despite his pre-accident surgeries, his left knee was back to normal before the subject accident, and that afterwards his knee pain became more constant. According to Plaintiff, because his symptoms continued, he underwent a total left knee replacement in February 2024, followed in April 2024 by a manipulation under anesthesia for post-operative stiffness.

Plaintiff further relies on the affirmed report of Dr. Lubliner, based on an October 2025 examination. At that time, Dr. Lubliner documented visible and objective findings in the left knee, including a long vertical surgical scar, range-of-motion limitations, weakness, and swelling. While acknowledging the pre accident surgical history and degenerative changes, he opines that the October 1, 2021 collision was a competent cause of the left knee injury, the need for the total knee replacement in 2024, and the subsequent manipulation. Dr. Lubliner finds that Plaintiff has and will continue to have "permanent scarring of the left knee, permanent loss of range of motion of the left knee, permanent swelling of the left knee, permanent weakness of the left leg and permanent limitation of his activities of daily living."

The Court notes that Dr. Lubliner, in his report, does not offer a causation opinion linking any condition affecting Plaintiff's right knee to the accident. Furthermore, he conducted x-rays of Plaintiff's knees on the date of examination, and with respect to the right knee only notes a finding of "mild arthritis".

On this record, Defendant has met her initial prima facie burden on the knee claims. Defendant submits admissible medical evidence of significant pre existing knee pathology, including prior ACL reconstruction and degenerative changes. She also relies on Dr. Carrer's affirmed report, which notes the approximately one year delay before Plaintiff's first documented knee complaints and the absence of contemporaneous knee findings in the emergency room records. Dr. Carrer further emphasizes that there was no left knee imaging available for her review and no objective evidence of internal structural damage or accident related permanency. This showing is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to serious injury and causation (see Toure, 98 NY2d at 352—353; Pommells, 4 NY3d at 572—573).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to the left knee. Plaintiff offers his sworn account that he fully recovered from his left knee surgeries before the accident, along with a documented post accident course of worsening symptoms and treatment culminating in a total knee replacement and subsequent manipulation. He also submits Dr. Lubliner's affirmed opinion that the October 1, 2021 collision was a competent cause of his current left knee pain, loss of motion, and functional limitations. When considered against Dr. Carrer's contrary conclusions, this evidence constitutes competing medical proof that must be resolved by the trier-of-fact (see Perl, 18 NY3d at 218 219).

With respect to the right knee, Defendant's submissions, including Dr. Carrer's findings of pre existing degenerative changes based on the MRI report, the absence of objective evidence of internal derangement, and the approximately one year delay before any right knee complaint, are sufficient, albeit without an express negative causation opinion, to shift the burden to Plaintiff to come forward with competent medical proof of a causal connection between the accident and any claimed serious injury to his right knee (see Pommells, 4 NY3d at 574—575; Toure, 98 NY2d 345; Seck v Minigreen Hacking Corp., 53 AD3d 608 [2d Dept 2008]). Plaintiff, however, offers no medical opinion or evidence attributing his right knee condition to the subject collision or supporting a finding of a "serious injury" to the right knee within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see id.). In the absence of such proof, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the right knee, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's right knee claim (see Toure, 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy, 79 NY2d 955).

90/180 Day Category

With respect to the 90/180 day category, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show that, for at least 90 of the first 180 days following the accident, he was prevented from performing substantially all of the material acts constituting his usual and customary daily activities. Defendant relies on the emergency room records, which reflect that Plaintiff was treated conservatively and discharged the same day with instructions that he could return to work in two to three days, and on Plaintiff's testimony and counsel's affirmation acknowledging that Plaintiff did not initially stop working, but continued his self employed carpentry, and did not cease working altogether until he began active knee treatment in late 2023. Although Defendant's examining orthopedist Dr. Carrer does not offer a specific opinion regarding Plaintiff's condition during the first 180 days after the accident, her report, together with the contemporaneous emergency room documentation and Plaintiff's own account of his work history, addresses Plaintiff's functional capacity during that period and is sufficient to satisfy Defendant's prima facie burden on this category (see Licari, 57 NY2d at 238; Gaddy, 79 NY2d at 958; DeFilippo v White, 101 AD2d 801, 802-803 [2d Dept 1984]).

In opposition, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of fact. While Plaintiff avers that he eventually reduced his workload and turned down certain jobs, he testified that he did not miss any work as a result of the accident until November 2023. He further acknowledges that he continued his full-time employment as a self-employed carpenter for more than two years before the 2024 knee surgery. Notably, Plaintiff offers no evidence that he was prevented from performing any specific daily living activities during the relevant 180-day period immediately following the subject accident. His vague claim of turning down unspecified jobs while maintaining his usual work schedule for two years does not constitute a curtailment of substantially all of his material acts within the meaning of the statute (see id.).

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claim under the 90/180 day category of serious injury.

DECISION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Motion # 2) for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's cross motion (Motion # 3) for summary judgment is granted to the extent that (1) all claims of serious injury relating to the right knee are dismissed, and (2) all claims under the 90/180 day category of serious injury are dismissed as to all alleged injuries; and it is further

The matter shall proceed to trial on the issues of comparative negligence and damages with respect to the alleged injuries to Plaintiff's cervical spine, lumbar spine, and left knee.

Paul Marrone, Jr., J.