PEOPLE v. VILSAINT (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (David S. Zuckerman, J.), rendered February 6, 2018, convicting him of attempted assault in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted assault in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree.

The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946;  People v. Lewis, 96 A.D.3d 878, 878, 946 N.Y.S.2d 206).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672;  People v. Silverstein, 236 A.D.3d 827, 829, 229 N.Y.S.3d 212).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Greenland, 243 A.D.3d 587, 588, 243 N.Y.S.3d 161;  People v. Gallardo, 234 A.D.3d 986, 986–987, 226 N.Y.S.3d 288;  People v. Colon, 275 A.D.2d 797, 797, 713 N.Y.S.2d 738).

The County Court properly determined that the defendant knowingly waived his right to counsel.  “A court must determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is made competently, intelligently, and voluntarily before allowing that defendant to represent himself or herself” (People v. Hall, 244 A.D.3d 753, 754, 244 N.Y.S.3d 739;  see People v. Webb, 172 A.D.3d 920, 921, 100 N.Y.S.3d 66).  “To ascertain whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a court must undertake a searching inquiry designed to insur[e] that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel” (People v. Stroud, 144 A.D.3d 1056, 1057, 40 N.Y.S.3d 910 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Brooks, 200 A.D.3d 904, 905, 155 N.Y.S.3d 345).  “The court's inquiry must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication” (People v. Hall, 244 A.D.3d at 755, 244 N.Y.S.3d 739 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d 1143, 1144, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711).

Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, in response to the defendant's request to proceed pro se, the County Court engaged in a searching inquiry and questioned the defendant as to his education, legal knowledge and experience, and prior exposure to the criminal justice system.  The court adequately informed the defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, drew the defendant's attention to the many challenges that he would face if he proceeded pro se, and apprised him of the benefits and the singular importance of representation by counsel in the adversarial system of adjudication.  Moreover, the defendant had the benefit of standby counsel during the colloquy, conferred with standby counsel, and steadfastly maintained his desire to proceed pro se throughout the proceeding.  Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se (see People v. Smith, 187 A.D.3d 944, 944, 132 N.Y.S.3d 431;  People v. Cucchiara, 174 A.D.3d 816, 816, 105 N.Y.S.3d 531).

The defendant's contention that the County Court, by the sentence it imposed, penalized him for exercising his right to a trial, is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit (see People v. Hurley, 75 N.Y.2d 887, 888, 554 N.Y.S.2d 469, 553 N.E.2d 1017;  People v. Dragani, 204 A.D.3d 690, 691, 166 N.Y.S.3d 253).  The record does not reflect that the court exercised any retaliation or vindictiveness against the defendant for electing to proceed to trial (see People v. Bradshaw, 229 A.D.3d 563, 564, 214 N.Y.S.3d 167;  People v. Garcia, 222 A.D.3d 659, 660, 201 N.Y.S.3d 181).  Forever, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

CONNOLLY, J.P., WARHIT, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur.