PEOPLE v. CARDOZA (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Christopher G. Quinn, J.), rendered June 25, 2024, convicting him of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and criminal trespass in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, his due process rights were not violated by the Supreme Court's failure to dismiss the counts of the indictment charging him with assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05[3] ) and resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), for which he was ultimately acquitted. As an initial matter, the court did not err in its determination not to dismiss those counts, as there was legally sufficient evidence to support them (see People v. Shorter, 226 A.D.3d 932, 209 N.Y.S.3d 511;  People v. Alman, 185 A.D.3d 714, 717, 126 N.Y.S.3d 730).  In any event, the defendant fails to demonstrate that his due process rights were violated by the submission of those counts to the jury (see People v. Paucar, 242 A.D.3d 1220, 1221, 244 N.Y.S.3d 255). The defendant's reliance upon People v. De Jesus (42 N.Y.2d 519, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752) is misplaced, as it is factually inapposite to the case at bar. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the jury's consideration of counts upon which the defendant was ultimately acquitted constituted the “interjection of extraneous considerations [which] unfairly burdened the defendant” (id. at 524, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court imposed a harsher sentence as punishment for exercising his right to a jury trial is without merit. “[T]he fact that the sentence imposed after trial was greater than the sentence offered during plea negotiations is not, standing alone, an indication that the defendant was punished for proceeding to trial․ There is no indication in the record that the sentence is the result of vindictiveness or retribution for the defendant ‘s refusal to accept a plea offer and the exercise of his right to a jury trial” (People v. Tyme, 222 A.D.3d 783, 785, 202 N.Y.S.3d 234;  see People v. Matthews, 195 A.D.3d 864, 866, 145 N.Y.S.3d 829). To the contrary, the record reflects that the court relied upon, inter alia, a presentence investigative report prepared by the Department of Probation in sentencing the defendant to a higher sentence than that which he was offered during plea negotiations (see People v. Matthews, 195 A.D.3d at 866, 145 N.Y.S.3d 829). Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.