PEOPLE v. YANG (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Michael Gary, J.), rendered November 16, 2016, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that his conviction of grand larceny in the third degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence is unpreserved for appellate review, as his motion to dismiss made at the close of evidence was not sufficiently specific (see People v. Jhagroo, 186 A.D.3d 741, 743, 127 N.Y.S.3d 294;  People v. James, 35 A.D.3d 762, 762, 825 N.Y.S.2d 776).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of grand larceny in the third degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Robinson, 60 N.Y.2d 982, 983, 471 N.Y.S.2d 258, 459 N.E.2d 483;  People v. Olivo, 52 N.Y.2d 309, 318, 438 N.Y.S.2d 242, 420 N.E.2d 40).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon viewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on the count of grand larceny in the third degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The defendant failed to raise any constitutional objections to the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413), and, therefore, to the extent that the defendant now raises constitutional claims, they are unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Grant, 7 N.Y.3d 421, 424, 823 N.Y.S.2d 757, 857 N.E.2d 52;  People v. Noble, 211 A.D.3d 970, 973, 180 N.Y.S.3d 262).  In any event, the defendant's contentions regarding the court's Sandoval ruling are without merit, as the ruling reflected a proper balance between the “probative value” of the defendant's prior convictions on the issue of his credibility and the danger of “impermissible prejudice” to the defendant (People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 377, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413;  see People v. Skinner, 195 A.D.3d 952, 952–953, 146 N.Y.S.3d 518).

The defendant's contention that the sentence imposed was excessive has been rendered academic (see People v. Nicholson, 31 A.D.3d 468, 469, 817 N.Y.S.2d 638), since the maximum expiration date of his post-release supervision has passed (see People v. Jackson, 231 A.D.3d 966, 966, 218 N.Y.S.3d 473;  People v. Reyes–Lopez, 189 A.D.3d 1269, 1269, 134 N.Y.S.3d 218).

BARROS, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.