IN RE: Adelaide MACKEY (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Caterina De Peralta, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated October 1, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, granted that branch of the father's petition which was for sole physical custody of the parties’ child and denied those branches of the mother's petition which were for sole physical custody of the parties’ child and for permission to relocate with the parties’ child to Maryland.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties are the parents of one child, born in 2015.  In September 2023, the father commenced a proceeding, inter alia, for sole physical custody of the child.  In October 2023, the mother commenced a separate proceeding, among other things, for sole physical custody of the child and for permission to relocate with the child to Maryland.  After a hearing, in an order dated October 1, 2024, the Family Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the father's petition which was for sole physical custody of the child and denied those branches of the mother's petition which were for sole physical custody of the child and for permission to relocate with the child to Maryland.  The mother appeals.

“The paramount consideration in any custody dispute is the best interests of the child” (Matter of Pacheco v. Maldonado, 221 A.D.3d 822, 822, 199 N.Y.S.3d 670 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260).  “The determination of the child's best interests is to be made based on all the relevant circumstances” (Matter of Chung v. Toppin, 209 A.D.3d 647, 648, 174 N.Y.S.3d 868 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  “In determining the child's best interests, the court must consider, among other things, (1) which alternative will best promote stability;  (2) the available home environments;  (3) the past performance of each parent;  (4) each parent's relative fitness, including his or her ability to guide the child, provide for the child's overall well being, and foster the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent;  and (5) the child's desires” (Rosenstock v. Rosenstock, 162 A.D.3d 702, 703, 78 N.Y.S.3d 384 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 172–173, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260).  “Since the Family Court's determination with respect to custody and parental access depends to a great extent upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, its findings are generally accorded great deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Bristow v. Patrice, 221 A.D.3d 684, 685, 199 N.Y.S.3d 629).

“ ‘A parent seeking to relocate with a child bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed move would be in the child's best interests’ ” (Matter of Squillini v. Tomasovich, 213 A.D.3d 943, 944, 182 N.Y.S.3d 652, quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 134 A.D.3d 688, 689, 20 N.Y.S.3d 427).  “In determining whether a proposed move is in a child's best interests, courts are ‘free to consider and give appropriate weight to all of the factors that may be relevant to the determination’ ” (id., quoting Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 740, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575, 665 N.E.2d 145).  “In the context of an initial custody determination, however, the strict application of the factors relevant to a relocation petition is not required” (id. at 945, 182 N.Y.S.3d 652;  see Joseph P.A. v. Martha A., 237 A.D.3d 1146, 1147, 230 N.Y.S.3d 741).

Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court's determination that an award of sole physical custody of the child to the father was in the child's best interests has a sound and substantial basis in the record.  The record established, inter alia, that since his birth the eight-year-old child lived with the father and the paternal grandmother in a stable home where the child's special needs had been met and that the father facilitated regular contact between the child and the mother since the mother relocated to Maryland (see Matter of Martinez v. Toole, 239 A.D.3d 855, 857, 234 N.Y.S.3d 284;  Matter of Paisley v. Moonsammy, 213 A.D.3d 941, 942, 182 N.Y.S.3d 671).

Accordingly, the Family Court properly granted that branch of the father's petition which was for sole physical custody of the child and denied those branches of the mother's petition which were for sole physical custody of the child and for permission to relocate with the child to Maryland.

DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.